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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, organizations produce a huge amount of sensitive data, such as personal
information, financial data, and electronic health records. Consequently, the amount of
digital data produced has increased correspondingly and often overwhelmed the data stor-
age capacity of many organizations. The management of such a large amount of data in
local storage system is difficult and incurs high expenses because of high-capacity storage
systems needed and the expert personnel to manage them. Although the cost of storage
hardware has tremendously decreased in recent years, about 75% of the total ownership
cost is still assigned to manage data storage. It is not surprising, therefore, that cloud com-
puting is now embraced as a key technology to provide a convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources, and demands minimum ser-
vice provider interaction or management effort. Organizations now have an option to
outsource their data to cloud storage to decrease the burden on local data storage and also
to reduce maintenance cost. Although the cloud offers tangible benefits to data owners,
outsourcing data to a remote server and delegating management of data to an untrusted
cloud service provider, can lead to loss of physical control over the data. To the clients, the
cloud is inherently neither secure nor reliable and this poses new challenges to the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in cloud computing. Without a local copy
of the data, traditional integrity verification techniques such as hash functions and signa-
tures are inapplicable in the cloud storage. Also, it is impossible to download a large-size
file from the cloud storage. The situation is made worse when users access data using
their mobile devices. In this context, a more efficient technique is required to remotely
verify the integrity of the outsourced data in the cloud. In this research, a new remote
data auditing method is proposed for securing data storage in cloud computing based
on an algebraic signature. This signature allows the auditor to check data possession in
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cloud storage, and this incurs fewer computational overheads on the auditor and server
in comparison to Homomorphic cryptosystem. Moreover, a new data structure – Divide
and Conquer Table (D&CT) – is designed to efficiently update the outsourced data dy-
namically by performing insert, append, delete, and modify operations by the data owner.
Furthermore, the proposed method is implemented in the real environment to prove the
security, justify the performance of our method, and compare with the most familiar and
the stat-of-the-art data auditing methods on the basis of computation and communica-
tion cost. It is found that by employing the proposed RDA method the computational
and communication costs of data integrity is reduced. D&CT data structure reduces the
computation cost of data update for normal and large-scale files markedly. Hence, the
proposed RDA provides an efficient and secure solution for mobile cloud computing.
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ABSTRAk
Dalam dunia hari ini, organisasi menghasilkan sejumlah besar data sensitif seperti
maklumat peribadi, data kewangan, dan rekod kesihatan elektronik. Kepesatan generasi
data digital telah mendahului keupayaan penyimpanan organisasi itu sendiri. Pengurusan
sejumlah besar data adalah sukar untuk disimpan sendiri dan telah meningkatkan per-
belanjaan yang tinggi terhadap organisasi kerana memerlukan sistem penyimpanan yang
berkapasiti tinggi serta kakitangan yang terlatih. Walaupun kos perkakasan penyimpanan
semakin berkurangan, pengurusan simpanan besar itu adalah lebih kompleks yang mana
merupakan kira-kira 75% daripada jumlah kos pemilikan. Akibatnya, kebanyakan organ-
isasi cuba untuk menggunakan data penyumberan luar kerana ia mengurangkan beban
penyimpanan data tempatan dan mengurangkan kos penyelenggaraan. Apabila peng-
guna awan menyumber luar data di pelayan capaian jauh, kawalan fizikal ke atas data
itu dilepaskan dan pengurusan data tersebut diserahkan kepada Penyedia Perkhidmatan
Awan yang tidak boleh dipercayai. Oleh kerana Perkomputeran awan itu pada asasnya
tidak selamat serta tidak boleh dipercayai pada pandangan pelanggan, ia menimbulkan
cabaran baru kepada integriti data dalam perkomputeran awan. Walau bagaimanapun,
teknik pengesahan integriti secara tradisional, seperti fungsi hash dan tandatangan adalah
tidak berkenaan dalam perkomputeran awan kerana ketidakupayaan untuk menyimpan
data salinan tempatan. Sebaliknya, muat turun fail saiz besar adalah tidak praktikal.
Keadaan yang dinyatakan di atas menjadi lebih teruk apabila pengguna mengakses data
dengan menggunakan peranti mudah alih sumber terhad. Oleh itu, teknik yang cekap
diperlukan dari jauh bagi mengesahkan integriti data yang disumber luar dalam perkom-
puteran awan. Dalam kajian ini, kami mencadangkan satu skim pengauditan data jauh
baru untuk menjamin penyimpanan data dalam perkomputeran awan. Kami juga merek-
abentuk struktur data baru yang membolehkan pemilik data dengan cekap mengemaskini
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data yang disumber luar secara dinamik dengan melakukan sisipan, menambah, memo-
tong, mengubah suai dan operasi. Selain itu, kami menguji skim ini untuk memastikan ke-
selamatan, kewajaran pelaksanaan kaedah ini, dan membandingkan dengan kaedah pen-
gauditan data stat-of-the-art berdasarkan asas pengiraan dan kos komunikasi.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the research work by presenting the statement of
problem, objectives of the research, and describing the methodology used for the re-
search. Section 1.2 justifies the motivations for the research and explains the significant
of the proposed work. Section 1.3 presents the problem statement by emphasizing on the
security issues in the data outsourcing frameworks. Section 1.4 states the research objec-
tives, and Section 1.5 gives an overview on the adopted methodology for the proposed
research. Finally, the layout of the thesis is presented in Section 1.6.
1.1 Background
Cloud Computing is a new model of computing over a shared pool of computing
resources such as network bandwidth, servers, storage, processing power, applications,
and services (Armbrust et al., 2010; Mell & Grance, 2011). Today, this new paradigm has
become popular and is receiving a lot of attention from researchers in the academic and
industrial communities. A recent survey indicates that more than 79% of organizations
attempt to utilize data outsourcing because it relieves the burden of local data storage and
reduce the maintenance cost (Buyya, Yeo, Venugopal, Broberg, & Brandic, 2009; Khan,
Kiah, Khan, Madani, & ur Rehman Khan, 2013). Moreover, the users are able to access
information from anywhere and at anytime, and on any device. (C. Wang, Wang, Ren, &
Lou, 2009; Xie, Wang, Yin, & Meng, 2007).
Although cloud computing offers several advantages for users (such as on-demand,
affordable, elasticity, ubiquitous resource access and measured service), there are some
security concerns that prevent a full adoption of this new technology, such as data in-
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Figure 1.1: Cloud Computing Challenges (Gens, 2010)
tegrity, confidentiality, and availability (Chow et al., 2009; Zhibin & Dijiang, 2012). This
is because the major challenge in cloud computing is related to security of data and in-
frastructure.
International Data Corporation (IDC) recently conducted a survey about the chal-
lenges and issues of cloud computing (Christiansen, Kolodgy, Hudson, Pintal, & IDC,
2010). The survey indicates, on the basis of user concerns, the cloud computing chal-
lenges are as follows: enough ability to customize, capability to integrate with in-house
IT, interoperability standards, cost, performance, availability, and security. Among these
cloud computing challenges, security represents 87.5% of users’ cloud fears that justify
the important of security in terms of users’ perspective. Figure 1.1 shows the results of
the IDC survey indicates the cloud computing challenges, and the different percentages
of users’ cloud fears (Gens, 2010).
After outsourcing the data to the remote clouds, the cloud users need to be ensured
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that the data remains intact. It is because the physical control is taken away over the
data, and the management of the data is delegated to the cloud service provider as an
untrusted party (Wei et al., 2013). Even though the cloud resources are more reliable
and have more powerful infrastructure than personal computer, the data in the cloud is
still vulnerable to many inside and outside threats. Such threats might compromise the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Zhifeng & Yang, 2013). For example,
the Byzantine failure is a type of internal attack that may be made by hardware errors or
the cloud maintenance personnel’s misbehaviors, while external attacks could be ranging
from natural disasters, like fire and earthquake, to adversaries’ malicious hacking. More-
over, if the adversaries gain the control of the cloud server, they have the capability to
launch the forge attack or the replay attack which aims to break the linear independence
among encoded data, by replacing the data stored in the corrupted cloud server with old
encoded data. As a result, the integrity of cloud users’ data stored on the server is at
risk. However, traditional integrity verification techniques, such as hash functions and
signatures are inapplicable in cloud computing because the data owner no longer physical
possess the stored data (Ateniese, Pietro, Mancini, & Tsudik, 2008). On the other hand,
downloading of possibly a large-size file is impractical. The aforementioned situation
worsens when users are accessing data using mobile devices.
As a conclusion, the cloud users require a reliable audit service to remotely audit the
integrity of the outsourced data within the cloud (H. Chen & Lee, 2013). However, due
to the externalized aspect of outsourcing data in cloud and mobile cloud computing, it
is highly challenging to protect the integrity and privacy of data, secure access to appli-
cations and information, and support data and service availability. This research focuses
on the remote data auditing methods to securely and efficiently verify the integrity of the
data over a cloud managed by the untrustworthy provider without having to retrieve the
data.
3
1.2 Motivation
In today’s world, the organizations produce a huge volume of sensitive data, such
as personal information, financial data, and electronic health records. The rate of pro-
ducing digital data consecutively is increasing and overtaking the storage ability of many
organizations. The management of such a large amount of data locally is difficult and
incurs high expenses on the organizations because of the requirement of high-capacity
storage systems and expert personnel. Despite the fact that the cost of storage hardware is
decreasing, the management of such huge storage is more complex and requires approxi-
mately 75% of the total ownership cost (Singh & Liu, 2008; Y. Chen & Sion, 2011). As
a result, most of the organizations attempt to utilize data outsourcing to overcome such
difficulties (Buyya et al., 2009).
However, since that data owners delegate the control over the data to an untrusted
cloud service provider (CSP), it raises new challenges to the integrity of data in cloud
computing systems (Cong, Kui, Wenjing, & Jin, 2010; Wei et al., 2013). A wide range of
internal and external security challenges has the capability to endanger the cloud infras-
tructures. Such threats might compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
data (Khan, Mat Kiah, Khan, & Madani, 2013; Q. Wang, Wang, Li, Ren, & Lou, 2009;
Zhifeng & Yang, 2013). In recent times, various companies reported data corruption
in servers with major cloud infrastructure providers, and many events of cloud service
outages, such as, Amazon Simple Storage Service breakdown (Gohring, 2008), Gmail
mass deletion (Arrington, 2006), sidekick cloud disaster (Cellan-Jones, 2009), and Ama-
zon EC2 service outage (Miller, 2010; Whittaker, 2012). Moreover, the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse (PRC) reports more than 535 data breaches during 2013, namely: breach-
ing of the cloud-based email service providers in Epsilon (Storm, 2011), compromising
Sony PlayStation Network (L. B. Baker & Finkle, 2011), Sony Online Entertainment,
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and Sony Pictures, stealing customers’ information on EMC’s RSA, and stealing of 3.3
million patients’ medical data of Sutter Physicians Services (Schwartz, 2012).
Data breach poses crucial threats to the outsourced data in cloud storage wherein an
individual’s name plus a medical record and/or a financial record or debit card is poten-
tially put at risk (W. Baker et al., 2011). Data breach usually occurs in different enterprises
for a reason of malicious or criminal attack, system glitch, or human error. Ponemon In-
stitute under the sponsorship of IBM has issued its annual report about cost of the data
breach from more than 250 organizations of the eleven countries participated in 2014,
such as Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United
States and, for the first time, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The research
shows that the U.S. experienced the highest total average cost of the data breach at more
than $5.85 million, followed by Germany at $4.74 million. In sharp contrast, Brazilian
and Indian companies experienced the lowest total average cost at $1.61 million and $1.37
million, respectively ("Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis," 2014). Figure 1.2
illustrates the average organizational cost of data breach varies by country in 2013 and
2014.
As a conclusion, the cloud is inherently neither secure nor reliable from the view
point of the clients. Recently, a number of remote data auditing framework are proposed
to verify the integrity of the outsourced data in the cloud storage (Ateniese et al., 2011;
Erway, Küpçü, Papamanthou, & Tamassia, 2009; Yang & Jia, 2013). Although the tra-
ditional remote data auditing methods preserve the integrity of data, they suffer from the
following issues: (1) They incur high computation cost on the data owner or the autho-
rized auditor; (2) Most of them are unable to support dynamic data updated caused for
imposing additional computation and communication cost on the data owner; and (3) By
increasing the size of file, the existing data auditing methods incur huge computation cost
on the auditor due to the applied data structure on them.
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Figure 1.2: The average total organizational cost of data breach over two years ("Cost of
Data Breach Study: Global Analysis," 2014)
This thesis addresses these security issues by proposing a secure and reliable remote
data auditing method to check the integrity of the outsourced data based on algebraic
signature properties. We also present the design of a new data structure that efficiently
supports dynamic data operations such as append, insert, modify and delete. Moreover,
this data structure empowers our method to be applicable for large-scale data storage with
minimum computation cost.
1.3 Statement of Problem
When cloud users store data in remote servers and delete a local copy of data, the
physical control over the data is under risk due to the management of data is delegated
to a semi-trusted CSP. As a result, the data owners (who outsourced data to the cloud
storage) need to use the remote data auditing techniques to securely prove the intactness
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of the data resides in cloud storage administrated by semi-trustworthy service provider
without downloading the whole data. The remote data auditing methods requires frequent
auditing which involves many processes and frequency includes transmission processes.
Consequently, the remote data auditing method incurs additional cost due to processing
time and transmission processes on the data owner, which is a significant burden for
many data owners especially when they use the mobile devices with restricted computing
resources (CPU).
Nowadays, many of organizations that produce a huge volume of large-scale data,
prefer to archive the data in the cloud storage to reduce the maintenance cost. These
organizations must have capability to perform the update operations (delete, insert and
modify) on the outsourced data rarely. The RDA methods also have to dynamically sup-
port data update operation without downloading the whole data blocks or modifying the
rest of blocks. To achieve this goal, the existing RDA methods use different type of data
structure (e.g. binary tree) to prove that the outsourced data remains intact. However,
the applied data structures in the traditional RDA methods are unable to effectively sup-
port dynamic data update operations for large-scale data. In other words, when the size
of the outsource file is large, to update a small number of data blocks, the data owner
requires re-balancing huge number of data blocks in the data structure. Therefore, the
traditional remote data auditing methods incur noticeable processing time on the auditor
for rearranging such huge number of blocks.
In contrast to store archival data in the cloud that require rare update operation,
there exist some large-scales data with specific application (e.g. business transactions
and online social networks), which are intrinsically liable to frequent data update from
users (Liu et al., 2014). However, supporting such frequent data update operations using
traditional remote data auditing methods result in considerable amount of computation
cost for the auditor. This is because the auditor requires rearranging the large number
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of data blocks within data structure for several times. As a result, designing a new data
structure to support frequent dynamic update for large scale data is imperative.
1.4 Statement of Objectives
We aim to propose an effective remote data auditing method for cloud computing to
minimize computational and communication cost of frequent data auditing. The objec-
tives of the research are listed as follows.
• To study the state-of-the-art methods for auditing data in single and distributed
cloud server and investigate the additional computation and communication cost in
current remote data auditing methods.
• To propose an efficient remote data auditing method for data storage in cloud com-
puting which minimizes computation and communication cost on client and cloud
server.
• To design an effective dynamic remote data auditing scheme for various volume of
data (e.g. normal and large-scale) by introducing a new data structure.
• To evaluate the proposed method by using mathematical modeling and testing in the
emulation environment and validate the performance by benchmarking and com-
paring the result of different experimental scenarios.
1.5 Proposed Methodology
We describe a literature review of the remote data auditing techniques in a single and
distributed cloud server. Remote Data Auditing refers to a sampling of the collected data
in the cloud and evaluating the data with various criteria, such as validity, accuracy, and
integrity as a way to verify the reliability of the storage provider. The thematic taxonomy
of the single and distributed storage auditing schemes are also presented. We identify
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the issues and problems of the existing remote data auditing frameworks, which directly
affects on the clients and cloud server and impedes the optimization goals of auditing
schemes for cloud and mobile cloud computing.
The research problem is investigated by using quantitative analysis on the developed
private cloud for checking computation, communication and storage overhead of the static
remote data auditing. Therefore, the static remote data auditing method (Ateniese et
al., 2007, 2011) is implemented by using the C language and the effects of dynamic
data update is evaluated on it. To investigate the effect of data update operations on the
dynamic remote data update methods (Q. A. Wang, Wang, Ren, Lou, & Li, 2011; Yang &
Jia, 2013), their data structures are implemented by using C++ and Java language. We use
different file size to explore the computation time and communication cost of the dynamic
data update in different scenarios.
We propose a novel remote data auditing framework for cloud computing to address
the issues of existing auditing schemes. We also design a new data structure to efficiently
support dynamic data operations, such as insert, append, delete, and modify operations.
As a result of implementing this data structure, the proposed model is applicable for
auditing large scale data storage dynamically.
The performance of the proposed model is evaluated by using mathematical model-
ing. We also validate the proposed model by using synthetic workload for mobile devices.
We set up our own Eucalyptus private Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud in order to
conduct the experiment. The experimental data are collected by implementing the frame-
work in different scenarios to evaluate the computation and communication overhead on
the auditor and cloud server.
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Figure 1.3: Outline of the thesis
1.6 Layout of Thesis
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Every chapter of this thesis is divided into
three parts; Introduction – to state the objective of the chapter; Material – to present the
main body of the chapter; Conclusion is a judgment or evaluation of the chapter objective
achievement and linkage to the next chapter. Figure 1.3 presents the outline on this study.
Chapter 2: Review of Literature.
This chapter presents a review of the state-of-the-art remote data auditing techniques
in single and distributed cloud server domains. The objective of this chapter is to high-
light issues and challenges to current RDA protocols in the cloud and the mobile cloud
computing. The thematic taxonomy of the data storage auditing is presented based on
significant parameters, such as security patterns, objective functions, auditing mode, up-
10
date mode, and dynamic data structure. The state-of-the-art RDA approaches that have
not received much coverage in the literature are also critically analyzed and classified into
three groups: provable data possession, proof of retrievability, and proof of ownership to
present a taxonomy. It also investigates similarities and differences in such methods and
discusses to diagnose significant and outstanding issues for further investigation.
Chapter 3: Problem Analysis.
This chapter explores the computation and communication overhead of the remote
data auditing scheme on the client and cloud sides to justify the research problem. We ex-
amine the additional overhead of dynamic data update operations by using the emulation
environment. The measurement parameters for problem analysis include computation
cost, and communication cost of during the verification phase, computation and commu-
nication overhead for updating a block in static and dynamic methods; computation cost
of frequent data updates for normal file size, and computation cost of updating large-scale
files.
Chapter 4: Remote Data Auditing Method.
This chapter presents the method used to achieve the objective of the research. It
outlines and streamlines the proposed framework for auditing data storage and elucidates
the architecture of the proposed model. A new data structure is also designed that is called
divide and conquer table to effectively support dynamic data update operations in block
level, such as: modification, insert, delete, and append. This data structure empowers the
proposed method to be applicable for auditing large-scale file size.
Chapter 5: Evaluation.
This chapter clarifies techniques that are used to experiment and presents the data
collection for evaluating the computation and communication cost of the proposed method
in distinctive phases, such as: setup, challenge, response, and verification. It also ex-
plains the setup environment, programming tools that are used to implement the pro-
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posed method, the measures that are used to check the effectiveness, and the method used
to processing the data.
Chapter 6: Result and Discussion.
The aim of result and discussion chapter is to show the advantage of the proposed
remote data auditing method, the dynamicity feature for normal and large-scale files, and
evaluate the performance of this method. To achieve these goals, the performance and
usefulness of the proposed method are presented by analyzing the experimented results.
This chapter analyze the security and correctness of the proposed remote data auditing
construction. Furthermore, the experiential result of the computation cost and computa-
tion of the proposed method in different phases are explained base on distinctive parame-
ters. The significant and validation of the proposed method is also discussed by analyzing
and comparing the result in different scenarios.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis by reporting on the addressed objectives of the
thesis. Moreover, it presents the finding of the research and focusing on the significant
of the proposed method. The scope, limitations and directions for future research this
research is also explained in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the existing remote data storage auditing schemes to verify
the integrity of outsourced data in the single cloud server domain. The objective of this
chapter is to highlight issues and challenges to current RDA protocols in the cloud and the
mobile cloud computing. It discusses the thematic taxonomy of RDA based on significant
parameters such as security requirements, security metrics, security level, auditing mode,
and update mode. The state-of-the-art RDA approaches that have not received much
coverage in the literature are also critically analyzed and classified into three groups of
provable data possession, proof of retrievability, and proof of ownership to present a
taxonomy. It also investigates similarities and differences in such methods and discusses
open research issues as the future directions in RDA research.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the fundamental concepts
of cloud computing and mobile cloud computing. Section 2.3 discusses the concept of
RDA, and explains the architecture of remote data auditing schemes. Section 2.4 tax-
onomizes and reviews the state-of-the-art RDA approaches and investigates the critical
aspects of the current auditing schemes. Section 2.5 provides a comparison of the current
RDA techniques by using the similarities and differences of the significant parameters
presented within the taxonomy. Section 2.6 focuses on the issues and challenges in cur-
rent RDAs. Finally, section 2.7 concludes the paper with future directives.
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2.2 Background
This section describes the concepts of cloud computing and fundamental of crypto-
graphic algorithm, such as homomorphic encryption and algebraic signature.
2.2.1 Cloud Computing
The Cloud Computing (CC) has emerged as the latest utility-oriented distributed
computing model and has been envisaged as the next generation of Information Technol-
ogy (IT), with the aim of augmenting the capabilities of the client devices by accessing
a pool of leased platforms, infrastructures, and applications without having to actually
own them. The cloud service models offer low-cost, on-demand, ubiquitous resource ac-
cess, rapid elasticity or expansion, and measured services (Höfer & Karagiannis, 2011;
Whaiduzzaman, Sookhak, Gani, & Buyya, 2014). The cloud systems have the capability
of conveniently adjusting the virtual allocated resources on the basis of the current re-
quirements with a minimal managerial effort and service interruption. Such elastic char-
acteristics reduce the wastage of resources in case of over-provisioning (Aceto, Botta, de
Donato, & Pescapè, 2013; Manvi & Krishna Shyam, 2013).
The cloud service models rely on a pay-as-you-go pricing model that charges the
clients on the basis of the amount of usage and some service metrics (Zhifeng & Yang,
2013). For example, the Dropbox service can be measured as Gigabyte per year. The
cloud computing also has led into appearing a new type of communication and collabo-
ration services by creating online social networks in which scientists are able to construct
research communities by sharing data and analysis tools (Barga, Gannon, & Reed, 2011).
The virtualization of resources is the core technology of cloud computing to inculcate a
vision of infinite resources to the clients (Fernando, Loke, & Rahayu, 2013).
From the perspective of deployment, the cloud computing is classified into four
modes, namely: public, private, hybrid, and community clouds, which are details as fol-
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lows: (1) Public cloud: In public cloud, service providers deliver application as services
over the Internet and allow clients to access computing resources through centralized
cloud servers, such as Amazon Web Services, Google App Engine, Microsoft Azure plat-
form, Salesforce, and Aneka (Fox et al., 2009). The Amazon Web Services allow users
to store data in Simple Storage Services (S3) (Kristensen, 2007), Google App Engine
offers deployment platforms and hosts web applications in Googles data centers (chun
Wesley, 2011). The Microsoft Azure platform provides a powerful platform for building,
deploying web applications in Microsoft data centers, and Aneka is used as a platform
to build applications and deploy them on public or private clouds (Calheiros, Vecchiola,
Karunamoorthy, & Buyya, 2012). (2) Private Cloud: The services and infrastructure are
exclusively used and managed by a single organization. (3) Community Cloud: The ser-
vices and infrastructure are shared among a set of organizations with common interests
or objectives that are managed either internally or by a trusted third party (Marinos &
Briscoe, 2009). (4) Hybrid Cloud: A combination of two or three of the aforementioned
clouds with multiple providers (Q. Zhang, Cheng, & Boutaba, 2010; Zissis & Lekkas,
2012).
Cloud service providers offer three types of service models, such as Software as a
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Va-
quero, Rodero-Merino, & Morán, 2011). In the SaaS layer, the users can access any kind
of software service remotely from the mobile devices. For example, Microsoft Live Mesh
allows users to share files and folder over multiple devices. The PaaS allows the users to
set the runtime environment or modify the environment based on the requirement, for
a specific application (Gonçalves & Ballon, 2011). The PaaS also provides the neces-
sary programming environments, libraries, and tools for the users to allow them to create,
manage, and deploy applications. For example, Google App Engine, Microsoft Azure,
and Amazon Map are PaaS services currently available in the market. The IaaS provides
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Figure 2.1: Different Service Delivery Models in Cloud Computing
a more flexible environment for the users by providing storage, computation, and net-
working infrastructure at the Virtual Machine (VM) level. For example, Amazon Elastic
Cloud Computing (EC2) and Simple Storage Service (S3) are two of the IaaS services
(Jing, Ali, She, & Zhong, 2013; Subashini & Kavitha, 2011; Takabi, Joshi, & Gail-Joon,
2010). Figure 2.1 illustrates three models in cloud services: SaaS,PaaS, and IaaS.
2.2.2 Security Background
The fundamental concept of security regarding to outsource data storage is composed
of three components: confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA Triad). Confidential-
ity refers to ensuring that unauthorized persons do not have privilege to access the infor-
mation. The main idea behind the data confidentiality in cloud and mobile cloud comput-
ing is to encrypt the data before transferring them by using Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) (Sahai & Waters, 2005), Proxy re-encryption (PRE) (Blaze & Strauss, 1998), or
Role-based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996). In-
tegrity ensures that unauthorized persons will not able to alter the stored data in the cloud
by using remote data checking methods. Finally, data availability in cloud ensures that
16
the information is accessible anytime anywhere. This section introduces commonly used
cryptosystems for data integrity and their modes of operation in cloud computing.
2.2.2.1 Fundamentals of Cryptography
Encryption algorithms are important procedures of cryptography that are used to
preserve integrity and confidentiality of data. There are two types of encryption schemes:
symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes. In the symmetric encryption scheme, the
sender and receiver need to establish a secure communication session based on a share
key and also use the same key for encrypt and decrypt the message. Therefore, this type
of encryption method will not be applied for two parties who never met before.
The main disadvantage of symmetric encryption scheme is that the encryptor to com-
municate with different persons requires storing the different key for each person. How-
ever, the generation and management of the large number of keys is complex and needs
a large storage space. Common symmetric key encryption algorithms include Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) (Daemen & Rijmen, 2000), Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Triple-Data Encryption Standard (3DES) (Chaum & Evertse, 1986),and One- and Snow
(Ekdahl & Johansson, 2003). In the Asymmetric algorithms, each user has two keys as
public and private keys which are used to establish a secure session of communication
across a network without requiring a symmetric key. Although this scheme is more se-
cure than their symmetric counterparts, the symmetric encryption scheme is faster than
it.
2.2.2.2 Probabilistic encryption
The most cryptographic algorithms are deterministic which means that every plain-
text will always be encrypted in the same ciphertext under a fixed encryption key. The
adversaries may be able to use this feature to compute some partial information about the
plaintext or the encryption key. For example, in RSA cryptosystem, the relation between
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one bit of ciphertext and plaintext, that is called Jacobi symbol, is predictable (Fontaine
& Galand, 2007).The probabilistic encryption is proposed to address this issue in sym-
metric and asymmetric cryptosystem. In the symmetric schemes, a unique random vector
is computed for each plaintext by using the randomized methods to generate different
ciphertexts with a same key. Since the security analysis in asymmetric schemes is mathe-
matical and formal, their randomized methods have to be analyzable in the deterministic
schemes, for example in (ElGamal, 1985; Goldwasser & Micali, 1982).
2.2.2.3 Homomorphic encryption
As mentioned earlier, with the growth in communication networks and the mobile
devices and their increasing capabilities over the last few years, the demand for storing
sensitive data on the cloud storage and delegating computations to untrusted cloud has
increased exponentially. Data encryption is a crucial method to store and access data
securely in the cloud. However, the main issue is how to perform computation on the
encrypted data without decrypting it and to obtain the same result as performing on the
original data.
Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos (1978) was the first to overcome this issue by homo-
morphic encryption. During the last few years, the extensive researches have been carried
out on this area and the application of this method has increased dramatically in cryp-
tographic protocols such as, secure data outsourcing, secret sharing scheme, and multi-
party computation. An encryption function (E()) is homomorphic if for any E(x),E(y)
,and E(x⊙ y) can be computable without decrypting x and y for operation ⊙:
∀x, y ∈ M,E (x ⊙ y) ← E (x) ⊙ E (y) (2.1)
Where M denotes the set of plaintext. This definition indicates that performing op-
eration on plaintext before encryption is equal to perform operation on the corresponding
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ciphertexts after encryption. One example of a deterministic multiplicatively homomor-
phic cryptosystem is RSA scheme which was created by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
(1978) on M = (Z/NZ, .) where N is product of two large prime number (p,q). If the
public and privet keys are define as {Ke = (e, n) ,Kd = d|n = pq, ed ≡ 1 mod φ (n)},
the encryption and decryption of a message is calculated by:
EKe (m) = m
emod n, (2.2)
DKe (m) = EKe(m)
d
mod n, (2.3)
Therefore, the encryption of the product of two messages is computed based on
multiplying the corresponding ciphertexts as follow:
EKe (m1) = m1emod n,
EKe (m2) = m2emod n


⇒ EKe (m1.m2) = EKe (m1) .EKe (m2) , (2.4)
The Paillier cryptosystem is another example of homomorphic cryptosystem that is
proposed by Paillier (1999) based on RSA scheme on M = (ZN2, .,+). The public and
private keys in Paillier method are defended as Ke = (N,g) and Kd = lcm((p−1),(q−1)),
where lcm denotes lowest common multiple. The owner selects a random number (r) and
encrypts the plaintext by:
EKe (m) = g
mrNmod N2 (2.5)
If EKe (m1) = gm1r1Nmod N2 and EKe (m2) = g2r2Nmod N2, the product of two
ciphertexts is calculated by the following formula:
EKe (m1) .EKe (m2) = g
(m1+m2)(r1r2)
N
mod N2 = E (m1 +m2) (2.6)
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2.2.2.4 Applications and Properties of Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
Homomorphic encryption schemes have been widely applied in the different areas of
cryptography because it allows manipulating an encrypted data without losing the security
and privacy of data. In the following several applications and properties of Homomorphic
cryptosystems are briefly reviewed.
• Protection of mobile agents: The homomorphic cryptosystem is able to ensure the
security and privacy of mobile devices by encrypting the whole program or the com-
municated data because the architecture of most computers are constructed based
on binary strings and only need multiplication and addition (Sander & Tschudin,
1998). There are two ways to protect the mobile agent based on homomorphic
encryption: (a) computing with encrypted data in which such algorithm is used to
work on encrypted data, and (b) computation with encrypted functions in which the
homomorphic scheme is in charge of evaluating and preserving the security of an
encrypted functions of mobile devices.
• Secure data access and sharing scheme in cloud computing: One of the important
applications of homomorphic cryptosystem is to ensure the confidentiality of out-
source data and provide secure data access and sharing in cloud computing. How-
ever, the most homomorphic based methods incur a huge computation and storage
overhead on cloud and client parties.
• Digital Watermarking schemes: Standard watermark detection methods usually
are constructed based on the symmetric or asymmetric cryptography which are vul-
nerable to several security risks. For example, accessing the watermark informa-
tion and symmetric key leads to remove watermark completely, the knowledge of
the public detection key in asymmetric watermarking schemes also increases threat
of oracle attacks. One of the efficient ways to overcome these security issues is
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to apply Zero-knowledge watermark detection based on homomorphic encryption
(Adelsbach, Katzenbeisser, & Sadeghi, 2002).
• Zero-knowledge proofs: Zero-knowledge proof is a method to convince a next
party that the statement is true without learning anything as a result of this process.
This method is a theoretical application of homomorphic cryptosystems. Remote
data checking in cloud computing is a crucial application of zero-knowledge proof
where the cloud wants to show the client that the outsourced data is remain intact.
In the next section some Zero-knowledge proof in cloud computing are reviewed.
• Commitment schemes: Commitment is an essential part of some modern cryp-
tographic protocols including zero knowledge proofs and secure computation in
which a player is able to select a value from some set and assures that he cannot
change his value or statement. The selected value should be kept secret until he
decides to reveal it for the other parties. Homomorphic cryptosystem provides an
efficient way to implement some commitment schemes. For example, one particu-
lar application of commitment is in zero-knowledge proofs for two main purposes:
(a) the prover uses the commitment schemes to ”cut and choose” proofs based on
the verifier challenge and only disclose what should be related later in the proof
(Goldreich, Micali, & Wigderson, 1991), and (b) commitment schemes is capable
of preventing verifiers from specifying their choices ahead of time in a commitment
and compose a parallel method without revealing additional information (Goldreich
& Krawczyk, 1996).
2.2.2.5 Algebraic signatures
Algebraic signature is a type of hash functions with algebraic properties that allows
to compute the signatures of unseen messages in a limited way. The fundamental feature
of algebraic signature schemes is to take a signature of the sum of some random blocks
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gives the same result as taking the sum of the signatures of the corresponding blocks
(Schwarz & Miller, 2006).
Let an element γ in the Galois field composed of a vector of various non-zero el-
ements γ = (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γn). An algebraic signature of file F including n data block
( f [1], f [2], . . . , [ f [n]) is computed by:
Sγ(F) =
n
∑
i=1
f [i].γ i−1 (2.7)
In the following, a number of algebraic signature properties are listed.
• Proposition 1: Litwin and Schwarz (2004) also shown that the algebraic signature
of concatenation of two blocks b[1] with length r and b[2] is computed by:
Sγ( f [i]|| f [ j]) = Sγ( f [i])⊕ rγSγ( f [ j]) (2.8)
• Proposition 2: The algebraic signature of summation of two files, F and G, is equal
to summation of signature of the files.
Sγ(F +G) = Sγ (F)+Sγ (G) (2.9)
Proof:The summation of signature of the two files, F and G consist of n blocks,
can be computed by:
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Sγ (F)+Sγ (G) =
n
∑
i=1
f [i].γ i−1 +
n
∑
i=1
g[i].γ i−1
=
n
∑
i=1
γ i−1( f [i]+g[i])
= Sγ(F +G)
In the rest of this chapter, the remote data auditing methods are studied critically.
2.3 Remote Data Auditing Technique
Today, most of the individuals and organizations are motivated to outsource the data
to the cloud to reduce the cost and time involved in procurement and maintenance of
local storage infrastructure. In cloud computing, the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is
in charge of managing the cloud storage services. Therefore, the Data Owners (DOs)
lose the physical control over the data. Instead, the management of data is delegated to
an untrusted third party. On the other hand, the CSP or any inside attackers are able to
arbitrarily change the amount of stored data without any user knowledge or permission
(B. Chen, Curtmola, Ateniese, & Burns, 2010). Therefore, several issues need to be
resolved before storing the sensitive data in the cloud. For instance, how can the user
completely put her trust in the CSP for preserving the outsourced data? Is it possible for
the CSP or any inside attackers to arbitrarily change the amount of stored data without
user knowledge or permission? Do the users have to download the whole outsourced data
to check the integrity of them? Is there any way to update the outsourced data without
having to download the entire data?
The Remote Data Auditing (RDA) refers to a sampling of the collected data in the
cloud and evaluating the data with various criteria, such as validity, accuracy, and integrity
as a way to verify the reliability of the storage provider (Cong et al., 2010). In this section,
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Figure 2.2: The network architecture of RDA in cloud computing
we detail the architecture of the RDA for the single cloud server and taxonomize the RDA
requirements.
2.3.1 Remote Data Auditing Architecture
The RDA approaches for the single cloud servers usually include four main com-
ponents, namely: (1) User: it represents an enterprise or individual having permission
to read the stored data in the cloud, (2) DO: Enterprise or businesses which store their
data in the cloud storage having the ability to do update operations (modify, delete, and
insert), (3) CSP: This entity is responsible to back-up the user data and generates a proof
as a response of the received challenges, and (4) Third Party Auditor (TPA): auditing
the outsourced data and its verification is done by TPA. It actually ensures whether the
data remains intact over the passage of time in public auditing models. Private auditing
schemes, however, cannot support the TPA and DOs in order to check the integrity of
the data (Sood, 2012; Sookhak, Talebian, Ahmed, Gani, & Khan, 2014; Sookhak et al.,
2015). Figure 2.2 clearly depicts the typical RDA components and their interactions.
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2.3.2 Taxonomy of Remote Data Auditing
Figure 2.3 shows the thematic taxonomy of remote data auditing in cloud comput-
ing that is categorized based on Security Requirements, Performance Metrics, Security
Objectives, Auditing Modes, and Updating Modes.
The security requirements attribute indicates a number of properties which must be
taken into account to propose a secure RDA method, as follows: (1) Robustness equips the
auditing methods with mechanisms to mitigate arbitrary amount of data corruption (Ate-
niese et al., 2011), (2) Fairness ensures that a dishonest data owner is unable to access the
data in the cloud storage and manipulate it (Zheng & Xu, 2012), (3) Data Deduplication
ensures maximum use of available storage space by recognizing distinct chunks of data
with identical content and eliminating redundant data. Considering that more than 75% of
the outsourced data in the cloud are not unique, deduplication can dramatically reduce the
required space to store a large data set (Gantz & Reinsel, 2010; Storer, Greenan, Long,
& Miller, 2008), (4) Data Recovery allows users to recover small or large fraction of file
corruptions outsourced to the cloud. This requirement can be achieved by using some
methods such as forward error correcting code (FEC) (Clark & Cain, 1981), or Read-
Salmon code (Lin & Costello, 2004), (5) Dependability protects the stored data against
Byzantine failures (Castro & Liskov, 2002), malicious data modification, and server col-
luding attack to augment data availability, (6) Batch Auditing ensures that TPA is able to
quickly manage multiple auditing tasks which are received simultaneously from different
users and in a cost efficient way, and (7) Data Privacy ensures that the auditors should not
be able to learn or guess the data content or have a copy of original data. In other words,
data confidentiality should be preserved against the auditors (Wei et al., 2013).
The performance metrics attribute includes a set of important measures such as com-
putation cost (processing time), communication cost, and storage cost, and probability of
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Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of Remote data auditing in cloud computing (Sookhak et al., 2014)
detection which are needed to be kept optimized when designing a RDA method. The
implemented method requires incurring the least computation, communication and stor-
age overhead over the client and server while the probability of detecting data corruption
achieves the maximum value (Bowers, Juels, & Oprea, 2009; Oprea, Reiter, & Yang,
2005).
The security objective attributes indicate the RDA method is able to ensure which
type of security components (integrity, confidentiality, and privacy). The attribute of the
auditing mode shows that who is responsible for verifying the outsourced data. In a
private verification, the DO only has to check the integrity of the data. However, in a
public verification mode, the DO is able to delegate the auditing task to the trusted third
party.
The next attribute is auditing mode including public and private auditing. In public
auditing mode the integrity of outsourced data is checked by third party auditor (TPA)
while in the private mode, the data owner is only able to audit the data.
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The attribute of the uploading mode indicates the type of data modification that can
be supported by the protocols. The current RDA methods employ three different strate-
gies for updating the outsourced data blocks in the single cloud server. (1) In the static
approach, the user must retrieve the data and upload the modified data on the cloud. This
process imposes high computation and communication overheads on the cloud side and
to the device side. (2) In the dynamic uploading approach, the user is able to update
the stored data to the cloud by inserting, deleting, and modifying a portion of the file,
or appending to the file remotely rather than downloading the entire file (Yang & Jia,
2012). (3) Semi-dynamic model: allows the owner to make partial update operations on
the outsourced data (Sookhak, Talebian, et al., 2014).
the attribute of
2.4 The State-of-the-art Remote Data Auditing Approaches: Taxonomy
RDA is a crucial technique to check data integrity in the cloud and mobile cloud
computing. According to identified security requirements in previous section, the state-
of-the-art remote data auditing approaches are analysed and taxonomized into three mod-
els, namely Provable Data Possession-based (PDP-based), Proof Of Retrievability-based
(POR-based), and Proof Of Ownership-based (POW-based) which are depicted in Figure
2.4. Also, few remote data auditing methods are described for each group and tabulated
the comparison results in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
2.4.1 Provable Data Possession-based Methods
The first group of remote data auditing schemes in cloud and mobile cloud comput-
ing that is only responsible to preserve the integrity of outsourced data, is called Provable
Data Possession (PDP). This type of methods usually include four main phases, such as:
setup, challenge, proof, and verification. (1) Setup phase: in this phase, the input data
is divided into n blocks and the unique tag (metadata) for each block is computed using
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Figure 2.4: Taxonomy of State-of-the-art Remote Data Auditing Methods (Sookhak et
al., 2014)
the distinctive formula. Finally, the input file and tags are sent to the cloud, (2) Chal-
lenge phase: in order to audit the cloud and check the correctness of the stored data, a
verifier requires selecting some data blocks randomly as a challenge by using pseudo-
random permutation, (3) Proof phase: upon receiving the challenge message, the prover
generates a short integrity check over the received challenge message as a proof message
- that usually includes the aggregation of the blocks and the tags – and sends it to verifier,
(4) Verification phase: in the verification phase, the verifier validates the proof message
regarding to the proof and challenge messages (Sookhak et al., 2015; Sookhak, Talebian,
et al., 2014). The structure of PDP-based methods is shown in Figure 2.5.
In the rest of this section some PDP-based methods are critically reviewed along
with their advantages and disadvantages.
2.4.1.1 Static PDP models
Ateniese et al. (2007) were the first to propose two provably-secure schemes by using
the RSA-based Homomorphic Verifiable Tag (HVT) to verify the integrity of data storage
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Figure 2.5: The structure of Provable Data Possession-based methods (Sookhak et al.,
2014)
in the cloud without having to retrieve the data. HVT permits the client to check whether
the server has certain blocks based on a proof that is constructed by the server, even when
the client has no access to the blocks. Secure PDP (S-PDP) is the first model with strong
guarantee on data possession by adding the robust feature to PDP based on spot-checking
mechanism. Since that incur computation cost on the client, they suggested an Efficient
PDP (E-PDP) to reduce the computation cost by assuring the possession of the combined
blocks (Ateniese et al., 2011). However, these two schemes have several drawbacks such
as: (1) incur expensive server computation and communication cost over the whole file
because of using RSA numbering, (2) have linear storage for the user, and (3) fail to
provide secure data possession completely when the prover has malicious intent.
Hanser and Slamanig (2013) offered a provable data possession method based on
elliptic curves cryptosystem in which a data owner or third party are simultaneously able
to audit outsourced data remotely. The main idea behind this method is generating a same
tag for simultaneous private and public verifiability by identifying a vector for each data
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block. Therefore, the input file including n data blocks, is represented by
[
n
t
]
consecutive
vectors where t is the length of each vector, as follows.
F =


F1
F2
.
.
.
Fn
t


=


F1,1 . . .F1,t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Fn
t ,1 . . .Fnt ,t


(2.10)
Finally, the data owner calculates a tag (Ti) for each vector (Fi) by using hash func-
tion which maps to an elliptic curve group (Icart, 2009).
The data owner or TPA is always in charge of auditing the outsourced data in all PDP
methods. In some situation, however, the client will be restricted due to unavailability of
Internet connection, such as on the ocean-going vessel, in the jail or battlefield. On the
other hand, the TPA is not able to perform remote data checking independently, when
the data owner is not capable of passing the verification step. The TPA does not have
permission to take the further countermeasures without informing the owner. H. Wang
(2012) overcome this issue by proposing a Proxy PDP (PPDP) method by using the bi-
linear pairing technique in which a remote data integrity checking task is delegated to a
proxy according to a warrant. As it is shown in Figure 2.6, the PPDP scheme consist of
four steps: (1) the system parameters and the public keys are generated by TTP, (2) the
warrant and corresponding sign are generated by the data owner to delegate the tasks to
proxy, (3) the proxy verifies the received warrant and the corresponding Signature, (4)
the client divides the input into n blocks, generates the corresponding tag for each block,
and store them on the cloud, (5) the CSP validates the tags to resist the malicious clients,
and (6) the proxy is able to audit the stored data in the cloud by using challenge-response
method.
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2014)
2.4.1.2 Dynamic PDP models
As mentioned in section 2.3, dynamic data update is a useful feature for data audit-
ing methods that allows data owners to update their outsourced data whenever necessary
without the need to download the data. The dynamic data update includes update, insert,
append and delete operations.
Ateniese et al. (2008) considered the problem of static PDP methods for updating
data and developed a new PDP protocol called Scalable PDP based on symmetric-key
cryptography to solve the scalability, efficiency, and dynamic update issues in original
PDP method. The distinction between Scalable PDP and original PDP is that a certain
number of short possession verification tokens are precomputed by the data owner before
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uploading data on the cloud. Each token are generated by using a random challenge
and a random set of data blocks. Although the scalable PDP supports dynamic data, the
update operations are limited to modify, delete, and append. To update a data block in
the cloud, the data owner needs to retrieve all tokens and replace the hash of the block’s
old version with the new one by using XOR operation (Bellare, Guérin, & Rogaway,
1995). However, once an update operation is asked by user, it is required to re-compute
all remaining tokens which are computationally expensive and thus impractical for large
files. In addition, even though the scalable PDP enjoys more efficiency than original
PDP, but the number of updates and challenges is restricted and it does not support public
verifiability in which other parties rather than data owner also can check the integrity of
outsourced data.
One of the effective ways to add dynamic data support to the current RDA protocols
is making use of authenticated data structures such as Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) (Merkle,
1980), skip list (Pugh, 1990). The first fully dynamic PDP method is designed by (Erway
et al., 2009) by combining of the original skip list (Pugh, 1990) with an authentication
dictionary (Goodrich, Tamassia, & Schwerin, 2001) and rank-based information to en-
able efficient authentication of the clients’ updates. In rank-based authentication skip
list structure, each node stores the homomorphic block tag of the data block (T (b[i])),
level of node, the number of leaf nodes which are reachable from that node as a rank
of node, searching variables, and a label of node. Erway et al.(2009) also proposed an-
other dynamic PDP method by using Rank-based RSA trees to enhance the probability
of detecting a tampered block in dynamic PDP method. The main difference of these two
methods is storing the rank information trees on the internal nodes in Rank-based RSA
scheme. To update a data block in Dynamic PDP, the client requests to retrieve the homo-
morphic block tag of this data block (T (b[i])) and its proof. In delete operation, the client
needs to access the homomorphic block tag of previous block (T (b[i−1])) and its proof.
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Figure 2.7: Rank-based Authenticated Skip List with block size 5, (a) before updating,
(b) after updating (Sookhak et al., 2014)
In insert operation, the height of the tower of the skip list associated with the new block
is also re-computed by the client. After verifying the proof, the client requires calculating
the label of the start node of the skip list after the update by (Papamanthou & Tamassia,
2007). In the last step of update operations, the server updates the skip list on the basis of
the received parameters.
Dynamic PDP (DPDP) method employs Rank-based Authenticated Skip List to ef-
ficiently support dynamic data update with O(logn) complexity (Erway et al., 2009).
However, the variable size of updated file incurs more overhead on other blocks with
O(n) complexity because the indices of the blocks are used in the skip list. For exam-
ple, Figure 2.7 shows the outsourced file that is divided into some blocks. If the data
owner decides to change the "white" to "red", it needs to balance the list by deleting the
some blocks and insert them in the new place because the size of blocks in Rank-based
Authenticated Skip List is fixed.
Esiner, Kachkeev, and Ozkasap (2013) overcome this issue by implementing a Flex-
ible Length-based Authenticated Skip List method in which the indices of the bytes of
the file are used to facilitate inserting, updating, deleting, or challenging a specific block
consisting of the bytes at specific indices of the file. The significant advantage of FlexList
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Figure 2.8: Updating operation in FlexList method (Sookhak et al., 2014)
method is its compatibility with the variable size of data block and data update. In other
words, each node indicates how many bytes can be reached from this node instead of the
number of accessible blocks. As a result, FlexList scheme is faster dynamic PDP in terms
of data update with complexity where u is the size of update. Figure 2.8 shows that the
data owner only needs to update the 3rd leaf of the list and the considering fathers.
Since prior dynamic data possession methods require verifying the cloud for each
data block update operation, they incur high computation overhead on cloud and data
owner. On the other hand, today, many web-based service providers include the web
services, blogs, and other web-based application providers tend to outsource their data to
the cloud or remote servers. In this way, users of such services are able to get access to
the data anytime and from anywhere, and perform functions such as deleting, modifying,
or inserting new data to the stored data, simultaneously. For instance, most of the popular
blogs which are hosted by a cloud-based server permit their subscribers to delete, append,
or remove blog content, freely. In this context, the data auditing methods should be able
to manage multi-user access to the shared data on the cloud without leaking or losing
data. Sometimes, the clients also need to retrieve previous versions of their data or they
need to verify the integrity of the data without concerning about computation and storage
overhead (Sookhak, Talebian, et al., 2014).
Y. Zhang and Blanton (2012) design an efficient dynamic provable possession based
on a new data structure (that is called block update tree) to address these issues. The data
owner and server needs to store the block update tree in order to overcome the requirement
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Figure 2.9: Insert operation in block update tree (Sookhak et al., 2014)
of verification for each dynamic operation. The main characteristic of this tree is that
it is always balanced irrespective of the number and order of dynamic operations on the
storage. Moreover, the size of the maintained update tree is independent of the outsourced
data size because when the owner restores some data blocks in the cloud, all previous
copies of the considering data blocks are deleted. The block update tree is a binary tree in
which each node consists of some attributes such as: (1) node type (op) indicates the type
of operation that is performed on the node (delete = −1, modi f y = 0, insert = 1) , (2)
data block range (L,U) represent the range of data blocks in which the index of left child
is always lower indices than L and the index of right child is always higher than U . As a
result, some standard algorithms such as AVL tree (AdelsonVelskii & Landis, 1963) are
able to be used to efficiently balance the tree. (3) offset (R) is used to identify the indices
of data blocks after insert and delete operations, and (4) version number (V ) represents
the number of data block modification. For example, Figure 2.9 shows the node balancing
function when a new node (D) is added to the tree. Since that the range of this node is
[111,120], it is inserted as a left child of A. The B also needs to be increased because of
the range overlap between B and D.
MHT is a simple and effective model of the authentication structure which is pre-
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sented as a binary hash tree. This data structure is used to detect any tampering and to
prove that a set of element remains unaltered. The leaves of the MHT are the hashes of
authentic data values and the other nodes are computed by hashing the combination of the
hash of left and right children (h(h(le f t child) ||h (right child))). However, MHT has a
node balancing drawback which occurs after inserting or deleting a series of requests. As
a result, this technique is not directly applicable in provable data possession schemes.
Q. A. Wang et al. (2011) proposed a Public Provable Data Possession (Public PDP)
method by combining the MHT data structure (Merkle, 1980) and bilinear aggregate sig-
nature (Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, & Shacham, 2003) to address the node balancing issue in
MHT. When data owner decides to update a data block, she sends the new data block
along with its authentication tag to the cloud. Upon receiving the update request, the
cloud performs the update operation, re-generates the root of the MHT, updates aggrega-
tion block tags and returns the signed root (signpr(root o f MHT )). Finally, the owner
validates the signed root to ensure the performance of update operation. Figure 2.10 il-
lustrates the effect of insert and delete operations on the MHT in the Public PDP method.
2.4.1.3 Privacy-Preserving models
Cloud-based collaborative authoring is a fledgling service that helps the clients to
share private documents with the others anywhere and anytime. The cloud-based structure
of collaborative authoring service augments usability and fault tolerance; and achieves
efficient resource allocation and global accessibility (Sheng-Cheng, Wu-Hsiao, Ming-
Yang, & Chun-Yuen, 2012). However, by storing data to a remote server, the clients lose
the physical control over data and delegate management of data to an untrusted cloud
service provider. As a result, to protect the privacy of data, the clients need to encrypt the
data using cryptographic techniques before outsourcing those data to the cloud (Kamara
& Lauter, 2010). Since that data owner and the co-authors only have the encryption key
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Figure 2.10: The effect of insert and delete operations on Merkle Hash Tree in Public
PDP method (Sookhak et al., 2014)
in collaborative text editing services, unauthorized users are unable to access the shared
document.
When the co-authors access to an outsourced document, the collaborative services
are in charge of downloading the last version of the document and decrypt it using the
appropriated key. On the other hand, by modifying a small part of the file, the owner and
the co-authors need to encrypt and decrypt the whole file to obtain the last version of the
file. Then, by increasing the size of documents or the number of authors, the required
time to encrypt and decrypt the document is also increasing.
Yeh, Su, Chen, and Lin (2013) addressed this issue by proposing an efficient and
secure cloud-based collaborative editing approach using the Red–Black tree to reduce the
number of data that need to be encrypted. In other words, when an authorized user (the
data owner or one of the co-authors) modifies a block of the file, instead of a whole file,
the modified block only requires to be encrypted and updated. The Red-Black tree is
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a type of binary search tree that was developed by Bayer (1972) as a symmetric binary
B-trees to organize a part of text fragments or numbers. The main property of this data
structure is that the computation order of search, insert, and delete operations is O(logn),
when n is the number of data blocks (nodes).
Data auditing methods usually assume TPA is a trustworthy agent and they neglect
the privacy of data when TPA is involved. However, such assumption is illogical and leads
to data leakage. C. Wang, Chow, Wang, Ren, and Lou (2012) considered this issue and
proposed lightweight TPA protocol on the basis of public key under Homomorphic Linear
Authenticator (HLA). The main idea behind of this method, namely privacy preserving
PDP (PP-PDP) , is to integrate HLA with random masking technique to protect both data
integrity and data privacy. In other words, before transferring the proof message to TPA,
the aggregated blocks µ under challenge message needs to be blinded by using a random
mask as follows:
µ ′ = µ + r.h((ux)r) (2.11)
Where, µ ′ is the blinded blocks aggregation, µ is the aggregated blocks, r is a ran-
dom mask, u is a cloud public key, x is a cloud private key, and h indicates the hash
function.
Yang and Jia (2013) designed another privacy-preserving auditing for data storage
security in cloud computing to address the storage overhead issue in Efficient privacy
preserving PDP (EPP-PDP) (C. Wang et al., 2012). To this end, they use the Bilinearity
property of the bilinear pairing and to generate an encrypted proof the challenge stamp
such that the auditor is only able to verify the proof. They also improve the performance
of this scheme by using the Data Fragment Technique and the HVT to reduce number of
data tags, as follows: (1) the input data is divided into n blocks and each data block is
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split to s sectors by using the data fragment technique, and (2) since that the number of
sectors in all block must be same, the number of these sectors in the data blocks that have
less sectors must be reached to s by appending the additional sectors with zero content.
As a result, the number of data blocks in the input file (F) is calculated by:
n =
sizeo f (F)
s. log p (2.12)
where p is the size of each sector and one data tag is generated for s sectors. For
example, when the size of each block is 20 Byte, 50 KB input file is divided to 2560
data blocks. Therefore, 2560 tags is needed to be generated for this file which incur 50
KB storage overhead while by using the data fragment technique, the storage overhead is
reduced to 50/s KB. However, the main disadvantage of this method is that it is unable to
efficiently support dynamic data update for large-scale files.
Zhu, Wang, Hu, Ahn, and Hu (2011) introduced a zero knowledge proof model to
PDP in order to hinder data leakage during verification step. This method, that is called
Improved PDP (I-PDP), also supports soundness property based on computation Diffie-
Huffman assumption and the rewindable black-box knowledge extractor. The soundness
property indicates that the cloud is not able to deceive the verifier to accept false state-
ments. The principal idea behind this scheme is to randomize data blocks and their tags
in order to prevent data and tag leakage during verification step.
Since that mobile computing devices have limited processing power, small storage
capacity and short battery lifetime, the audit services are required to be efficiently de-
signed for these devices. As a result, Yan, Hongxin, Gail-Joon, and Mengyang (2012)
improved the performance of audit service in two ways: utilizes probabilistic query and
periodic verification which helps to balance the computation and communication over-
head. They also reduced the size of required storage using an algorithm which selects a
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number of sectors for each block in the input file.
Wei et al. (2013) was the first to propose a privacy preserving and computation au-
diting by using Commitment-Based Sampling (CBS) technique (Du, Murugesan, & Jia,
2010) and designated verifier signature (Huang, Yang, Wong, & Susilo, 2011; J. Zhang &
Mao, 2008) to achieve privacy cheating discouragement and minimize the computation
cost in cloud computing. To store the input file on the cloud securely, the data owner
splits the input file into n blocks and n storage space are allocated to the blocks by the
CSP. Before transferring the data blocks to the cloud, each data block needs to be signed
to enable the data auditing. After generating a secure communication tunnel by using a
session key, the data blocks, and corresponding signature are transmitted to the cloud.
When the data blocks are received, the CSP decrypts data blocks by using a session key
and verifies the signature by using its secret key.
The main contribution of this method, namely Secure PDP (Sec-PDP), is to use
the CBS technique based on Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) to provide computation security
in two steps: (1) computation request step: in which the positions index of data blocks
(I = {I1, I2, . . . , In}) and a computation service request including a set of some basic func-
tions (F = { f1, f2, . . . , fn}) such as data sum, average, and other complicated computa-
tions are submitted to the cloud. (2) commitment generation step: when the computation
request is received by the cloud, the requested data blocks based on their position index
set are retrieved and considering functions are computed on them (yi = fi(b [i]) and the
value of intermediates nodes are computed by V = H(Vle f tchild)||H(VRightchild). Finally,
the root of MHT (R), its signature and the set of computation results are transferred to the
user through transmission tunnel. As a result, the data owner or the TPA is able to ver-
ify the storage correctness and the computation correctness by using challenge-response
method and re-building the MHT. Figure 2.11 shows the steps of this method to provide
the security and privacy for storage and computation in cloud computing.
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Figure 2.11: Security and privacy for storage and computation in cloud computing
(Sookhak et al., 2014)
2.4.1.4 Robust Data auditing
The most of data auditing methods rely on selecting small portions of the data ran-
domly as a challenge and checking their integrity is called spot checking. However, this
technique is only able to detect a fraction of the data corruption in the server and the client
cannot find corruption of small parts of the data. Ateniese et al. (2011) was the first to
empower the PDP protocols to mitigate the arbitrary amount of data corruption (is called
robust feature) by integrating Forward Error Checking (FEC) with PDP methods. In other
words, the input file firstly needs to be encoded by using the FEC technique and then the
encoded file is used as an input file to the PDP methods. There are different ways to
encode the input file that causes the auditing schemes to include different properties and
performance characteristics. The main distinction between these encoding techniques is
related to the way of encryption or permutation the data blocks in each constraint group.
• Simple Reed-Solomon: to achieve this goal, the input file is divided into k−symbol
chunks and then each chunk is expanded it to n−symbol codeword by applying a
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2014)
(n,k) Reed-Solomon code. The first k symbol in the output is the original file
and the remaining symbols are parity blocks which are used to recover d erased
blocks. The constraint group is defined concept as a group of blocks from the
same encoding symbols (the original k blocks and their corresponding d parity).
However, the attacker is able to manipulate the data by deleting a fixed number of
blocks (any d +1 blocks of encrypted file from the same constraint group) due to
the fixed number of k and d.
• Permutation All (ΠA):to overcome the first model, it requires hiding the constraints
among blocks. As a result, all blocks of the encoded file should be permuted ran-
domly. However, the resource-intensive nature of this method is slow because of
performing permutation on all blocks. Furthermore, the robustness of the file is
compromised by allowing sequential access to the original file.
• Permutation-Redundancy (ΠR): in spite of the Permutation all method (ΠA), only
the parity symbols needs to be permuted and encrypted. The comparison of (6,4)
code permutation by the (ΠR) and (ΠA) methods are illustrated in Figure 2.12.
As mentioned earlier, the Reed-Solomon code is able to provide error correction in a
static setting and it needs to hide the relationship between the symbols and the constraint
groups by using permutation functions. On the contrary, since that dynamic data update
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affects on the parity symbols of the corresponding group, the relationship between the
symbols and the constraint groups has to be revealed in dynamic methods. Considering a
contradiction between dynamic data update and robustness feature, an important question
comes to mind: how is it possible to add the robust feature to dynamic provable data
possession?
B. Chen and Curtmola (2012) solved this issue and introduced a Robust Dynamic
PDP (RD-PDP) by presenting two new permutation functions such as Permute-Redundancy
(ΠR−D), and Variable Length Constrain Group (VLGG).
• Permute-Redundancy (ΠR−D): in this scheme, the (ΠR) technique is adopted to
add the robustness feature to the dynamic PDP method. Since that the content of
constraint group depends on the index of data symbol, to insert/delete a data block,
the client has to download the whole file and re-compute the parity based on a new
set of constrain blocks. However, to modify a data block, the client only needs to
download the requested block and the considering parity. After updating the data
block and computing the new parity symbol, the parity symbols have to permuted
and re-encrypted to preserve the privacy of data against server.
• Variable Length Constrain Group (VLGG): to overcome the drawback of ΠR−D
technique in insert/delete a data block, symbols are assigned to constraint groups
on the basis of the content of symbols instead of the position of symbols in ΠR−D.
As a result, the data owner is able to update (insert and delete operations) the sym-
bol, by only downloading the affected parity and updating the considering parity
symbols of the considering constraint group.
They also combined Reed-Solomon codes (Reed & Solomon, 1960) with Cauchy
Matrices (Plank & Xu, 2006) in order to reduce communication overhead of RS and
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support efficient dynamic updates. In addition, the Cauchy Reed Solomon codes are two
times faster than classical form of Reed Solomon.
2.4.2 Proofs of Retrievability-based methods
Proof Of Retrievability (POR) is a type of cryptographic Proof Of Knowledge (POK)
to ensure the privacy and integrity of outsourced data in the untrusted cloud without hav-
ing to download the files. It also provides data recovery and mitigates data corruption by
performing Forward Error-correcting Codes (FECs) in which the verifier has capability
to recover the file when a considerable fraction of the file is uncorrupted, as proved by
spot-checks. The main difference between POR and PDP is the security features which
they provide, because in the POR approach the client’s data are completely stored on the
server, while the PDP-based methods only guarantee that most of the client’s data are kept
in the server and a small portion of the data may be lost by the server. In addition, the
POR method stores a redundant encoding of the client data on the server (Cash, Küpçü,
& Wichs, 2012).
2.4.2.1 Static POR methods
The first POR method was proposed by Juels and Kaliski Jr. (2007) on the basis
of sentinel blocks (called sentinel) which are concealed among other data blocks before
transferring to the cloud. The sentinel blocks are computed by using a one-way function
( f ) as follows:
sentinles : {s1,s2, ...,sw}→ si = f (key, i) (2.13)
Since modifying part of data affects sentinel blocks with a certain probability, the
verifier only requires checking whether a random set of sentinel blocks is intact. The
main disadvantage of POR scheme is that the number of challenges is limited by the
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number of embedded sentinel blocks in to file.
Shacham and Waters (2008) designed another POR scheme, namely Compact Proof
Of Retrievability (Compact POR), to improve the efficiency and security of POR protocol
and overcome its limitation in terms of number of challenge. The Compact POR method
relies on applying the BLS homomorphic signature (Boneh, Lynn, & Shacham, 2004)
to aggregate the tags and generate a single short tag as a proof to minimize the network
computation overhead (for t challenges) during checking the integrity of blocks. The
authors used the Reed-Solomon code (Plank & Xu, 2006) to support the error recovery
in two ways, such as public verifiability, and private verifiability. The main difference
between these two methods is that in private verifiability model the verifier needs to know
the DO’s private key in order to validate the proof message rather than the DO’s public
key in public verifiability model.
Non-trivial (linear or quadratic) communication complexity is another crucial issue
of the existing POR schemes which are designed based on the homomorphic commitment
schemes because of the linear sizes of their proves. Yuan and Yu (2013a) proposed a new
POR method (that is called Public Proof Of Retrievability (Public POR))with constant
communication cost by using a constant size polynomial commitment technique (Kate,
Zaverucha, & Goldberg, 2010). A polynomial commitment scheme helps the prover to
generate a polynomial with a short string as a proof which can be used to audit the cloud.
Since the polynomial commitments have a constant size and the overhead of opening
a proof is constant, this scheme decreases the communication cost in POR scheme. In
order to reduce the complexity of the challenge message of Public POR method, the
authors follow the challenge technique in (Dodis, Vadhan, & Wichs, 2009) in which a
Hitter sampler technique (Goldreich, 1997) is used to randomly select the indices of input
file as a challenge.
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2.4.2.2 Dynamic POR models
The main limitation of most the POR methods is to fail to support dynamic data up-
date efficiently as the server is not able to distinguish the relation between the data blocks
and encrypted codewords. Cash et al. (2012) overcome this difficulty and implement a
Dynamic Proof Of Retrievability (Dynamic POR) by combining the POR scheme and
Oblivious Random Access Machine (ORAM) technique (Goldreich & Ostrovsky, 1996;
Goodrich, Mitzenmacher, Ohrimenko, & Tamassia, 2012). ORAM is a hierarchical data
structure which allows the client to read and write from/to the outsource data in a private
way by hiding the location of the codewords. This data structure includes several levels
of hash tables to hold encrypted address-value pairs while the lower tables have more
capabilities. The top tables store the most recently accessed data and the bottom tables
keep the least recently used data. When the client wants to read a data block, the address
of data is hashed to checks the proper location in the top table. If the data is found, some
random positions in the remaining tables are checked to hide the location of found data
blocks. Otherwise, the next level table is checked to find the hashed address again. After
finding the data by checking the tables, the found data needs to be written into the top
table. The write operation is easier than read in which the encrypted address and value
are stored in the top table.
Figure2.13 shows the construction of Dynamic POR method, the data owner divides
the input file into l blocks with size k and then applies the systematic Reed-Solomon code
to each block for ensuring the data recovery on each block. In the last step, the data owner
uses the ORAM technique to outsource the data and keep a short local state.
Fairness is another inherent security issue in dynamic POR methods in which a dis-
honest data owner legally accuses the truthful cloud service provider for tampering its
outsourced data. Zheng and Xu (2011) addressed this issue by proposing a Fair-Dynamic
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(Sookhak et al., 2014)
Proof Of Retrievability (FD-POR) method on the basis of 2-3 range based tree (rb23Tree)
and Hash-Compress-and-Sign (HCS). Rb23Tree is an authenticated data structure based
on a 2-3tree in which all intermediate nodes have two or three children and the leaves
should be located on the same height. This tree is applied for authenticating a specific
value that is stored at a specific leaf. The main feature of this tree is that leaf removal
and leaf insertion involve logarithmic complexity. However, balancing rb23Tree is an
expensive task and imposes a huge computational burden on the server.
The core idea underlying the FD-POR approach is securing the block index when
computing the authentication tag in the compact POR scheme to prevent data leakage. As
it is shown in Figure 2.14, the FD-POR scheme consists of four steps. In the first step, an
input file is divided into n blocks (F = { f1, f2, ..., fn}) and then each block is encrypted
by using ECC (F = { f ′1, f ′2, ..., f ′n, f ′n+1}). In the next step, the encrypted blocks are
hashed (Hi = h( f ′1)) to construct the rb23Tree with leaves H1,H2, ...,Hn,Hn+1. Finally, a
flat tree is constructed to achieve the fairness.
47
Pr iKi
FEnF =
F

F
2
F
3
Fn
F’

F’
 F’

F’n
Root
H
n- H	nH0 H
 H H Hi Hi+
Step3: Make rb23Tree 
with N+1 level
λ
Step 4 : Construct flat 
Fairness tree with 
leaves λ1,…,λn
+= iii HHhashl
λ

λ

λ

λn
Step 2: compute Fi’
 by ECC
Step 1: divide F 
into n blocks 
Figure 2.14: The main idea behind FD-POR scheme (Sookhak et al., 2014)
2.4.3 Proof of Ownership-based Methods
Data deduplication is a type of single-instance data storage (data compression) tech-
niques, which is used to remove data redundancy and duplicate copies of data to provide
a cost-efficient storage (Mandagere, Zhou, Smith, & Uttamchandani, 2008; Meyer &
Bolosky, 2012). Deduplication techniques are responsible to recognize a common set
of bytes within or between files (known as chunks) and allow the storing of a single in-
stance of each chunk, irrespective of the number of repetitions. In typical storage system
that support data deduplication, a client needs to convince the server of having a copy of
the outsourced file by sending a hash of file to the server. If the server finds this hash
in the database, accepts the client’s claim and marks the client as the owner of that file;
otherwise ask him to upload the entire file. However, this method is vulnerable against
some security attacks, because anyone who gets the hash value is permitted to access the
file (Halevi, Harnik, Pinkas, & Shulman-Peleg, 2011; Harnik, Pinkas, & Shulman-Peleg,
2010).
Halevi et al.(2011) considered these security issues and proposed a deduplication
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scheme in which the data owner is able to convince the server without transferring the
file. This method (that is called Proof of Ownership (POW)) is constructed on the basis
of Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) and Collision-Resistant Hash (CRH) functions. Since in
the POW scheme the client needs to persuade the cloud, the role of prover and verifier is
reversed. When the server receives the input file (F), he maps it to L bits using Pairwise
Independent Hashing (X = hPIH(F)), and then constructs a Merkle tree based on it
(R = MHT (X)). The verifier returns the root of the MHT and the number of its leaves
(RMHT , nl) as the verification information. During the Proof step, the client computes
the sibling-paths of all the leaves as a proof of deduplication and sends it to the cloud.
Finally, the verifier validates the sibling-paths with regard to MHT (X). Figure2.15 shows
the core idea behind the Proof of ownership method.
Design a secure data deduplication method to provide simultaneously data auditing
and deduplication in cloud computing is contradictory because security and efficiency
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aspects seem to be two conflicting goals. In other words, deduplication eliminates the
identical contents, while data security attempts to encrypt all the contents, and the same
contents can then be encrypted by two different keys to create different ciphertexts (Mar-
ques & Costa, 2011; Storer et al., 2008).
Zheng and Xu(2012) introduced the first Proof of Storage with Deduplication (POSD)
method by integrating two different concepts of Proof of Data Possession(PDP) and Proof
of Ownership (POW) with the purpose of providing both security and efficiency. This
method consists of four steps, such as key generation, uploading, auditing and dedupli-
cation. Before uploading the file to the cloud, the honest data owner is responsible to
generate two pairs of public and private keys for checking data integrity and deduplica-
tion. The data owner divides the file into n block with m bits and then computes the
block tags to upload to the cloud. The POSD method includes two challenge-response
algorithms such as data auditing, which the data owner validate the correctness of data
by sending challenge to the cloud as a prover, and deduplication, which the cloud verifies
the claim of a client for having a copy of outsourced data.
The POSD scheme needs to meet the following security requirements: (1) server
unforgeablity in which the server should provide a valid response to the client challenges
with non-negligible probability, and (2) (k,Θ) uncheatablity in which dishonest clients are
not able to deceive the server with non-negligible probability. The validity of the POSD
scheme depends on the reliability of the clients in terms of performing key generation,
while this assumption is not reasonable in the cross-multiple users and the cross-domain
environment of cloud computing.
Shin, Hur, and Kim(2012)showed that dishonest client is able to manipulate the key
generation step to create weak keys. As a result, this method fails to fulfill the unforge-
ablity and uncheatablity features as security requirements and it is vulnerable to some
attack scenarios such as (1) Malware Distribution: a malicious client uploads a file in
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the cloud and modifies it by attaching a malware to this file. This malware is distributed
among clients when they execute the deduplication step to take the ownership of the orig-
inal file, and (2) Unintended content distribution network: an adversary has capability to
transfer the data to the other malicious client through the cloud by using the weak key.
Shin et al.(2012) improved the security of POSD scheme by minimizing the client ca-
pability to control the key generation step. The core idea behind this method, namely
Improved POSD (I-POSD) is to blind the keys with random values, when the server re-
ceive the data and corresponding tags.
The POSD scheme (Zheng & Xu, 2012) also suffers from the linear communication
and computational cost on the client side regarding to the number of elements in each
data block and the number of checking blocks during data auditing step. As a result, by
increasing the number of mobile users, the communication and computational cost incur
a huge overhead on the client who utilizes the resource constrained devices (e.g. Smart
mobile phones) to access the cloud storage.
Yuan and Yu(2013b) proposed a new data storage auditing with deduplication ca-
pability to address the linear communication and computational cost on POSD scheme
based on polynomial-based authentication tags and homomorphic linear authenticators.
The communication complexity of auditing step in this method, that is called Public Cloud
Auditing with Deduplication (PCAD), depends on transferring a challenge message, the
aggregation tags of data blocks and the proof information which impose O(1) as a total
communication complexity on the client. However, the total communication complexity
in POSD method is O(s+ k) because the CSP needs to transfer k authentication tags of
the challenging blocks and s aggregated data blocks to the verifier, where s is the size of
data block.
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2.5 Comparison of Remote Data Auditing Schemes
This section compares the current remote data auditing protocols on the basis of the
taxonomy presented in Figure 2.3. The commonalities and differences in such protocols
are compared based on the presented parameters in such taxonomy. The comparison
parameters considered are: Scheme Nature (SN), Protocol Type (PT), security pattern,
Cryptography Model (CM), Batch Auditing (BA), Public Auditing (PA), dependability
(Dep), and Data Recovery (DR). Table 2.5 shows a comparison of remote data auditing
protocols based on such parameters and the assumptions and drawbacks of each method,
as well.
The attribute of the SN indicates the various types of RDA techniques single cloud
server that are divided in to provable data possession-based, proofs of retrievability-based,
proof of ownership-based methods.
The attribute of the security pattern indicates the cryptographic algorithms that are
used at the client side or the cloud side dynamically to audit or store data. The following
security patterns are practiced to audit the outsourced data in the current data storage
security schemes:
• Homomorphic encryption: as aforementioned in section 2.2.2.3, the homomorphic
encryption is one of the main cryptographic techniques that is used to perform
computation on the ciphertext without requiring to decrypt it. In single cloud server,
the homomorphic encryption mechanisms are categorized into the following six
types:
1. RSA Homomorphic: this technique allows the client to combine the computed
tags for multiple blocks of each file into a single value.
2. Paillier Homomorphic: It is a type of RSA homomorphic cryptographic sys-
tem in which the encryption of summation of blocks is equal to multiplication
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Remote Data Auditing Protocols on the basis of The Basic
Parameters
53
of encryption of individual blocks (Paillier, 1999).
3. Paillier Homomorphic:The Homomorphic Verification Token (HVT) is a mech-
anism which can be used in distributed clouds to check the integrity and iden-
tify the errors by using the universal hash function (Carter & Wegman, 1979)
and Reed-Solomon method (Plank & Ding, 2005) (e.g., (Ateniese et al., 2011,
2007; Hanser & Slamanig, 2013)).
4. Homomorphic Linear Authentication (HLA) utilizes a linear combination of
the individual data block to generate a single value. Because the HLA uses a
relatively small-sized BLS signature, it incurs less computation overhead than
HVT (e.g., (Shacham & Waters, 2008; Q. A. Wang et al., 2011; C. Wang,
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Chow, et al., 2012)).
5. Homomorphic Verification Response (HVR) is a mechanism that can be used
to verify the integrity in distributed cloud storage by combining multiple re-
sponses from several clouds into a single value.
6. Homomorphic MAC cryptosystem is used to protect the scheme against pol-
lution attack when the client and server have a shared secret key.
• (n,k)–Reed Solomon (RS) code: is one of the most important encryption mecha-
nisms to correct block-based error codes, and is applicable in a wide range of digital
communications and storage domain. The RS code encrypts k blocks to n block by
adding d = n−k bits parity to the original file to enable the DO to correct up to ⌊ k2
⌋
symbols.
• Symmetric key cryptography: In the symmetric encryption scheme, the sender and
receiver must establish a secure communication session based on a shared key and
also use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the message (Dutta, Barua, & Sarkar,
2004).
• Pairing-based cryptography: The main idea behind this method is to construct a
mapping between the elements of two cryptographic groups for building a cryp-
tosystem on the basis of the reduction of one problem in one group. It can be
included Cryptographic Bilinear Pairings and Diffie-Hellman assumption (Dutta et
al., 2004).
• Polynomial commitment scheme: Helps a committer to commit to a polynomial
with a short string that can be utilized by a client to verify claimed evaluations of
the committed polynomial.
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• Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH): is a valuable assumption for cryptographic
purposes and relates to the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm problem
within a cyclic group (Bao, Deng, & Zhu, 2003). This means that CDH is concerned
with the mathematical operations that are completed quickly, but difficult to reverse.
The second part of security pattern includes some data structures that are used to
provide dynamic data update, which are explained as follows:
• Rank-based skip list: is an authentication model that enables the client to efficiently
perform the update, delete, and insert operation on the outsourced data. Each of
the node in this data structure stores the homomorphic block tag of the data block
(T (b[i])), level of the node, the number of leaf nodes that are reachable from that
node as a rank of a node, searching variables, and a label of the node.
• Range-based 2-3 Tree (rb23Tree): is an authenticated data structure based on a
2-3 tree in which all nodes have two or three children, except the leaves which are
located on the same height. This tree is applied for authenticating a specific value
that is stored at a specific leaf (Zheng & Xu, 2011).
• Merkle Hash Tree (MHT): is a binary tree structure often used for data integrity
verification. In the MHT, the leaves are the hash values of the individual blocks
while the remaining nodes are calculated on the basis of the hash value for a com-
bination of the two children nodes (Q. A. Wang et al., 2011). Figure 2.16 shows a
MHT data structure for a file including four data blocks.
• Update Trees: This hash tree has three main features which make it different from
the other authenticated data structures such as (i) it is always balanced, (ii) its size
is independent of the number and order of dynamic operations or outsourced data
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blocks on the storage, and (iii) each node in such tree is consist of a range of block
indices instead of a certain index in MHT (Y. Zhang & Blanton, 2012).
The attribute of the cryptography model indicates a common methodology to design
the cryptographic protocols, including: (1) Standard model: In this model of computa-
tion, the complex assumptions, such as hash functions (MD5, SHA) are used to prove the
security of the scheme. However, achieving the security proofs in such a model is very
difficult. (2) Random oracle model: The hash functions in such a model are replaced by
a set of truly random functions to prove the security of the ideal system. It is noteworthy
to mention that whenever a method is secure using the random oracle model, the imple-
mentation of such a system is also secure in the standard model (Canetti, Goldreich, &
Halevi, 2004).
To analyze the efficiency of the remote data auditing approaches, there are several
metrics that should be considered: (1) Computational cost (Processing time): Data au-
diting approaches impose different computation overhead on the client as a verifier and
cloud service provider as a prover on the basis of their cryptographic algorithms. Client
computation indicates the computational resources that are used by the client to generate
the challenge and verify the proof message while server computation denotes the com-
putation resources that the server uses to process an update step or compute a proof for
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a block. (2) Communication cost shows the size of the challenge message sent to the
prover and the size of proof message received by the verifier. There are two techniques
to reduce computation and communication complexity in remote data auditing methods,
such as sampling and batch auditing. In the sampling technique, the input file is divided
into several blocks and a random number of blocks is used to perform batch processing
(Erway et al., 2009). The batch auditing technique decreases the size of the proof mes-
sage by sending a linear combination of random blocks to decrease the communication
overhead (Q. Wang et al., 2009). (3) The probability of detection: is the last factor which
represents the probability of detecting a cloud server’s misbehavior. The comparison of
the efficiency between some protocols based on the computation cost, communication
cost, and the probability of misbehavior detection are represented in Table 2.5, where n
is the number of blocks of each file, s is the number of sectors of a block, m indicates the
number of symbols of a block, t shows the number of blocks that will be changed, c is the
number of cloud service providers in multi-cloud, ρ and ρk are the probability of block
corruption in a cloud server and kth server in the multi-cloud, and Ω(.) is the proof size
in the hash function.
2.6 Open issues and challenges
In this Section, we highlight some of the most important issues and challenges in
deploying and utilizing the remote data storage auditing approaches as the future research
directions.
2.6.1 Lightweight data auditing approach for mobile cloud computing
Developing lightweight remote data auditing approaches to improve the security of
mobile users without any further limitation and requirement is a significant challenge in
mobile cloud computing environment. Dividing the huge files into some blocks, gen-
erating the specific tag for each block, computing a challenge, and verifying the proof
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Table 2.2: Efficiency comparison between some remote data auditing protocols
Protocols Client com-
putation
Server com-
putation
Communication
complexity
Probability of
detection
PDP (Ateniese et
al., 2007)
O(t) O(t) O(mn) 1− (1−ρ)t
Scalable PDP
(Ateniese et al.,
2008)
O(t) O(t) O(t) 1− (1−ρ)mt
DPDP(I) (Erway
et al., 2009)
O(t logn) O(t logn) O(t logn) 1− (1−ρ)t
DPDP(II) (Erway
et al., 2009)
O(t logn) O(nε logn) O(t logn) 1 −
(1−ρ)Ω(logn)
R-DPDP(VLCG)
(B. Chen &
Curtmola, 2012)
O(t logn) O(t logn) O(log2n) N/A
Public PDP (Q.
A. Wang et al.,
2011)
O(t logn) O(t logn) O(t logn) 1− (1−ρ)t
PP-PDP (C. Wang
et al., 2012)
O(t logn) O(t logn) O(t logn) 1− (1−ρ)t
EPP-PDP (K.
Yang & X. Jia,
2012)
O(t) O(ts) O(t) 1− (1−ρ)ts
I-PDP (Y. Zhu et
al., 2012)
O(t + s) O(ts) O(t + s) 1− (1−ρ)ts
RDPC (L. Chen,
2013)
O(t) O(t) O(t) N/A
POR (Juels &
Burton S. Kaliski,
2007)
O(t) O(t) O(mn) N/A
Compact POR(I)
(Shacham & Wa-
ters, 2008)
O(t) O(t) O(mn) 1− (1−ρ)t
Compact POR(II)
(Shacham & Wa-
ters, 2008)
O(t + s) O(t + s) O(s) 1− (1−ρ)mt
DPOR (Cash et
al., 2012)
O(tlog2n) O(t2log2n) O(t2log2n) N/A
POSD (Qingji
Zheng & Xu,
2012)
O(t) O(n) O((m+ t)n) N/A
message are particular tasks in data auditing mechanisms that noticeably increase overall
execution time and decrease the lifetime of resource constrained devices such as smart
phones and tablets.
A feasible approach to decrease the side effect of remote data auditing approach on
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mobile devices is to utilize the efficient public verification approach. As a result, the mo-
bile user delegates the challenge and verification steps to the trusted third party to release
the mobile devices from the communication and computation overhead of these steps.
However, some of remote data auditing approaches (e.g. DPOR (Cash et al., 2012)) are
unable to support the public verification technique. On the other hand, when the secu-
rity of data is very important, data owners prefer to use the private verification methods.
Therefore, implementing lightweight remote data auditing methods demands lightweight
computation and communication techniques to be applicable on mobile devices.
2.6.2 Dynamic data update
To update a single bit of data or changes a bit location of the outsourced data in
static data auditing methods, the data owner has to download the whole data, change the
location of more than half bits of files, and upload it again to the cloud which incurs high
communication overhead on the data owner. Therefore, dynamic data update is a vital
feature to almost all remote data auditing approaches in the cloud and mobile cloud com-
puting due to the dynamic nature of the data involved, such as electronic documents and
log files. However, one of the main limitations of POR-based and POW-based methods
is the need to support dynamic data update (Erway et al., 2009). Although Cash et al.
(2012) proposed a first POR-based method to overcome the dynamic data update issue
in cloud computing, the lack of public verification feature makes this method impractical
for mobile cloud computing.
On the other hand, current dynamic data update methods also impose high stor-
age and computation overhead on data owner (especially on resource restriction devices)
resulting from re-balancing the stored tree, increasing the size of the tree. The main ap-
proach to address this issue is to develop an update tree with independent size of the
outsourced data and without having to balancing procedure. As a result, enabling mobile
60
users to efficiently and dynamically update their outsourced data requires future research
and developments (Sookhak, Talebian, et al., 2014; Sookhak et al., 2015).
2.6.3 Data access control over shared data
Today, many web-based service providers including the web services, blogs, and
other web-based application providers tend to outsource their data to the cloud or remote
servers. It is clear that users of such services require gaining access to their data anytime,
anywhere, and simultaneously performing updating operations such as deleting, modify-
ing or inserting new data to the stored data. For instance, most of the popular blogs which
are hosted by a cloud-based server permit their subscribers to delete, append, or remove
blog content, freely. However, most of the methods which are designed to ensure data in-
tegrity are unable to fulfill these requirements completely or will incur extra computation
and high storage overhead on the users.
Data deduplication is a necessary feature of remote data checking mechanisms which
has a noticeable effect on data communication and communication cost over cloud user.
Though the POW-based approaches permit multi users to get access to the shared data,
the users are unable to write, delete or modify the data in the same time. In this context,
the remote data auditing methods need to manage multi-user access to the shared data on
the cloud without leaking or losing data.
2.6.4 Data computational integrity
Recently, many data owners tend to outsource an arbitrary computation service to a
cloud service provider (Cachin, 2011). Ensuring the integrity outsourced computations
enable a client to transfer a computation step of remote data checking in PDP-based,
POR-based and POW-based method to another computer and then, without executing
the computation, merely checks the integrity of computation in the new computer (Setty,
Blumberg, & Walfish, 2011). In other words, the practical and unconditional verifica-
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tion is capable of contributing significantly to the development of remote data auditing
approaches by reducing the computational overhead. However, current data integrity
methods are unable to support data computation integrity as well. Migrating computa-
tional functions along with data into the cloud and using challenge-response approach to
verify computation and data integrity can be a possible way to address this issue. This
technique, which is useful for resource constraint devices to reduce the computation cost
still needs certain degree of attention.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter explains the concept of cloud computing, mobile cloud computing and
discussed the different techniques used to ensure data integrity and privacy in the cloud
and mobile cloud computing. It analyzes the current RDA methods in detail with the aim
of highlighting the similarities and differences in the thematic taxonomy based on various
parameters. It discusses the issues in the state-of-the-art RDA approaches and focused on
the challenges pertaining to the security requirements to provide optimal and lightweight
security frameworks. Several open challenges particularly, lightweight data auditing, dy-
namic data update, data access control, and computational integrity were presented as the
most important open challenges for future efforts.
Auditing outsourced data in cloud computing is an emerging research area, which
has been getting more attention in recent years. Current RDA approaches accomplish
data checking process in diverse modes. Several approaches only audit the integrity of
outsourced data, while a number of these approaches focus on error recovery and the
rest of approaches are able to check the data ownership as well. Two different types of
verification pattern are used, in private verification only the data owner is able to check
the integrity of data instead of the TPA in the public verification mode. The ultimate goal
of RDA is to preserve the integrity and privacy of outsourced data and computation in
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single and distributed cloud servers regardless of underlying resource restrictions.
Current RDA methods employ a homomorphic cryptosystem to verify the integrity
of the outsourced data, which incurs additional processing time and data transmission
process. As a result, additional computation and communication cost arises in the veri-
fication phase of such methods. Moreover, current RDA methods use different types of
hash trees to support dynamic data update. However, such data structure suffer from node
balancing issue result in additional computation cost on the auditor.
Hence, current RDA methods requires considerable processing time for performing
data integrity dynamically. In the next chapter, the problem statement of this research is
analyzed by using the emulation environment. For example, It can be seen that when the
size of outsourced file is large, the existing data structures are unable to efficiently support
dynamic data update operations.
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the required processing time and transmission processes to
verify the proof and perform data update operation for normal and large scale files in the
traditional remote data auditing methods. The main objective of this chapter is to analyze
the aforementioned research problem in section 1.3. The measurement parameters to
analyze and establish the problem consists of processing time of data integrity, processing
time of dynamic data update for normal and large scale files, data communication cost of
dynamic data update, and processing time for frequent data update.
The problem analysis is carried out on the basis of the traditional integrity-based
remote data auditing methods, due to the scope of the research. As mentioned in section
2.4, the integrity-based remote data auditing methods are divided into two categories
based on data update operations, such as static and dynamic. The first auditing method
that is selected for analysis is the Provable Data Possession (PDP) method (Ateniese et
al., 2011, 2007), which is known as a fundamental of static method in this area and has
relatively better performance than other methods as described in Table 2.2. Moreover,
most of integrity-based methods have been designed based on the PDP method. Section
2.4.1 explains that most of dynamic integrity-based method use the binary tree as a data
structure to support dynamic data update operations. In other words, such data structures
prevent the CSP to use the old version of data block as a proof message. Among such
methods, the Public PDP method (Q. A. Wang et al., 2011; C. Wang, Wang, Ren, Cao,
& Lou, 2012) is used in the problem analysis section. This is because the public PDP
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shows better performance than other integrity-based dynamic methods as indicated in
Table 2.2. Thereby, public PDP has become a widely used auditing method in domain
and has attracted large number of citation in literature.
The processing time of traditional RDA methods (Ateniese et al., 2011, 2007; Q. A. Wang
et al., 2011; C. Wang, Wang, et al., 2012) is analyzed for different size of the outsource
files in remote cloud server nodes. On the basis of the literature, the size of normal file is
in the range of 10 MB -50 MB (Q. A. Wang et al., 2011; C. Wang, Wang, et al., 2012).
Moreover, most of the existing cloud storage applications allow the users to store docu-
ments from 10 MB to 50 MB, such as Google Drive (Google Docs, Sheets, and Slides
size limits, 2015).
The remaining parts of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 investi-
gates the additional processing time of data auditing in the existing schemes. Section
3.3 analyzes the additional transmission cost of dynamic data update in existing audit-
ing schemes. Section 3.4 studies the processing time of dynamic data update in static
auditing methods. Section 3.5 analyzes the effect of replay attack on static remote data
auditing methods. Section 3.6 presents the additional processing time of dynamic data
update of large-scale files in the traditional auditing schemes. The effect of frequent up-
dates on processing time of recent auditing methods is described in Section 3.7. Finally,
the conclusion of this chapter is presented in Section 3.7 with conclusive remarks.
3.2 Analysis of Processing Time of Traditional RDA Methods on the Auditor
Performing a data auditing technique incurs specific excessive amount of computa-
tion burden (processing time) to the both auditor and service provider based on the type
of cryptographic algorithm used. According to the RDA structure, processing time of
auditor includes the following costs:
(i) Processing time of setup step (PTs): The computational cost (processing time) to
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process a file and generating the tags;
(ii) Processing time of challenge step (PTc): The computational cost (processing time)
to select a certain number of blocks randomly as a challenge message;
(iii) Processing time of verification step (PTv): the required processing time to verify
the proof message.
Hence, the total processing time (∑PT ) of the RDA methods -that is incurred on the
auditor- is computed by Equation 3.1.
∑PT = PTs +PTc +PTv (3.1)
Since the data owner needs to divide the input file into n blocks and generate tags
only one time per file in the set up phase, most of the researchers exclude the processing
time of setup phase from the total processing time of RDA methods (Q. Wang et al.,
2009). In other words, in contrast to the other phases of RDA method, the setup phase
will not be repeated in the consequent auditing steps and no further cost will be incurred
on the auditors due to performing setup step. As a result, the total processing time is
calculated from Equation 3.2.
∑PT = PTc +PTv (3.2)
The processing time of data integrity in the remote data auditing methods are illus-
trated in Figure 3.1.
In the following, the processing time of data integrity in traditional data auditing is
analyzed on the basis of two steps- challenge, and verification.
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Figure 3.1: The Processing Time of Data Integrity in Remote Data Auditing Methods
3.2.1 Processing Time of Challenge Step
As mentioned in section 2.4.1 of chapter 2, in the challenge step of the traditional
RDA methods, the auditor needs to select a number of data blocks randomly on the basis
of the rate of data corruption in the server. For example, if the attacker or the untrusted
CSP modifies the outsourced data with the rate of 1%, the auditor must randomly choose
230 or 460 blocks of file to detect such misbehavior with probability of 90% or 99%
respectively. After selecting the indices of blocks by using pseudo-random permutation
technique, the auditor sends the list of indices as challenge to the server. The challenge
step in the traditional RDA methods is an identical process and incurs negligible pro-
cessing time on the auditor. Figure 3.2 shows the computation cost of challenge step in
traditional RDA methods.
3.2.2 Processing time of verification step
The processing time of the verification part is the most important cost in RDA
schemes. It is because the verification part is carried out several times by the auditor,
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Figure 3.2: Processing time of challenge step in traditional RDA methods for (a) 90%
probability, (b) 99% probability
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and such cost is directly incurred on the auditor.
When the challenge message is received in the PDP scheme, the CSP generates a
proof message including combination (T ) of requested tags and the hash of combination
of the requested blocks on the basis of challenge message (ρ). The set of (T,ρ) is sent
to the auditor as a proof message. Upon receiving the proof, the auditor verify the proof
message by using the Homomorphic Verifiable Tag (HVT) cryptosystem. However, ver-
ification step in public PDP method incur more computation cost on the auditor due to
applying the binary tree for supporting dynamic data update. In other words, when the
proof message is received in public PDP method, the auditor needs to re-construct a data
structure (that is called Merkle Hash Tree) to authenticate the message, which is a time
consuming process and incurs considerable computation cost on the auditor. Finally, the
auditor uses the Homomorphic Linear Authenticator (HLA) cryptosystem to verify the
proof message. The computation cost of verification step of traditional RDA methods for
normal file size in the range of 10 MB to 50 Mb and probability of detection 90% and
99% is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The graph shows that the computation cost of verification
step for PDP method is around 0.25 and 0.40 second when the probability of detection
is 90% and 99% respectively. Such cost rises dramatically to 0.284 and 0.810 second in
the public PDP method for 90% and 99% probability of detection respectively. The main
reason of this unwanted additional cost is using the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) as a data
structure.
Analysis of the computation complexity of data integrity indicates that performing
remote data auditing methods incur considerable processing time to the client. Decreasing
such processing time can play an important role in RDA area because the data owner
(auditor) is able to use the smart phones with limited CPU and power resources.
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Figure 3.3: Processing time of verification step in traditional RDA methods for (a) 90%
probability, (b) 99% probability
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3.3 Analysis of Communication Cost of Data Update for Normal File Size in Static
Integrity-Based Methods
To update a block of the outsourced file, the data owner needs to download a part of
data and upload it to the cloud after performing update operations. The transmission cost
of dynamic data update indicates the amount of transmitted data between the data owner
and the CSP during data update.
During the setup phase of PDP scheme (Ateniese et al., 2011, 2007), the data owner
generates a tag for each data block by using the following equation:
Ti = (h(v||i).g f [i])d mod N (3.3)
Where v and d are the data owner’s private key, N and g are the data owner’s public
key, and f [i] is the ith block of the file. The data owner outsourced the data blocks and
tags to the cloud and deletes the local copy of them. Assume that the data owner wants to
update the outsourced file by inserting a new block after block j. To achieve this goal, all
of the blocks after j must be shifted forward to provide a location for inserting the new
block. Since the tag of blocks depends on the location of the blocks, changing the position
of the blocks affects the tag of the blocks. Therefore, the data owner must perform the
following modifications:
(i) Download the outsourced file completely and retrieve the blocks after j.
(ii) Compute tags for a new block and the blocks after j.
(iii) Outsource the data blocks and tags to the cloud and deleting the local copy of file.
As a result, the communication cost of data update in such method consists of the
amount of data blocks that must be downloaded and uploaded for performing update
operations. Figure 3.4 illustrates the communication cost of updating a block in PDP
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Figure 3.4: Communication Cost of Updating a Block in PDP Method
scheme (Ateniese et al., 2011, 2007) when the size of outsourced is from 10 MB – 50
MB. As it is clear, inserting a single block in the random position of the traditional RDA
methods results in considerable communication cost on the auditor. The graph also shows
that such cost increases dramatically by increasing the size of file.
3.4 Analysis of Processing Time of data update for Normal File Size in Static
Integrity-based Methods
Dynamic data update operations consist of insert, delete, and modify operations.
Therefore, the processing time of dynamic data update includes the following costs:
(i) Processing time of data insert (CTi): When the data owner wants to update a single
block of the outsourced file by inserting a new block, the following process needs
to be performed by the data owner: (1) generating the tag of new block, (2) up-
dating the data structure by inserting a new block, (3) checking the integrity of the
outsourced data. Hence, the processing time of data insert is computed by Equation
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3.4.
∑PT i = PTnew−tag +PTstructure−update +∑PT (3.4)
Where PTnew−tag indicates the processing time to generate the new tag, PTstructure−update
indicates processing time to rearrange the data structure on the basis of data oper-
ations, and ∑PT is the processing time to check the integrity of the outsourced
file.
(ii) Processing time of delete (PTd): To delete a block, the data owner has to: (1) delet-
ing the block and updating the data structure, (2) checking the integrity of the out-
sourced data. Therefore, the computation cost of delete operation is computed by:
∑PT d = PTstructure−update +∑PT (3.5)
Where PTstructure−update is processing time for the data structure rearranging, and
∑PT is the processing time for checking the data integrity.
(iii) Processing time of data modification (PTm): the modify operation includes: (1) gen-
erating the tag of the modified block, and (2) checking the integrity of the out-
sourced data. Consequently, the computation cost of data modification is calculated
by:
∑PT m = PTnew−tag +∑PT (3.6)
Where PTnew−tag is the processing time to generate the tag of modified block, and
∑PT is the processing time to validate the data integrity.
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Therefore, the total processing time of dynamic data update operations (∑PTu) in-
cluding a set of insert, delete, and modify operations is computed by adding the process-
ing time of data insert (PTi), processing time of delete (PTd), and processing time of data
modification (PTm), as follows:
∑PT u = PTi +PTd +PTm (3.7)
To show the effect of updating blocks on processing time, a scenario is considered
in this research in which a new data block is inserted after a specific block that is selected
randomly. This scenario is repeated 10 times to insert 10 data new blocks randomly in
each file to demonstrate the effect of frequent data update. This experiment is performed
for different normal files (10 MB – 50 MB) in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Processing Time of Updating a Block in PDP
Method
File Size (MB) Number of Updates Processing Time (ms)
10
2 528.477
4 648.955
6 730.713
8 772.354
10 787.563
20
2 837.422
4 1261.309
6 1619.668
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.1 – Continued
File Size (MB) Number of Updates Processing Time (ms)
20
8 1910.137
10 2155.875
30
2 1176.953
4 1937.91
6 2620.918
8 3223.184
10 3772.586
40
2 1387.1
4 2358.972
6 3257.126
8 4078.904
10 4850.359
50
2 1617.568
4 2822.369
6 3965.359
8 5044.309
10 6081.066
The comparison of processing time for different size of files is also illustrated in
Figure 3.6. When the number of update operations are 2, the computation cost is in the
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Figure 3.5: Processing Time for Updating Different Blocks in Traditional RDA Methods
range of 528.5 ms – 1617.6 ms for 10 MB – 50MB files respectively. Therefore, it is
concluded that updating small number of data blocks in traditional RDA methods incur
significant processing time on the auditor.
Analysis the processing time and communication cost of existing RDA schemes
shows that performing update operations increase such cost dramatically. Moreover, the
size of outsourced block is directly related to the processing time and transmission pro-
cess of update operations.
3.5 Analysis of Replay attack of data update for Normal File Size in Static Integrity-
based Methods
The main disadvantage of most of static integrity-based RDA methods is that the
server is able to use the previous version of the data blocks for generating the response
message to pass the verifying phase during update operations (that is called replay at-
tack). For example, imagine that the data owner wants to change the ith block of the
outsourced data (b[i],T [i]) to (b′[i],T ′[i]) in PDP method, where T [i] and T ′[i] are the tag
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of the blocks. When the modified block and corresponding tag (b′[i],T ′[i]) is received,
the cloud server pretends that the requested block and tag are updated accordingly. After
that the data owner delete the local copy of the modified block and the corresponding tag.
However, there is no way in static integrity-based RDA methods to ensure whether or not
the block has been modified. As a result, when the data owner sends a challenge message,
the server is able to use the old version of this block to generate a valid proof message
for the data owner. It can be conclude that the static integrity-based RDA Method are not
able to securely perform data update operations.
3.6 Analysis of Dynamic Data Update Operations for Large Scale File Size in Dy-
namic Integrity-based Methods
One of the main application of cloud storage is to archive the sensitive data of the
ordinary users or organizations. The size of this information can be large and they will be
update infrequently. This section analyzes the computation cost of dynamic data update
operations on the traditional dynamic integrity-based data auditing methods for the large-
scale files that needs to be updated rarely. The size of file is considered between 1 GB
and 10 GB, because the maximum file size in most of the cloud storage is less than 10
GB. For example, the maximum size of file in Box is 2 GB to 5 GB (What’s the maximum
file size I can upload?, 2014), and OneDrive is 2 GB to 10 GB (Perez, 2014).
When a part of outsourced file is updated, the data owner needs to ensure that the
server is unable to use previous version of updated blocks to generate the response mes-
sage (Sookhak, Talebian, et al., 2014). One of the effective ways to overcome such an
important issue is making use of binary tree data structures, such as Merkle Hash Tree
(MHT) (Merkle, 1980). Although MHT data structure decreases the processing time of
data update for normal file size and enhance the security of method, such data structures
lack in considering the additional cost of updating large-scale files.
To demonstrate the effect of dynamic data update operation on processing time for
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large-scale file, a scenario is defined wherein the data owner updates a small number
of outsourced blocks (between 2 and 10) by inserting new blocks in random positions
or deleting blocks randomly. The size of each block is 8 KB and number of blocks is
from 125000 to 1250000. Table 3.2 explains the computation cost of updating a block
on applied data structures in the dynamic integrity-based data auditing methods. The
attribute file size indicates the size of the outsourced file. The attribute of number of
updates shows how many times the outsourced file are updated by inserting a single block
in a random position or deleting a random block. Finally, the processing time attribute
demonstrates the processing time to perform the update operations.
Table 3.2: Processing Time of Updating a Block in PDP
Method
File Size (MB) Number of Updates Processing Time (ms)
1
2 1.6122
4 3.2394
6 4.8521
8 6.4803
10 8.092
2
2 1.6282
4 3.2404
6 4.8756
8 6.4953
10 8.131
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.2 – Continued
File Size (MB) Number of Updates Processing Time (ms)
3
2 1.6304
4 3.2598
6 4.9005
8 6.5281
10 8.1603
4
2 1.6464
4 3.2768
6 4.9162
8 6.5476
10 8.202
5
2 1.6469
4 3.2998
6 4.9585
8 6.5966
10 8.262
6
2 1.6488
4 3.3051
6 4.9611
8 6.6232
10 8.279
7 2 1.6642
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.2 – Continued
File Size (MB) Number of Updates Processing Time (ms)
7
4 3.3279
6 4.98
8 6.6328
10 8.298
8
2 1.6806
4 3.3501
6 4.9937
8 6.6737
10 8.326
9
2 1.698
4 3.3568
6 5.0145
8 6.7972
10 8.3585
10
2 1.7022
4 3.362
6 5.0402
8 6.9102
10 8.4177
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Figure 3.6: Processing time of Data Update in traditional RDA methods when the number
of updates is 2
The main drawback of the binary trees is that after inserting a new data block in such
data structure (e.g. MHT), the auditor requires to make the tree balance and re-compute
the hash of root of the tree through a path from the new block to the root of the tree.
Performing this process incur considerable processing time on the auditor.
Figure 3.6 shows the processing time of data update in traditional RDA methods for
large-scale files (range in 1 GB to 10 GB) when number of update blocks is 2. It can
be seen when the size of file increases from 1 GB to 10 GB, the processing time of data
updates is raised from 1.6 s to 1.7 s.
The processing time of data update for large-scale files is illustrated in figure 3.7
when the number of updates is 4. The graph demonstrates that the difference of processing
time for a range of 1 GB to 10 GB is around 180 millisecond.
The processing time of data update for 6 and 8 times updates in the large-scale files
are displayed in figure 3.8 and figure 3.9. These graphs clearly shows that the difference
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Figure 3.7: Processing time of Data Update in traditional RDA methods when the number
of updates is 4
between the processing time of updating a single block in large-scale files is around 200
millisecond to 430 millisecond for 6 and 8 times data update respectively.
The processing time of data update for various range of large-scale files (from 1 GB
to 10 GB) is shown in Figure 3.10 when data owner performs data update 10 times. It is
clear that increasing the size of file to 10 GB result in additional computation cost on the
auditor (around 330 Millisecond).
In summary, re-arranging the data structure in traditional RDA methods (e.g. MHT)
caused to noticeable processing time on the auditor even though the number of update is
small. In other words, analysis of the defined scenario proves that updating only a small
part of the file in large-scale size incurs high processing time on the auditor. Moreover,
increasing the size of file has a direct relation with the processing time when the binary
tree data structure is used to support dynamic data update in the traditional RDA methods.
82
Figure 3.8: Processing time of Data Update in traditional RDA methods when the number
of updates is 6
Figure 3.9: Processing time of Data Update in traditional RDA methods when the number
of updates is 8
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Figure 3.10: Processing time of Data Update in traditional RDA methods when the num-
ber of updates is 10
3.7 Analysis of Frequent Data Update on Dynamic RDA Methods for Large-Scale
Files
The cloud storage can be used to store the users’ data of the large-scale data applica-
tions, such as social networks, and bank transactions. These applications allow the users
to perform a small but very frequent update (Naone, 2010).
As mentioned earlier in the Section 2.4.1.2 of chapter 2, traditional dynamic integrity-
based RDA methods use a specific data structure to perform dynamic data update effi-
ciently, such as MHT (Merkle, 1980). However, to perform frequent data update, these
data structures must be re-balanced frequently, which incurs considerable processing
time. To evaluate the effect of frequent data update operations on MHT data structure,
we consider a scenario wherein the data owner needs to perform 10 different number of
update operations (10 – 100) on two different outsourced files 1 GB and 10 GB. The
positions of the blocks are selected randomly when the size of each block is 4 KB. The
processing time of node re-balancing refers the required time to re-balance the data struc-
84
Figure 3.11: Comparison of processing time of node re-balancing for performing 10 and
100 times data updates
ture after inserting a new block in a random position of tree. Figure 3.11 shows the
comparison of computation cost of node re-balancing issue in MHT data structure for
different large-scale files when the number of data updates is 10 and 100. It can be seen
that by increasing the number of data updates in large-scale files, noticeable processing
time is incurred on the data owner due to node re-balancing issue.
3.8 Conclusion
Remote data auditing is a useful technique to ensure the integrity of outsourced data
in cloud storage systems. However, traditional RDA methods incurs additional processing
time on the auditor due to applying homomorphic cryptographic techniques.
Nowadays, the data owner is able to outsource different file size into the cloud stor-
age. Moreover, the stored data in the cloud storage systems can be updated by the data
owners frequently or infrequently on the basis of the application. As a result remote
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data auditing methods should have capability to support both of frequent and infrequent
data update for different size of files effectively. However, current data auditing meth-
ods are deficient in deployment of dynamic data update operations when the size of the
outsourced file is large. The existing RDA methods focus on performing dynamic data
update for normal file size by using different data structures, such as MHT. Therefore,
applying such methods for checking the integrity and updating the large-scale outsourced
data incurs significant computation cost on the auditor.
The evaluation shows that verifying the integrity of the outsourced data with normal
size (10 MB – 50 MB) by traditional remote data auditing methods incurs approximately
400 to 800 millisecond processing time on the auditor. The results demonstrates that
updating a single data block infrequently (between 2 and 10 times) when the size of file
is 1 GB, incurs 1612 millisecond to 8092 millisecond processing time on the auditor. By
increasing the size of the outsourced file to 10 GB, performing infrequent data update (2
– 10 time) incurs more processing time on the auditor (1702 to 8417 millisecond).
The effect of frequent data update on the applied data structure in the traditional
RDA methods is also examined by inserting a single block in random position of the
MHT data structure. This experiment repeated 10 to 100 times to clarify the additional
processing time of node re-balancing issue in traditional methods. The result shows that
the processing time of node re-balancing for inserting 10 blocks is from 92 millisecond
to 418 millisecond when the size of file is from 1 GB to 10 GB. By increasing the number
of update operations to 100, the processing time is raised from 914 millisecond to 4128
millisecond.
Hence, the current remote data auditing methods employ considerable processing
time for verifying the integrity and performing update operations in cloud computing. In
the next chapter, a new remote data auditing is proposed to fulfill these issues. Moreover,
a new data structure is also designed to support dynamic data update efficiently.
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CHAPTER 4
DYNAMIC REMOTE DATA AUDITING (DRDA) METHOD
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes in detail a novel remote data auditing method for addressing
the problem of additional processing time in the checking of the integrity of outsourced
data in cloud computing. The proposed method uses the characteristics of the algebraic
signature technique to effectually verify the correctness of the outsourced data. Moreover,
this method has capability to effectively support dynamic data update operations for large-
scale files by using a new data structure, namely divide and conquer table. The chapter
composes of the following sections.
Section 4.2 explains the proposed the Static Remote Data Auditing (SRDA) method
for auditing the outsourced data in the cloud storage by using algebraic signature. Section
4.3 presents the proposed Dynamic Remote Data Auditing (DRDA) method to efficiently
support dynamic data operations by introducing a new data structure (Divide and Conquer
Table). Finally, the conclusion of this chapter is presented in section 4.4 with highlighting
the usefulness of the proposed method.
4.2 Proposed Static Remote Data Auditing Method
We propose a novel dynamic remote data auditing method to verify the correctness
of outsourced data in the cloud computing. The proposed method incorporates the fea-
tures of algebraic properties, which incurs low computation cost on clients and server and
makes it suitable for various tasks in large-scale storage systems.
In traditional data auditing methods, the homomorphic cryptosystem is usually used
to generate a tag and verify the integrity of the outsourced data remotely that considerable
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Figure 4.1: Cloud Data Storage Audit Architecture
computation cost on the auditor. To address this issue, Static Remote Data Auditing
(SRDA) method focuses on utilizing the algebraic signature for generating the tags and
checking the correctness of the data in the cloud storage system.
The architecture of the SRDA method in cloud and mobile cloud computing domain
comprises of four main components (Figure 4.1), as follows:
DO who outsources the data in the cloud through a mobile device, laptop or personal
computers. DO is able to check the integrity of the data and update the data in the
cloud by using insert, append, delete operations.
CSP: is an entity with a large amount of space to store owner’s data. The CSP is respon-
sible for generating the response message to prove the possession of the outsourced
data.
TPA: Because performing an auditing task introduces performance overheads at the DO
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side, the audit task is preferably delegated to an entity called the TPA. The TPA is
a trusted entity with expertise and capability to perform the auditing task on behalf
of the DO. By employing a TPA, users (especially with limited computing power,
storage and connectivity) are alleviated from the burden of expensive auditing tasks.
Although the TPA is considered as a trustworthy and reliable entity for data audit-
ing, it may be curious at the same time. Therefore, one of the important issues in
the data audit service in the presence of a TPA is to prevent data leakage during
auditing and preserve the privacy of data.
User (A/B/C): is an entity (individual or enterprise) who is registered by the DO and
granted access to the outsourced data for reading the data.
Remote data auditing services follow response-challenge procedure in which (1) The
DO, firstly, pre-processes her file, generates some metadata, and hands over metadata to
TPA. At this point, DO is not required to be involved in the audit process anymore, (2)
To check correctness of data in the cloud, TPA generates a random challenge message
and sends it to the CSP (the DO is also able to generate the challenge message when the
TPA is not supported by RDA service), (3) When Cloud storage receives the challenge,
computes the corresponding response and sends it to the TPA, and (4) After receiving a
response from CSP, the verification is carried out to find out whether or not the CSP has
correctly stored the outsourced file. It is important to mention that in order to reduce the
overhead of the audit process only a small fraction of whole file is queried.
In the rest of this section, a secure algorithm is presented to remotely audit out-
sourced data in cloud computing based on the algebraic signature technique. the pro-
posed remote data auditing method consists of the four phases. such as (1) Setup phase,
(2) Challenge phase, (3) Response phase, and (4) Verification phase. The following sec-
tions explain the aforementioned steps.
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4.2.1 Setup Phase
The Data Owner (DO) firstly divides the input file F in to m blocks F [1] , F [2] , . . . , F [m].
Each data block F[i] is also divided into n sectors indicated as F [i] [1], F [i] [2], . . . , F [i][n]
by using the data fragment technique. If the number of sectors in a data block is less than
n, the DO simply increases the number of sectors to n by appending the number of zero
as new sectors to the considered block. Afterward, the DO generates: (1) a secret key by
executing the KeyGen algorithm, (2) a unique file id ( f id) for each file by using FidGen
algorithm, and (3) a unique tag (Ti) for each block of data file on the basis of the alge-
braic signature technique by calling the TagGen algorithm. Finally, the DO sends the data
blocks along with the corresponding tags and file ID ( f id,F[i],Ti,Ci)mi=1 to the CSP and
delete the local copy of the file and tags from the local storage.
KeyGen(1k)→ (pk,sk). This probabilistic key generation algorithm takes a security
parameter k as an input and produces a pair of public and private key. The private key
includes a secret hash key skh to compute hash H(.) and a file id secret key skFid to sign
a message. The public key is also used to verify the signature.
FidGen(F,skFid)→ ( f id). This algorithm creates a unique file id ( f id) for each file
(F). To achieve this goal, the DO (data owner) firstly generates a unique fingerprint
( f print = Filename||m||n) for each file consisting of the file name (Fname), number of
blocks (m), and number of sectors (n). After that, the fid is generated for each file by
concatenating the fprint and its signature that is computed under skFid,as follows:
f id = f print||SignskFid( f print) (4.1)
TagGen(F,skh,skFid)→ (T,C). This algorithm is used to compute a single tag for
each block based on the algebraic signature of the considering block. The tag of each
block (i) consists of two parts, as a block tag (Ti) and tag controller (Ci), that are com-
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puted by using the formula:
Ti= Sγ( f [i] ||Hskh(τ)) (4.2)
Ci = nγ
n
∑
j=1
Hskh(τ).γ j−1 (4.3)
where, τ indicates the concatenation of fid and index of block (τ = f id||i), and γ is
a non-zero elements in the Galois field for generating algebraic signature.
4.2.2 Challenge Phase
To verify the integrity of outsourced data, the auditor requires sending a challenge
message to the server. The challenge message is composed of a subset of c random ele-
ment of set [1,m] data blocks. The auditor also generates a random coefficient for each
block to make sure that server possesses each one of the challenged blocks. The indices
and coefficients ({csi,νi}ci=1) are computed by using pseudo-random permutation (Im-
pagliazzo, Levin, & Luby, 1989) keyed with a fresh randomly-chosen key for each chal-
lenge message. It is because of preventing the server from anticipating the block indices.
Moreover, the pseudo-random permutation prevents server from keeping a combination
of the data blocks instead of the original blocks. Finally, the auditor sends the challenge
message (chal = {csi,νi}ci=1) to the server.
4.2.3 Response Phase
Upon receiving the challenge message (chal = {csi,νi}ci=1), the server computes the
response message on the basis of the challenge message.The response message consists
of two parts (µ,σ), as follows.
(i) µ part. The first part of response message (µ) is computed by linear combining of
the selected c blocks of the challenge phase. In other words, µ contains n sectors
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µ1,µ2, · · ·µn that are computed by making XOR considered sectors of selected c
blocks (Equation 4.4).
µ j =
csc∑
i=cs1
νi. f [i][ j] (4.4)
For example, assume that the auditor selected blocks 2, 5, and 7 as a challenge
message and sent them as a challenge message to the server. Therefore, µ involves
n sectors µ1,µ2, · · ·µn of such three blocks that are computed by making XOR the
sectors of 2th,5th, and 7th data blocks of the outsourced file in the cloud storage,
as follows (for simplifying this example, the value of the coefficients(ν) are not
considered).
µ =


µ1 = f [2][1]⊕ f [5][1]⊕ f [7][1]
µ2 = f [2][2]⊕ f [5][2]⊕ f [7][2]
.
.
.
µn = f [2][n]⊕ f [5][n]⊕ f [7][n]
(4.5)
Figure 4.2 shows how the sectors of µ (µ1,µ2, ...,µn) are generated by using n
sectors of three blocks F[2],F[5] and F[7].
(ii) σ . part The second part of the response message (σ) is calculated by aggregating the
authenticator tags of the selected blocks in the received challenge by the following
Equation.
σ =
csc∑
i=cs1
νi.(Ti⊕Ci) (4.6)
Finally, the server sends the response message ( f id,µ,σ) to the verifier.
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Figure 4.2: Linear combination of requested data blocks as a part of response message
(µ).
4.2.4 Verification Phase
When the response message is received, the auditor firstly verifies the signature of
the f id under DO’s public key (pk) and reject the message if the signature is invalid.
Otherwise, the auditor recovers the file name ( f name), number of blocks (m), and number
of sectors (n). Then, the auditor checks the integrity of the outsourced blocks by:
σ
?
=
n
∑
j=1
µ jγ j−1 (4.7)
Figure 4.3 shows the process of our data auditing scheme for cloud computing.
4.3 Dynamic Data Operations
Dynamic data update is an important characteristic of auditing schemes that enables
the cloud user to update the outsourced data by using insert, delete, modify, and append
operations without requiring to download the whole data. However, the server is able to
use the previous version of the data blocks for generating the response message to pass the
verifying phase during update operations (that is called replay attack). To prevent such
attack and support dynamic data update, we propose a data structure that is called Divide
and Conquer Table (D&CT). This data structure helps the auditor to store an abstract
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Figure 4.3: Interaction of Component of DRDA Method.
information of data blocks.
The D&CT consists of two components: Logical Index (LI) and Version Number
(VN). The LI indicates the original index of data block in the server and the VN indicates
the current version of data block on the basis of number of updates. When a data block is
updated, the considering VN in the D&CT must be incremented by 1. The index of each
block in the D&CT also denotes the physical position of the outsourced data block.
The D&CT data structure must be created by the DO before outsourcing a data block
to the cloud. In other words, before generating a tag for each data block during the setup
phase, a new entity including (LI = i,VN = 1) is also appended to the D&CT. Moreover,
when the DO computes a tag for each data block, the abstract information of data needs
to be inserted into the tags by setting τ = f id||LI||VN. It is because to prevent the server
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Figure 4.4: The structure of Initial D&CT.
to obtain enough information to deceive the auditor by forging the tag from the dynamic
operations. Otherwise, the malicious server may forge the tag without having information
about the secret hash key when the same τ value is used more than one time. Figure 4.4
shows the details of the proposed data structure (D&CT).
The D&CT must be stored in the local storage of the DO or the auditor who are re-
sponsible for managing the D&CT during update operation. Although such data structure
empowers our scheme to support dynamic data update operations, managing the D&CT
data structure during insert and delete operations imposes high computation overhead on
the auditor. For example, to insert a new data block after the ith block, the data owner
must shift n− i blocks down. Moreover, the data owner must shift up n− i data blocks
for deleting the ith block. Therefore, by increasing the size of file (i.e., large scale files),
a huge number of data block must be shifted during insert or delete operations that in-
curs computation overhead on the client side. Figure 4.5 illustrates the insert and delete
operations by using D&CT and their effects of shifting blocks.
To overcome this issue, we reduce the size of the D&CT by dividing it to k data
structures in which each of such data structures is able to store
[
n
k
]
of the data blocks. As
a result, when the DO decides to insert a new block after the ith block, the data owner
only needs to shift
[
n
k
]− i data blocks. The experimental results show that the proposed
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Figure 4.5: Shifting Blocks in Insert and Delete Operations.
data structure is able to support the large scale data efficiently. Each of the D&CTs most
also hold the maximum and minimum range of stored data. For example, the range of ith
D&CT is from (i−1)[nk
]
+1 to i
[
n
k
]
. Such ranges need to be modified during insert and
delete operations.
The number of divisions (k) is computable by comparing the overhead of these two
type of D&CTs during insert and delete operations. As aforementioned previously, the
insert or delete operations are carried out in the simple D&CT by shifting the remaining
blocks that leads to considerable overhead on the auditor O(n). However, the second data
structure only inures o(nk ) as a computation overhead on the auditor. It is because the
data blocks are stored in k arrays instead of an integrated data structure and the blocks of
one D&CT needs to be shifted in each time. Furthermore, in the worst case, our method
incurs O(k) to find the location of the block. Therefore, the proposed method is efficient
if and only if:
k+ nk 6 n⇒ k+
n
k −n 6 0⇒
k2 +n−nk
k 6 0 (4.8)
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Since k > 1, then:
k2 +n−nk ≤ 0⇒


kmin = n−
√
n2−4n
2
kmax = n+
√
n2−4n
2
(4.9)
Therefore, the optimal number of divisions is computed by using the following for-
mula:
1− nk2 = 0⇒ k
2 = n⇒ kopt =
√
n (4.10)
Table 4.1 shows the minimum, maximum, and optimized number of D&CT tables in
the proposed method when the size of outsourced file is between 1 GB and 100 GB and
the size of each block is 4 KB.
Table 4.1: Processing Time of Updating a Block in PDP
Method
File Size (GB) Number of blocks (n) kmin kmax kopt
1 125000 1.000008 124999 353.55339
2 250000 1.000004 249999 500
3 375000 1.000003 374999 612.37244
4 500000 1.000002 499999 707.10678
5 625000 1.000002 624999 790.56942
6 750000 1.000001 749999 866.0254
7 875000 1.000001 874999 935.41435
8 1000000 1.000001 999999 1000
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.1 – Continued
File Size (GB) Number of blocks (n) kmin kmax kopt
9 1125000 1.000001 1124999 1060.6602
10 1250000 1.000001 1249999 1118.034
20 2500000 1 2499999 1581.1388
30 3750000 1 3749999 1936.4917
40 5000000 1 4999999 2236.068
50 6250000 1 6249999 2500
60 7500000 1 7499999 2738.6128
70 8750000 1 8749999 2958.0399
80 10000000 1 9999999 3162.2777
90 11250000 1 11249999 3354.102
100 12500000 1 12499999 3535.5339
As mentioned earlier, data owner requires to use the abstract information of each
block in such data structure during the tag generation. Since, we divide the D&CT to
several data structures, we compel to add the D&CT number to the tag of each block to
prevent the server from using the old version of files. As a result, the data owner computes
a new τ by:
τ = f id||DN||LI||VN (4.11)
Where, f id is the file id, DN shows the block stores in which D&CT, LI indicates the
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logical index, and V N is the version number of the block. Finally, the tag of each block
is generated by using Equation 2.
In the rest of this section, we discuss how our method performs dynamic data oper-
ations, such as modification, insert, delete and append by using D&CT data structure in
details.
4.3.1 Data Modification
Supporting data modification is the important requirements of remote data checking
techniques in which the Data Owner (DO) has capability to modify a part of the specified
block. Suppose that the DO wants to modify the ith block of the file F( f [i]) to f ′[i]. The
DO executes the modification algorithm to perform the following modifications:
1. Finding the location of the considered block. The D&CT that holds the required
data block can be approximately identified by ki =
⌊
i
n
k
⌋
+ 1 where i indicates the
index of block, and nk is the number of data blocks in each D&CT. Finally, the result
is compared by the maximum and minimum ranges of the obtained D&CT (ki).
2. Increasing the version number of identified block by 1 (V N′ =V N +1).
3. Generating a new block tag for modified data block by:
T ′i = Sγ( f ′ [i] ||Hskh( f id||DN||LI||VN′)) (4.12)
C′i =
n
∑
j=1
Hskh( f id||DN||LI||VN′).γ j−1 (4.13)
4. Sending the modification request message to the CSP, which includes ( f id, i, f ′[i],T ′i ,C′i)
Upon receiving the modification request message, the CSP replaces the block f [i]
with f ′[i] and update the verion of data block by replacing the tag (Ti,Ci) with
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(T ′i ,C′i). Figure 4.6 shows that the data owner modify block f [12] when the number
of entities in each of table is 5. It is clear that the data owner only needs to increase
the NV of this block.
4.3.2 Data Insert
To insert a new data block ( f ∗[i+1]) after the ith block of the file F ( f [i]), the DO
needs to run insert algorithm to perform the following modifications:
1. Finding a D&CT that stores the ith block of the file F and the accurate position of
the new block (p) in the found D&CT.
2. Constructing a new row (LI∗,VN∗), inserting it after pth block of the found D&CT,
and shifting the subsequent blocks
⌈
n
k
⌉− p one position down. The DO also sets
the logical index of data block LI∗ = Max(LI)+ 1 and the version number of the
block VN∗ = 1.
3. Increasing upper and lower bounds of subsequent D&CTs by 1. The upper bound
of the current D&CT also needs to be increased.
4. Generating a block tag (T ∗i+1,C∗i+1) of the new data block by:
T ∗i+1= Sγ( f ∗ [i+1] ||Hskh( f id||DN||LI∗||VN∗)). (4.14)
C∗i+1 =
n
∑
j=1
Hskh( f id||DN||LI∗||VN∗).γ j−1 (4.15)
5. Sends the insert request message to the CSP, which includes ( f id, i + 1, f ∗[i +
1],T ∗i+1,C∗i+1). When the CSP receives such the message, the new data block and
the considering tag are inserted after position i in the file.
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Figure 4.6 illustrates how data owner inserts a new data block after 7th block of the
input file ( f [7]). This block is located in 3th row of the second data structure (D&CT 2[3]).
Therefore, the DO only needs to shift 3 entities down to insert the new block (LI∗,VN∗) =
(16,1). Furthermore, DO must increase upper bound of D&CT2(UB2 =UB2+1), lower
bounds of D&CT3(LB3 = LB3+1), and upper bound of D&CT3(UB3 =UB3+1) respec-
tively.
4.3.3 Data Append
The append operation refers to the insertion of a new data block into the end of
data blocks. IN this situation, the Do only needs to insert a new row to the end of the
last D&CT without having to shift any entities of the D&CTs. For instance, Figure 4.6
shows that to append a new block, the data owner creates a free row for the last table and
increases its upper bound (UB3 =UB3 +1).
4.3.4 Data Delete
The delete operation is opposite the insert operation in which the ith block of the file
F( f [i]) is removed from the D&CTs. To achieve this goal, the DO finds the D&CT that
contains the required block ( f [i]) and the position of the requested block (p) on the basis
of the D&CTs ranges. Then, the found block is removed by shifting all of the subsequent
blocks
⌈
n
k
⌉− p one position up. Moreover, the upper and lower bounds of subsequent
D&CTs are decreased along with the up range of current D&CT. Finally, The DO sends
a request to delete the ith block of the file to the server.
For example, as it is shown in Figure 4.6, to delete a 4th data block ( f [4]), the data
owner only needs to shift up 1 rows ( f [5]) and the upper and lower bounds of next tables
will be reduced (LB2 = LB2 − 1),(UB2 = UB2− 1),(LB3 = LB3 − 1),(UB3 = UB3−
1)along with the upper bound of the first table (UB1 =UB1−1).
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Figure 4.6: Managing modification, Insert, Append, and Delete Operations using D&CT
4.4 Conclusion
We propose a remote data auditing method on the basis of algebraic signature prop-
erties, which allows the client to check data possession in cloud storage efficiently while
incurring a fewer computational overhead on cloud side and client side compares to Ho-
momorphic cryptosystem. To support dynamic data update operations, such as insert,
append, delete, and modify operations, we extend our data auditing method by designing
an efficient data structure. The D&CT also helps the auditor to store an abstract informa-
tion of data blocks to prevent the server from using an old version to pass the verification
phase and performing the replay attack.
The D&CT data structure also empowers our method to be applicable for large-scale
data storage with least computation cost on client and server. It is because the divisibility
as the main feature of our data structure, which reduces the number of block that must be
shifted up or down during insert and delete operations.
In the next chapter, we justify the performance of our method, and compare with the
stat-of-the-art data auditing methods.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
5.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed DRDA method by using the
data collection method. It also explains the tools that was used to test the proposed scheme
and the statistical model used to process the collected data. Section 5.2 explains the
setup environment, programming tools, and the prerequisites to implement the proposed
remote data auditing scheme. It also includes a structure, which described the sampling
technique adopted in the data collection based on essential parameters of the proposed
scheme. Section 5.3 presents the data collection for evaluating the processing time of
proposed RDA method in distinctive phases, such as: setup, challenge, response, and
verification. Section 5.4 presents the data collection for evaluating the communication
cost of the proposed method in different phases. Section 5.5 presents the data collection
for evaluating the processing time of dynamic data update of the DRDA methods for
large-scale files (rarely update). The Data collection for evaluating the processing time of
frequent file update is presented in section 5.6. Lastly, section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
The proposed auditing method provides a novel solution to verify the integrity of the
outsourced data in cloud computing. The public and private data sets were employed to
test the DRDA method in different experimental scenarios, and the experimental results
are validated by benchmarking in the cloud computing environment.
The experiments include outsourcing and verifying the integrity of the different size
of the outsourced files, and updating various number of data blocks of the outsourced files
in the cloud. Then, to demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method, a variety
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of the implementation parameters were employed, such as the processing time and the
communication cost of data integrity for the normal files (10 MB – 50 MB) and the large-
scale files (1 GB – 10 GB), the processing time of data update for large-scale files (1 GB
– 10 GB), and the processing time of frequent data update for large-scale files (1 GB –
10 GB). Each experiment was conducted 20 times and the mean of each experiment (as
a processing time or communication cost) is computed and signified by considering 99%
confidence interval.
5.2 Evaluation of the Proposed DRDA Method
This section explains the methodology that was adopted to evaluate the proposed
method in cloud computing environment. It also presents the experimental setup, the
statistical method which illustrates the confidence level of data, along with the data col-
lection structure.
5.2.1 Experimental Result
Experimentation of the proposed remote data auditing scheme was carried out by
using a Eucalyptus private Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud. Eucalyptus stands
for “Elastic Utility Computing Architecture for Linking Your Programs to Useful Sys-
tems”. It is a Linux-based open-source software architecture which can be installed on
any Linux operating systems (such as RHEL, Centos, Ubuntu, and Debian) with no need
for modification. Eucalyptus was adopted in this thesis due to the following advantages:
• Its compatibility with Amazon AWS APIs 1 which means that we can use Euca-
lyptus commands to manage Amazon or Eucalyptus instances and move freely be-
tween a Eucalyptus private cloud and the Amazon Public cloud making it a hybrid
cloud.
1http://aws.amazon.com/s3/
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• Eucalyptus cloud computing architecture is highly scalable because of its distributed
nature and is flexible enough to support businesses of any size.
• It allows you to make your apps in-house on Eucalyptus and then migrate them to
the AWS.
Eucalyptus was designed initially at the University of California, Santa Barbara to
support high performance computing (HPC) research (Nurmi et al., 2009). The main
components the Eucalyptus are summarized as follows.
(i) Cloud Controller (CLC) is actually the entry-point into the cloud for administrators,
managers, developers, and end-users and is accountable for satisfying the request
of node managers. CLC is also responsible for making and implementing high level
scheduling decisions with the help of cluster controllers.
(ii) Cluster Controller (CC) generally executes on a computer system that has network
connectivity to the systems running Node Controllers (NCs) and to the machine
running the CLC. It actually manages a number of VMs and schedules their execu-
tion on particular NCs.
(iii) Node Controller (NC) is executed on every system that is selected for hosting VM
instances. It manages the life cycle of instances by making interaction with the OS
and the hypervisor running on the same system and the CC.
(iv) Storage Controller (SC) essentially implements block-accessed network storage such
as EBS (Amazon Elastic Block Storage). Subsequently, it has the capability to send
disk traffic across the local network to a remote storage site.
(v) Walrus permits different users to store persistent data. It set access control policies
for users to allow certain operations such as delete, create, etc. Its interface is,
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however, compatible with Amazon’s S3 to store and access both the virtual machine
images and user data. It is actually a file-level storage system while essentially
represents a block-level storage system.
The experimental setup is implemented using Java and C on a system with an In-
tel Core i5-2450M CPU at 2.5 GHz, and 4 GB RAM. The Pairing-Based Cryptography
(PBC) version 0.5.14 and elliptic curve of the 160-bit group are also used to simulate the
existing data auditing schemes (Wang, Wang, Ren, Lou, & Li, 2011; Yang & Jia, 2013).
All results are calculated by averaging of 20 trials.
5.2.2 Structure of Data Collection and Analysis
To implement the proposed data auditing scheme, three main parameters were con-
sidered: The file size, the length of the signature, and the detection rate (i.e., the prob-
ability of misbehavior detection). Figure 5.1 shows the taxonomy of implementation
parameters that are used during setup, challenge, response, and verification phases of the
data storage auditing method.
The parameter of file size indicates the size of input file, which the DO wants to
outsource in the cloud storage. The performance of DRDA method is determined along
the footing of two types of files, as (1) normal size in the range of 10 MB to 50 MBs
because current cloud storage applications permit the users to outsourced this size of
documents, such as Google Drive (Google Docs, Sheets, and Slides size limits, 2015). (2)
Large-scale file in the range of 1 GB to 100 GB because the maximum file size of the
cloud storage is less than 10 GB. For instance, the maximum size of file in Box is 2 GB
to 5 GB (What’s the maximum file size I can upload?, 2014), and OneDrive is 2 GB to 10
GB (What’s the maximum file size I can upload?, 2014).
The parameter of signature length indicates the number of bit of algebraic signature.
The algebraic signature has the capability to generate a short byte string from a large
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Figure 5.1: Structure of Implementation Parameters
block of the file. However, the byte string must be large enough to decrease the proba-
bility of collision and make it extremely unlikely. For Example, a 16 bit signature faces
a collision with probability 2−16, while the rate of accidental fit for 256 bit signature is
around 2−256. Thus, it is likely impossible to generate a coherent set of signatures with-
out knowing the secrets. The Algebraic signature is computed along the groundwork of
defining multiplication by using Galois’ theorem GF(2g) (Savas et al., 2010) as polyno-
mial multiplication modulo a generator polynomial where g can be 16 as half-word or
32 as word. The addition of two polynomials is simply computed by the bitwise XOR
of the string. Furthermore, the multiplication by the unknown X is carried out by a left
shifting and making XOR with a parameter corresponding to the generator polynomial.
As a result, a γ can be identified with the unknown, so that multiplication by γ includes a
left shift operation followed by a conditional XOR. Broder (1993) proposed a technique
to perform several shift operations at one time, by creating a table consists of a number
of decisions that are used as the XOR-operand.
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The parameter of detection rate indicates the degree of probability at which the server
misbehavior can be detected using the sampling technique. In other words, it indicates
the number of blocks of the outsource file that need to be checked by the auditor in order
to find the server misbehavior with a specified probability. The probability of detection
can be computed using this expression Px = 1− (1−Py)c Therefore, if the probability of
corrupted blocks Py = 0.01 and the probability of detection Px = 90%, the auditor needs to
check around 230 blocks. To achieve the probability of detection Px = 95% and 99% the
number of challenge blocks should be around 300 and 460 respectively (more explanation
in section 6.3 of chapter 6).
5.2.3 Performance Analysis
There are two important metrics that are applied to examine the efficiency of the
remote data checking approaches, such as processing time (computation cost) of data
integrity, and communication cost of data integrity.
5.2.3.1 Processing time
As discussed in section 3.2.3.1, remote data auditing methods incur excessive amount
of processing time on the auditor and cloud service provider as a prover on the basis of
their cryptographic algorithms and applied data structure in the method. Processing time
of remote data auditing methods can be evaluated in two situations, such as data integrity,
and dynamic data update, as follows:
(1) Processing time of data integrity. Remote data auditing method involves four phases;
setup, challenge, response, and verification. As explained in chapter 4, each phase
is responsible to perform an specific task and incurs an amount of computation bur-
den on the auditor or server. As a result, processing time of data integrity of the
proposed method includes the following processing times:
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(i) Processing time of setup phase (PTs). indicates the computational resources
that are used by the auditor to divide the file and compute the tags.
(ii) Processing time of challenge phase (PTc). is the time that is utilized to gener-
ate the challenge.
(iii) Processing time of verification phase (PTv). The most important cost in re-
mote data auditing methods is processing time of verification step in which
the proof message is checked by the auditor.
(iv) Processing time of response phase (PTr).) indicates the required time to pro-
cess and generate the proof message in the response step.
Among these processing times, PTs,PTc and PTv are incurred on the auditor and the
cloud server with unlimited computation cost only needs to tolerate the processing
time of response step.
(2) Processing time of dynamic data update. dynamic data auditing methods enable data
owners to update the outsourced data by using insert, delete, append, and modify
operations. During dynamic data update operations, the data owner needs to ac-
complish some tasks, such as find the location of requested block, generate new
tag, and re-balance the applied data structure on the basis of the update operations.
The require time to execute the update operation tasks is called the processing time
of dynamic data update (more explanations section 3.2.3.2).
5.2.3.2 Communication Cost
The communication cost shows the amount of data transfer between auditor and
server in different phases of auditing scheme. The proposed data auditing methods in-
volves three communication costs, such as communication cost of setup phase, commu-
nication cost of challenge phase, and communication cost of response phase, as follows.
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Figure 5.2: Performance analysis parameters
(i) The communication cost of the setup phase indicates the size of data blocks, tags,
and other auxiliary files that are sent to server during the setup phase. This com-
munication cost is incurred on the auditor.
(ii) The communication cost of challenge phase includes the size of the challenge mes-
sage sent to the prover. This communication cost is imposed on the auditor.
(iii) The communication cost of the response phase: the amount of the proof message
as a server response that are sent to the verifier is known as communication cost of
response phase (imposed on the server).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the performance analysis parameter for the remote data auditing
method.
According to the length of the signature and the probability of detection parameters,
there are 15 different situations for each of the files that must be considered in evaluation
of the proposed method (DRDA). For instance, Figure 5.3 shows the possible number of
examination of processing time for outsourcing a 10 MB file to the cloud.
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Figure 5.3: The Number of Tests of Processing Time for 10 MB file
5.2.4 Confidence Intervals in Data Gathering
As mentioned earlier in section 5.2, the primary data are gathered by testing the
proposed auditing method in different scenarios. Each experiment is conducted 20 times
to estimate each parameter based on the sample statistics. A confidence level is a way
to show the precision and uncertainty of a selective sampling method, which includes a
range of intervals determined from the specified confidence level, a statistic, and a margin
of error. The level of confidence is the probability that the parameter is truly captured by
the confidence range. The common confidence levels (α) are 90%, 95%, and 99%.
The confidence interval is generally computed by using the Equation 5.1.
Con f idenceInterval = SampleMean(CriticalValue)(StandardError) (5.1)
The critical value is derived from t-table or z-table on the basis of the level of the
confidence (α), number of samples, population standard deviation, and normality of vari-
ables. The z-table is used to calculate the confidence interval if: (1) the population stan-
dard deviation is known and the number of samples are bigger than 30, or (2) the number
of samples are less than 30, population is normally distributed, and the population stan-
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dard deviation is known. Equation 5.2 shows how the confidence interval is computed
using the z-table.
µ = ¯X ±Z σ√
n
(5.2)
Where µ is the confidence interval, ¯X is mean of samples, z is the critical value
that extracted from z-table, σ is standard deviation, and n is the number of samples. For
example, the critical value (z) for a 95% and 99% confidence interval is 1.96 and 2.58
on the basis of the z-table. Moreover, indicates the standard error (E) that is used for
computing the confidence interval. The confidence interval also is in the range of ¯X−ZE
as a lower bond and ¯X +E as an upper bond.
In contrast to z-table, when the population standard deviation is unknown, the num-
ber of samples are less than 30, and the population is normal; the confidence interval is
computed based on the t-table by:
µ = ¯X± tn−1 S√
n
(5.3)
Where S is the sample standard deviation, and tn−1 extracts from t-table. To eliminate
the human error in computing the confidence interval, the IBM SPSS2 as a well-known
statistical software is utilized. The following sections present the data collection in dif-
ferent experiments to evaluate DRDA method.
In the remaining of this chapter, we explain the impractical results of the proposed
remote data auditing method in the real environment.
2http://www-01.ibm.com/software/my/analytics/spss/products/statistics/
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5.3 Data Collection for Processing Time of Data Integrity
This section presents the processing time of the proposed data auditing scheme in
the setup, challenge, response, and verification phases respectively.
5.3.1 Processing time of setup phase
In the first step of DRDA method, the data owner needs to divide the file into m
blocks and each block is divided into n sectors. Then, a unique tag is generated for each
of the blocks of the input file. Performing this process incurs computational burden on the
auditor. However, the setup step only carried out one time for each file. Table 5.1 shows
the processing time in the setup phase of the proposed remote data auditing scheme on
the client side. The attribute of file size shows the size of an input file that needs to be
outsourced to the cloud. The attribute of signature length indicates the length of algebraic
signature that is used to generate the tags of the blocks. The attribute of processing time
of the setup phase indicates the required time for preprocessing the file.
Table 5.1: Processing Time in the Setup Phase of DRDA
method for Normal File Size
File Size (MB) Signature Length (b) Processing Time (ms)
10
16 756845
32 262817
64 175482
128 132574
256 113179
20 16 1540664
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.1 – Continued
File Size (MB) Signature Length (b) Processing Time (ms)
20
32 546013
64 356409
128 267600
256 225753
30
16 2264003
32 789339
64 610332
128 400714
256 341512
40
16 3054354
32 1036636
64 702073
128 549325
256 459677
50
16 3771161
32 1291138
64 941757
128 732689
256 598921
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Table 5.2 illustrates the processing time of the setup phase for large-scale data files
when the length is 256 b.
Table 5.2: Processing time in the Setup Phase of DRDA
method for Large-Scale File Size
File Size (MB) Signature Length (b) Processing Time (ms)
1 256 12294697
5 256 61329453
10 256 122968256
5.3.2 Processing time of challenge step
In the second phase, the auditor has to select 230, 300, and 460 blocks randomly
and generate 230, 300, and 460 coefficients respectively to check the integrity of the
outsourced file with 90%, 95%, and 99% the probability of detection (more explanation
about challenge step in section 4.2.2 and explanation about probability of detection in
section 6.3). Table 5.3 shows the processing time of the change phase of the proposed
data auditing method when the size of files is the normal file size (in the range of 10 MB to
50 MB). The attribute of file size indicates the size of the outsourced file and the attribute
of probability of detection indicates the estimation of server misbehavior detection on the
basis of the number of blocks in the challenge message. The mean attribute shows the
processing time of challenge phase for different file size and probability of detection. The
attribute of standard error indicates the standard error of the means of processing time.
115
The lower bond and upper band attributes also show a lower limitation and an upper
limit of the sampling distribution (the mean of processing time) on the basis of t-table or
z-table.
Table 5.3: Processing Time of the Challenge Phase for Nor-
mal File Size
File
Size
(MB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
10
90% 11.52 0.60586 9.82545 13.2146
95% 12.52 1.01673 9.67628 15.3637
99% 19.64 1.15453 16.4109 22.8691
20
90% 13.12 0.72645 11.0882 15.1518
95% 15.72 0.91199 13.1692 18.2708
99% 25.84 0.66 23.994 27.686
30
90% 11.52 0.60586 9.82545 13.2146
95% 12.52 1.01673 9.67628 15.3637
99% 19.64 1.15453 16.4109 22.8691
40
90% 12.2 0.73126 10.1079 14.2921
95% 14.95 0.93323 12.2801 17.6199
99% 22.3 1.52022 17.9508 26.6492
50
90% 15.9333 0.78962 13.5828 18.2839
95% 20.4667 0.38873 19.3095 21.6239
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.3 – Continued
File
Size
(MB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
50 99% 25 1.18322 21.4778 28.5222
Table 5.4shows the processing time of challenge phase for auditing the large-scale files in
different probability of detection.
Table 5.4: Processing Time of the Challenge Phase for
Large-Scale File Size
File
Size
(GB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1
90% 13.6 0.4 12.4093 14.7907
95% 15.8 0.2 15.2046 16.3954
99% 18.7333 0.20625 18.1194 19.3473
5
90% 12.9333 0.26667 12.1395 13.7272
95% 16.4 0.27255 15.5886 17.2114
99% 18.6 0.13093 18.2102 18.9898
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Table 5.4 – Continued
File
Size
(GB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
10
90% 12.8 0.27946 11.9681 13.6319
95% 15.7333 0.20625 15.1194 16.3473
99% 17.2 0.31168 16.2722 18.1278
5.3.3 Processing time of Response Phase
The third phase of the DRDA scheme is called response phase in which the server is
responsible for generating a linear combination of challenged blocks as a response mes-
sage. The processing time of the response phase for normal file size is illustrated in Table
5.5. The attribute of file size indicates the size of the outsourced file, which is in the range
of 10 MB to 50 MB. The attribute of probability of detection shows the number of se-
lected blocks as a challenge message that is 230 blocks for a 90% probability, 300 blocks
for a 95% probability, and 460 blocks for a 99% probability. The mean of processing
time attribute presents the average processing time of generating the response message.
Ultimately, the standard error, lower bond, and upper bond attributes are computed by
using equations 5.2 or 5.3 to show the standard error of the means of processing time, the
minimum, and the maximum value of the sampling distribution respectively.
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Table 5.5: Processing Time of the Response Phase for Nor-
mal File Size
File
Size
(MB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
10
90% 7607.16 18.6333 7568.7 7645.62
95% 9910.08 18.0214 9872.89 9947.27
99% 15224.9 26.2708 15170.7 15279.1
20
90% 7793.92 52.6163 7685.33 7902.51
95% 10143.4 50.7756 10038.6 10248.2
99% 15456.8 40.5481 15373.1 15540.4
30
90% 7942.72 72.7489 7792.57 8092.87
95% 10306.6 32.2553 10240 10373.2
99% 15768.7 78.2975 15607.1 15930.3
40
90% 7995.85 68.2266 7853.05 8138.65
95% 10910.4 161.946 10571.4 11249.4
40 99% 15945.4 292.806 15332.5 16558.2
50
90% 7851.73 45.6179 7753.89 7949.57
95% 10221.9 74.3653 10062.4 10381.4
99% 15731.7 154.799 15399.7 16063.7
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Table 5.6 shows the mean of processing time of generating response message for the
large scale files in rage of 1 GB to 10 GB.
Table 5.6: Processing Time of Response Phase for Large-
Scale File Size
File
Size
(GB)
Probability of
Detection
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1
90% 7896.47 6.13333 7883.31 7909.62
95% 10342.6 22.4 10294.6 10390.6
99% 16091.5 47.8667 15988.9 16194.2
5
90% 7688.2 1.2 7685.63 7690.77
95% 10674.1 41.4667 10585.2 10763.1
99% 15842.2 28.8 15780.4 15904
10
90% 7895.8 7.2 7880.36 7911.24
95% 10380.3 1.06667 10378 10382.6
99% 15607.5 3.86667 15599.2 15615.8
5.3.4 Processing time of verification step
After getting the response message, the auditor validates the integrity and rightness
of the outsourced file in the verification phase. Preforming this process incurs amount of
the processing time on the auditor. Table 5.7 presents the processing time of the verifica-
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tion phase on the basis of the size of files (normal size in the rage of 10 MB – 50 MB),
length of the signature (in the range of 16 b – 256 b), and probability of detection (90%,
95%, and 99%).
Table 5.7: Processing Time of the Verification Phase for Nor-
mal File Size
File
Size
(MB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
10
16
90% 229.6 0.5099 227.252 231.948
20 90% 230 0.70711 226.744 233.256
30 90% 231.6 0.92736 227.33 235.87
40 90% 232 0.83666 228.148 235.852
50 90% 231 1.18322 225.552 236.448
10 95% 229.6 0.92736 225.33 233.87
20 95% 230.2 0.66332 227.146 233.254
30 95% 230.4 1.43527 223.792 237.008
40 95% 229.8 0.66332 226.746 232.854
50 95% 229.4 0.74833 225.955 232.845
10 99% 243 0.70711 239.744 246.256
20 99% 244.6 1.02956 239.86 249.34
30 99% 244 1.04881 239.171 248.829
40 99% 243.8 0.5831 241.115 246.485
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.7 – Continued
File
Size
(MB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
50 16 99% 243 1.41421 236.489 249.511
10
32
90% 64.6 2.06398 55.0973 74.1027
20 90% 64 1.04881 59.1712 68.8288
30 90% 63.2 1.46287 56.4648 69.9352
40 90% 64 1.87083 55.3865 72.6135
50 90% 63.8 1.06771 58.8842 68.7158
10 95% 69.2 0.86023 65.2394 73.1606
20 95% 68.6 1.8868 59.913 77.287
30 95% 69.6 1.43527 62.9919 76.2081
40 95% 68.6 1.02956 63.8598 73.3402
50 95% 69.6 0.67823 66.4774 72.7226
10 99% 70.2 1.82757 61.7857 78.6143
20 99% 71.4 1.63095 63.8909 78.9091
30 99% 70.4 3.20312 55.6525 85.1475
40 99% 70.4 1.02956 65.6598 75.1402
50 99% 71.6 1.07703 66.6412 76.5588
10
64
90% 31.2 0.66332 28.146 34.254
20 90% 31.4 0.8124 27.6596 35.1404
30 90% 31.8 1.11355 26.6731 36.9269
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.7 – Continued
File
Size
(MB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
40
64
90% 31.8 0.86023 27.8394 35.7606
50 90% 32 0.70711 28.7444 35.2556
10 95% 34 0.83666 30.1479 37.8521
20 95% 34.6 0.5099 32.2524 36.9476
30 95% 34.8 0.8 31.1167 38.4833
40 95% 34.2 1.15758 28.8704 39.5296
50 95% 34.4 1.02956 29.6598 39.1402
10 99% 34.8 0.86023 30.8394 38.7606
20 99% 35 1.04881 30.1712 39.8288
30 99% 35.4 0.92736 31.1303 39.6697
40 99% 35 1.14018 29.7505 40.2495
50 99% 35 0.70711 31.7444 38.2556
10
128
90% 18.4 0.5099 16.0524 20.7476
20 90% 18.8 0.5831 16.1154 21.4846
30 90% 19 0.83666 15.1479 22.8521
40 90% 18 0.44721 15.941 20.059
50 90% 18.6 0.67823 15.4774 21.7226
10 95% 19.6 0.8124 15.8596 23.3404
20 95% 19.6 1.2083 14.0369 25.1631
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.7 – Continued
File
Size
(MB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
30
128
95% 19.8 0.86023 15.8394 23.7606
40 95% 19.2 0.86023 15.2394 23.1606
50 95% 19.8 0.37417 18.0773 21.5227
10 99% 20.2 0.86023 16.2394 24.1606
20 99% 20.6 0.92736 16.3303 24.8697
30 99% 20 0.70711 16.7444 23.2556
40 99% 20.2 0.66332 17.146 23.254
50 99% 20 0.83666 16.1479 23.8521
10
256
90% 12 0.31623 10.5441 13.4559
20 90% 11.8 0.73485 8.4167 15.1833
30 90% 12 0.70711 8.7444 15.2556
40 90% 11.6 0.92736 7.3303 15.8697
50 90% 11.4 0.92736 7.1303 15.6697
10 95% 12.4 0.8124 8.6596 16.1404
20 95% 12.6 0.5099 10.2524 14.9476
30 95% 12.2 0.5831 9.5154 14.8846
40 95% 12.8 0.37417 11.0773 14.5227
50 95% 12.2 0.66332 9.146 15.254
10 99% 13.2 0.37417 11.4773 14.9227
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.7 – Continued
File
Size
(MB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
20
256
99% 13.4 0.5099 11.0524 15.7476
30 99% 13.6 0.5099 11.2524 15.9476
40 99% 13.2 0.96954 8.7362 17.6638
50 99% 13 0.70711 9.7444 16.2556
The processing time of verification phase for large-scale file size (in range of 1 GB
– 10 GB) is shown in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Processing Time of the Verification Phase for
Large Scale File Size
File
Size
(GB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1
256
90% 12.6 0.67823 9.4774 15.7226
5 90% 12.2 0.37417 10.4773 13.9227
10 90% 12.8 0.5831 10.1154 15.4846
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Table 5.8 – Continued
File
Size
(GB)
Length of
Signature
(b)
Probability
of Detec-
tion
Mean of
Processing
Time (ms)
Standard
Error
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1
256
95% 13 1.04881 8.1712 17.8288
5 95% 13.6 1.43527 6.9919 20.2081
10 95% 13.2 0.8 9.5167 16.8833
1 99% 16.6 0.74833 13.1546 20.0454
5 99% 16.6 1.1225 11.4319 21.7681
10 99% 15.8 0.66332 12.746 18.854
5.4 Data Collection for Communication Cost of Data Integrity
Communication cost is an important standard that is employed to measure the ex-
ecution of the remote data auditing methods. In the remaining of this section, the data
collection of communication cost of setup phase, challenge phase, and response phase are
studied respectively.
5.4.1 Communication Cost of Setup Phase
The amount of transferred data from the data owner to the server during the setup
phase is known as an actual communication cost of setup phase. The transferred data
in the setup step consist of the blocks of the file, tags, and some auxiliaries. In this
study, to highlight the overload of setup phase, the size of input file is excluded from
the communication cost. Therefore, the imposed communication cost on the auditor is
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computed by:
ImposedCommunicationCost = actualCommucnicationCost−FileSize (5.4)
Table 5.9 presents the communication cost of setup phase for outsourcing the normal
file size. It can be seen that when the size of file is 10 MB and the size of signature is
16 b, the actual communication cost of setup phase is around 10.00976563 MB and the
imposed communication cost is 0.00976563 MB.
Table 5.9: Communication cost of Setup phase for Normal
File Size
File Size (MB) Signature Length (b) Imposed Communication Cost (MB)
10
16
0.00991
20 0.01967
30 0.02944
40 0.0392
50 0.04897
10
32
0.01967
20 0.0392
30 0.05873
40 0.07827
50 0.0978
10 64 0.0392
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.9 – Continued
File Size (MB) Signature Length (b) Imposed Communication Cost (MB)
20
64
0.07827
30 0.11733
40 0.15639
50 0.19545
10
128
0.07827
20 0.15639
30 0.23452
40 0.31264
50 0.39077
10
256
0.15639
20 0.31264
30 0.46889
40 0.62514
50 0.78139
Table 5.10 shows the communication of the setup phase for uploading large-scale
file (in range of 1 GB to 10 GB) into the cloud storage.
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Table 5.10: Communication cost of Setup phase for Large-
Scale File Size
File Size (GB) Signature Length (b) Imposed Communication Cost (GB)
1
16
0.00112
2 0.00209
3 0.00307
4 0.00405
5 0.00502
6 0.006
7 0.00698
8 0.00795
9 0.00893
10 0.00991
1
32
0.00209
2 0.00405
3 0.006
4 0.00795
5 0.00991
6 0.01186
7 0.01381
8 0.01577
9 0.01772
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.10 – Continued
File Size (GB) Signature Length (b) Imposed Communication Cost (GB)
10 32 0.01967
1
64
0.00405
2 0.00795
3 0.01186
4 0.01577
5 0.01967
6 0.02358
7 0.02748
8 0.03139
9 0.0353
10 0.0392
1
128
0.00795
2 0.01577
3 0.02358
4 0.03139
5 0.0392
6 0.04702
7 0.05483
8 0.06264
9 0.07045
10 0.07827
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.10 – Continued
File Size (GB) Signature Length (b) Imposed Communication Cost (GB)
1
256
0.01577
2 0.03139
3 0.04702
4 0.06264
5 0.07827
6 0.09389
7 0.10952
8 0.12514
9 0.14077
10 0.15639
It is important to mention that similar to the processing time of setup step, the effect
of communication cost of setup phase has not been considered by the researchers. This is
because the setup step is carried out one time for each file.
5.4.2 Communication Cost of Challenge Phase
To verify the integrity of the outsourced data blocks, the auditor must select a number
of blocks randomly as a challenge message on the basis of probability of detection rate.
For example, in the proposed method, the auditor has to randomly select the index of 230
blocks, 300 blocks, or 460 for achieving 90%, 95%, or 99% probability of misbehavior
detection. The amount of transferred data in this step is known as a communication cost
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of challenge step. Table 5.11 shows the computation cost of transferring the challenge
messages to the server for normal file size on the basis of length of the signature and
probability of detection attributes.
Table 5.11: Communication Cost of Challenge phase for
Normal File Size
File Size (MB) Signature
Length (b)
Probability of
Detection
Communication
Cost (KB)
10-50 16-256 90% 0.89844
10-50 16-256 95% 1.17188
10-50 16-256 99% 1.79688
The communication cost of challenge phase for verifying the integrity of large-scale
file size in range of 1 GB to 10 GB is also presented in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.12: Communication Cost of Challenge phase for
Large Scale File Size
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Probability of
Detection
Communication
Cost (KB)
1-10 16-256 90% 0.89844
1-10 16-256 95% 1.17188
1-10 16-256 99% 1.79688
5.4.3 Communication Cost of Response Phase
After receiving the challenge message and generating the response message, the
prover requires to transfer the response message to the auditor. The amount of the trans-
ferred message to the auditor as a response message is referred to the communication cost
of the response phase. Table 5.13 shows the communication cost with subject to length
of signature and probability of detection attributes for normal file size (10 MB – 50 MB).
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Table 5.13: Communication Cost of Response phase for
Normal File Size
File Size (MB) Signature
Length (b)
Probability of
Detection
Communication
Cost (KB)
10-50 16 90%-99% 4.00391
10-50 32 90%-99% 4.00781
10-50 64 90%-99% 4.01172
10-50 128 90%-99% 4.01563
10-50 256 90%-99% 4.03125
The communication cost of the response message or large-scale files in range of 1
GB to 10 GB is also illustrated in Table 5.14.
Table 5.14: Communication Cost of Response phase for
Large-Scale File Size
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Probability of
Detection
Communication
Cost (KB)
1-10 16 90%-99% 4.00390625
1-10 32 90%-99% 4.0078125
Continued on Next Page. . .
134
Table 5.14 – Continued
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Probability of
Detection
Communication
Cost (KB)
1-10 64 90%-99% 4.01171875
1-10 128 90%-99% 4.015625
1-10 256 90%-99% 4.03125
5.5 Data Collection for Processing Time of Dynamic Data Update Operations for
Large Scale File Size
As aforementioned in section 3.2.3 of chapter 3, the processing time of dynamic data
updates indicates the required time to perform update operations such as insert, delete,
and insert a block. To demonstrate the effect of dynamic updates on the DRDA method, a
scenario defined in which a data owner insert or delete a random data block. This scenario
can be repeated several times to show the effect of number of update operations on large
scale files in the DRDA method. Table 5.15 shows the processing time of dynamic data
update for large-scale files.
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Table 5.15: Processing Time of Data Update for Large-Scale
Files
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Number of
updates
Processing Time
of Data Update (s)
1-10
256
2 0.032
1-10 4 0.064
1-10 6 0.096
1-10 8 0.144
1-10 10 0.176
5.6 Data Collection for Processing Time of Frequent Data Update for Large-Scale
Files
Performing data update operations (including insert, delete, and append) on the
large-scale files can incur noticeable processing time on the auditor. This is because the
auditor need to re-balance the applied data structure in the data auditing methods. Table
5.16 shows the processing time of node re-balancing for frequent updates of large-scale
file in the proposed method. The attribute of processing time of node re-balancing indi-
cates the require time for re-structuring and re-arranging the nodes in the data structure of
the method. The attribute of the number of update indicates how many data operations are
carried out by the data owner. The attribute of file size indicates the size of the outsourced
file. The attribute of signature length indicates the size of algebraic signature that is used
in the DRDA method.
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Table 5.16: Processing Time of Data Update for Large-Scale
Files
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Number of
updates
Processing Time of
Node Re-balancing (ms)
1
256 10
0.0001
2 0.0001
3 0.0003
4 0.0005
5 0.0007
6 0.0009
7 0.001
8 0.0012
9 0.0014
10 0.0015
1
256 100
0.088
2 0.09
3 0.094
4 0.099
5 0.11
6 0.115
7 0.119
8 0.124
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 5.16 – Continued
File Size (GB) Signature
Length (b)
Number of
updates
Processing Time of
Node Re-balancing (ms)
9
256 100
0.124
10 0.125
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter presented the data collection method for examining the proposed remote
data auditing scheme based on two essential parameters: processing time and communi-
cation cost.
The DRDA scheme is tested on the real environment, and the benchmarking is used
to evaluate such a scheme. The data collection is performed by sampling the critical
evaluation parameters with in two different groups of files, such as (1) Normal file in the
range of 10 MB – 50 MB, and (2) Large-scale file in the range of 1 GB – 10 GB. The data
of each experiment is collected in the sample space of 20 values. The mean value for a
sample set of data in each of the experiments is computed based on the 99% confidence
interval.
As a conclusion, the DRDA scheme successfully leveraged the algebraic signature
properties to audit the integrity of the outsourced data in cloud computing. The evaluation
of the DRDA scheme in the real environment shows the viability of the proposed method
for performing data auditing remotely in different scenarios for various normal and large-
scale files.
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The next chapter analyzes the presented results of this chapter to indicate the useful-
ness of the proposed DRDA scheme.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the result of the experimental research of the proposed remote
data auditing scheme by using Eucalyptus as a private cloud. Moreover, the discussion
section goes one step further in looking over the results by comparing the result analysis
to show the validity of the proposed scheme. The conducted experimental research is
expected to fulfill the following objectives:
(i) To demonstrate the superiority of the proposed data auditing scheme to preserve
the integrity of outsourced data in the cloud computing in terms of processing time
and communication cost.
(ii) To find out the length of signature, which results in minimum processing time on
the auditor.
(iii) To show the dynamicity feature of the proposed method by presenting the D&CT
data structure and identify the feasibility of this scheme in facing the large-scale
file.
(iv) To demonstrate that the proposed method is viable for normal and large scale data
volume by evaluating the performance of the method in different scenarios.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 6.2 proves the security of
the proposed scheme, and section 6.3 analyses the security strength of the DRDA method
based on sampling strategy. Section 6.4 presents the empirical result of the processing
time of the DRDA method in different phases, such as: setup, challenge, response, and
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verification. The experimental result of the communication cost of the proposed scheme
is also explained in section 6.5. Section 6.6 presents the performance analysis of D&CT
data structure. Section 6.7 shows the effectiveness and validity of the proposed scheme by
comparing the result with state-of-the-art methods. Finally, section 6.8 presents summary
and conclusion of this chapter.
6.2 Security Analysis
This section presents the evaluation of the security of the proposed remote data au-
diting construction in terms of security and correctness.
The DRDA scheme relies on the algebraic signature that generates a small entity as a
signature for each block and is able to show any modifications in the original block. The
algebraic signature also has the capability to verify a large amount of stored data on the
distributed storage systems with minimum processing time and communication overhead
(Schwarz & Miller, 2006). As a result, the algebraic signature can be used for verifying
the correctness of outsourced data specially by using the resource restricted devices. On
the other hand, probability of collision in the algebraic signature is negligible (Litwin
& Schwarz, 2004). For example, if the length of signature is 64 bits, the probability of
collision is very small (2−64). In the following, two main properties of the algebraic
signature are listed that are used to proof the correctness of the proposed method.
Proposition 1. The algebraic signature of concatenation of two files F with length l
and G is computed by Sγ(F||G) = Sγ(F)⊕ lγSγ(G) (Litwin & Schwarz, 2004).
Proposition 2. The summation of algebraic signature of m blocks of a file F is equal
to the algebraic signature of summation of the blocks.
Sγ ( f [1])+Sγ ( f [2])+ . . .+Sγ ( f [m]) = Sγ ( f [1]+ f [2]+ . . .+ f [m]) (6.1)
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Proof. Assume that the File F is divided into m blocks and each of the blocks
consists of n sectors. Then:
Sγ( f [1])+Sγ( f [2])+ ...+Sγ( f [m])=
n
∑
j=1
f [1][ j].γ j−1 +
n
∑
j=1
f [2][ j].γ j−1 + ...+
n
∑
j=1
f [m][ j].γ j−1
=
n
∑
j=1
( f [1][ j]+ f [2][ j]+ ...+ f [m][ j]).γ j−1
=
n
∑
j=1
(
m
∑
i=1
f [i]).γ j−1
= Sγ ( f [1]+ f [2]+ . . .+ f [m])
As mentioned earlier in section 4.2 of chapter 4, after generating the public and
private keys, the DO (data owner) generates a unique f id for the input file. Then, the
DO calculates a unique tag (Ti,Ci) for each block of the file by using equation 4.2, and
4.3. Finally, the DO outsources the file id, data blocks, and tags to the cloud. Since the
algebraic signature of concatenation of two files F with length l and G is computed by
Sγ( f [i]|| f [ j]) = Sγ( f [i])⊕ lγSγ( f [ j]) (proposition 1), It is concluded that:
Ti =
n
∑
j=1
F[i][ j].γ j−1⊕nγ
n
∑
j=1
Hskh(τ).γ j−1
After receiving the challenge message, the CSP who replies decently to a query
({csi,νi}ci=1), generates a proof message including f id,µ and σ by:
µ j =
csc∑
i=cs1
νi. f [i][ j]
σ=
csc∑
i=cs1
νi.(Ti⊕Ci)
By extending σ on the basis of the properties of algebraic signature, it can be seen
that:
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σ=
csc∑
i=cs1
νi.((
n
∑
j=1
f [i][ j].γ j−1⊕nγ
n
∑
j=1
Hskh(τ).γ j−1)⊕nγ
n
∑
j=1
Hskh(τ).γ j−1)
=
csc∑
i=cs1
νi.
n
∑
j=1
f [i][ j].γ j−1
=
n
∑
j=1
csc∑
i=cs1
νi. f [i][ j].γ j−1
=
n
∑
j=1
µ jγ j−1
As a result, the correctness of the verification phase of the proposed scheme is proved
(σ
?
=
n
∑
j=1
µ j.γ j−1).
6.3 Security Strength
The proposed remote data checking scheme is constructed on the basis of a random
sampling strategy to reduce the workload on the server. In the sampling technique, the
auditor requires selecting a random number of blocks (c) out of m blocks of the file (F)
to perform batch processing. We analyze the probability of misbehavior detection of our
scheme based on the block sampling.
Suppose the CSP modifies y blocks out of the m outsourced blocks. Then, the prob-
ability of corrupted blocks is equal to py = ym . Let c be the number of blocks that the
auditor asks to verify the integrity of the outsourced data in the challenge step and n be
the number of sectors in each block. Let x be a discrete random variable that indicates the
number of blocks chosen by the auditor that matches the blocks modified by the CSP. We
compute the probability that at least one of the blocks picked by the auditor is matched
143
with one of the modified block by the server, namely Px(x > 1)) as follows:
px(x > 1) = 1− px(x = 0)
= 1− m− y
m
.
m− y−1
m−1 · · ·
m− y− c+1
m− c+1
= 1− (1− y
m
).(1− y
m−1) · · ·(1−
y
m− c+1)
= 1−
c−1
∏
i=1
(1− y
m− i)
Since (1− y
m−i) 6 (1− ym), then 1−∏c−1i=1 (1− ym−i > 1− (1− ym)c. Therefore, the
probability of detection px(x > 1) is:
px(x > 1)> (1− y
m
)c = 1− (1− py)c (6.2)
On the other hand, it is clear that (1− y
m−i)> (1− ym−c+1), then 1−∏c−1i=1 (1− ym−i)6
1− (1− y
m−c+1)
c
. Therefore:
px(x≥ 1)6 1− (1− y
m− c+1)
c (6.3)
As a result, from Equation 6.2 and 6.3, we conclude that the probability of detection
between (1− y
m
)c and 1− (1− y
m−c+1)
c
.
From the point of view of sectors, since, each of the block consists of n sectors, such
probability on the basis of sector corruption ps is computed by:
py > (1− ps)n ⇒ 1− (1− py)c > 1− (1− ps)nc
⇒ px(x > 1)> 1− (1− ps)nc
Suppose the Data Owner (DO) divides 1 GB file into 125000 blocks with size 8
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Figure 6.1: Number or required blocks as a challenge message under different number of
data corruptions.
KB and outsources the blocks in the cloud after generating the tags. Figure 6.1 shows
the number of challenge blocks (c) that are required to detect the different number of
corrupted blocks (y) when the probability of misbehavior detection is collected from a
set of Px = {0.7,0.8,0.9,0.99,0.99999}. For example, if the server modifies py = 0.01
of the outsourced blocks (m = 125000), the auditor needs to randomly select 230 blocks
as a challenge to achieve Px of at least 0.90. As it is clear, by increasing the number
of corrupted blocks, the least number of challenge blocks are required to achieve such a
probability of detection (i.e., only 22 blocks for py = 0.1,Px = 0.9 ).
Figure 6.2 illustrates the number of challenge blocks when the probability of misbe-
havior detection is between 0.5 and 1 with variable rate of data corruption. For example,
if the server modifies 0.01% out of the m outsourced blocks, the DO needs to randomly
select 527 data blocks as a challenge for detecting the corrupted blocks with probability
of 0.9949. It also can be seen when the rate of corrupted blocks is around 0.1%, the min-
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Figure 6.2: Number or required blocks as a challenge message under probability of mis-
behavior detection is from 0.5 to 1.
imum numbers of challenge blocks (between 34 and 51 data blocks) are required to audit
the outsourced data with probability 0.5 to 0.9949.
6.4 Performance Analysis of Processing Time
In this section, we assess the performance of the proposed remote data checking
method in terms of the computation burden (processing time) in the setup, challenge,
response, and verification phases.
6.4.1 Results of Setup Phase
As previously mentioned in Section 4.2.1.1 of Chapter 4, in the setup phase, the
data owner divides the input file into m blocks, generates the public and private keys, and
computes a unique tag for each block.
Figure 6.3 shows the processing time of setup phase for different size of files when
the signature length is 16 in 20 different experiments. When the size of input file is 10
MB, the incurred processing time on the data owner is 757 second. As it is clear, upon
increasing the size of file, more processing time is also imposed on the data owner because
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Figure 6.3: The Processing Time of Setup Phase When the Signature Length is 16.
of increasing the number of blocks. For example, the processing time of 50 MB input file
is 3771 second. This experiment is repeated when the length of signature is 32 (Figure
6.4), 64 (Figure 6.5), 128 (Figure 6.6), and 256 (Figure 6.7).
The processing time of setup phase for various sizes of the input file is compared
on the basis of the signature length (SL). As it is shown in Figure 6.8, by increasing the
length of signature from 16 bits to 256 bits, the less computation overhead is incurred on
the data owner. It is because, the number of sectors in each block are also increasing. For
example, when the size of file is 50 MB, the processing time is in the range from 3771 to
599 second for 16 bit signature and 256 bit signature respectively.
The Setup phase is a one-off time-consuming process, especially when the size of
files are big. In other words, most of the time the owner needs to carry out the setup phase
for only one time. In Figure 6.9, we show the computation overhead of large-scale files
from 1 GB to 10 GB when the length of signature is 256 bits. For instance, the processing
time of setup phase for computing tags of 5 GB file is around 61329 seconds.
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Figure 6.4: The Processing Time of Setup Phase When the Signature Length is 32.
Figure 6.5: The Processing Time of Setup Phase When the Signature Length is 64.
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Figure 6.6: The Processing Time of Setup Phase When the Signature Length is 128.
Figure 6.7: The Processing Time of Setup Phase When the Signature Length is 256.
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Figure 6.8: The Comparison of Processing Time in Setup Phase Based on the Various
Size of Signature.
Figure 6.9: The Processing Time of Setup Phase for Large Scale Files When the Signature
Length is 256.
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6.4.2 Results of Challenge Phase
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2.1.2 of Chapter 4, the auditor needs to select a
number of blocks as a challenge message. In this section, it shows how many computation
burdens are incurred on the auditor to achieve the 90%, 95%, and 99% probability of
detection.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the processing time for generating the random challenge that
consists of c random indices and coefficients ({csi,vi}ci=1) in 20 different experiments.
As it is clear, to achieve 90% probability of detection, the auditor must select 230 blocks
out of 2560 in 10 MB, 5120 in 20 MB file, 10240 in 30 MB, 5129 in 40 MB, and 12800
in 50 MB. By increasing the probability of detection, the auditor requires selecting more
data blocks as the challenge, which causes more processing time on the auditor. From
the other perspective, the processing time of challenge phase is independent from the
signature length and directly depends on the probability of detection. The graph also
shows that the size of file has a negligible effects on the processing time of this phase.
The processing time of generating the challenge messages for large-scale files is also
displayed in Figure 6.11 in which the number of blocks is 262144, 1310720, and 2621440.
The graph shows that the processing time of the challenge messages for 90% probability is
between 12.8 and 13.6 ms. When the probability of detection reaches 95%, the processing
time is in the range of 15.73 to 16.4 ms. Finally, by increasing the probability of detection
to 99%; the processing time of challenge phase is also increasing and fluctuating between
17.2 to 18.73 ms. Therefore, the growth rate of processing time is independent from the
size of file during the challenge phase, and the auditor is able to generate the challenge
massage several times with such cost. This is because the auditor only needs to choose c
random blocks, which incurs a small cost on the auditor.
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Figure 6.10: The Processing Time of Challenge Phase for different size of the file.
Figure 6.11: The Processing Time of Challenge Phase for Large-Scale Files.
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6.4.3 Results of Response Phase
When the server receives the challenge message, the response message is computed
on the basis of the received challenge, the stored blocks, and tags (the details can be found
in Section 4.2.1.2 of Chapter 4). Therefore, the processing time of the response phase is
incurred on the server. This section presents implementation results of response phase
with probability of detection 90%, 95%, and 99%.
Figure 6.12 shows the impact of file size on the processing time of the response mes-
sages for 16 bit signature. When the auditor sends a challenge message, including 230
blocks to achieve 90% probability, the computation time changes from 7.56 to 7.99 sec-
ond. For 95% probability of detection, the computation time is around 10 seconds and for
99% probability, the computation time is increasing from 15.24 to 15.87 second. There-
fore, it can be concluded that the computation time is roughly constant and is independent
from size of file.
The impact of probability of detection on the computation time of the response mes-
sages is also evaluated when the length of signature is 16 bits. Figure 6.13 demonstrates
that by increasing the probability of detection, the number of the requested blocks are also
increasing, which caused additional processing time to be incurred on the prover. For ex-
ample, the imposed computation on the server during the response phase of 10 MB file,
are 7.56 second for 90% probability. When the probability of detection increases to 95%
the processing time is also increasing to 9.95 second. In 99% probability, the processing
time reaches the 15.24 second. The graph also shows that the processing time of 50 MB
file reaches 7.99 s, 10.22 s, and 15.73 s for 90%, 95%, and 99% probability of detection
respectively.
Figure 6.14 illustrates the impact of normal file size on the computation time dur-
ing the response phase with 32 bits as the length of signature. As it is clear, when the
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Figure 6.12: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Response Phase
when signature length is 16.
probability of detection is 90%, the processing time fluctuates between 7.65, and 8.22 s.
By augmenting the probability to 95%, the processing time varies slightly from 9.91 s
to 10.49 s. Finally, a slight increase cost is also observed during the response phase of
normal file size with 99% probability (between 15.19 s, and 15. 78 s).
The effect of the different probability of detection on the processing time of response
phase for normal file size with 32 bit signature is shown in Figure 6.15. It can be seen
when the size of file is 10 MB, the processing time is about 7.65 s, 9.91 s, and 15.19 s
for 90%, 95%, and 99% probability of detection respectively. By augmenting the size
of file, the computation time of response phase is slightly increasing, for example; the
processing time in 50 MB file size is 8.22 s, 10.49 s, and 15.78 s on the basis of the
amount of detection probabilities.
Figure 6.16 displays the impact of the file size on the processing time of response
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Figure 6.13: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Response
Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 16.
phase for 64 bit signature. It can be seen that the size of file has an inconsiderable effect on
the processing time of the response phase. For instance, when the probability of detection
is 90%, 95%, or 99%, the processing time is about 7.85 s, 1026 s, or 15.48 s respectively.
The effect of probability of detection on processing time is also illustrated in Figure
6.17 for 64 bit probability. The computation time for the file with size 10 MB, is around
7.68 s, 9.89 s, and 15.19 s for different probability of detection. When the size of file
reaches 50 MB, the processing time approaches to 7.84 s, 10.49 s, and 15.81 s regarding
to probability of detection.
The effect of file size on the processing time for 128 bit signature is analyzed in Fig-
ure 6.18. This graph demonstrates that the size of file has not been considerable influence
on the processing time of response phase. For example, the processing time for 90%,
95%, and 99% of the probability is approximately 7.75 s, 10.52 s, and 15.84 s orderly.
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Figure 6.14: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Response Phase
when signature length is 32.
Figure 6.15: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Response
Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 32.
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Figure 6.16: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Response Phase
when signature length is 64.
The impact of probability of detection on processing time of response phase for 128
signatures is revealed in Figure 6.19. Regarding to this graph, when the size of file is
10 MB, the processing time is around 7.68 s, 9.92 s, and 15.26 s for different rate of
probability. As such, the processing time for 50 MB file size is 7.94 s, 10.60 s, and 16.12
s respectively.
The processing time of the response phase is also analyzed for 256 bit signature to
show the impact of file size on it in Figure 6.20. Similar to Figure 6.18, the processing
time for different file size is approximately constant. For example, when the probability
of detection is 90%, 95%, or 99%, the processing time of normal file size is around 7.58
s, 10.26 s, and 15.57 s orderly.
The effect of probability of detection on the processing time of response phase is
also evaluated in Figure 6.21 for 256 bit signature. Clearly, the processing time depends
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Figure 6.17: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Response
Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 64.
Figure 6.18: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Response Phase
when signature length is 128.
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Figure 6.19: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Computation Time during Re-
sponse Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 128.
Figure 6.20: The Impact of Normal File Size on Computation Time during Response
Phase When Signature Length is 256.
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Figure 6.21: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Response
Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 256.
on probability of detection directly.
Figure 6.22 compares the processing time of response phase for different size of
signature and probability of detection when the size of input file is from 10 MB to 50
MB. The graph demonstrates that the processing time of the response phase only depends
on the probability of detection. Moreover, the length of signature has a negligible effects
on the processing time of this step.
The processing time experiment of the response phase is also conducted for the large-
scale file size of input file (1, 5, and 10 GB) to prove that the processing time of response
phase is independent of the size of the file. Figure 6.23 displays that the computation time
of such files are around 7.8, 10.6, and 16.1 when the probabilities of detection are 90%,
95%, and 99% respectively. Moreover, Figure 6.24 shows the impact of probability of
detection on processing time during the response phase for large-scale file sizes. As it is
clear, by increasing the number of the probability, the processing time is also increasing.
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Figure 6.22: The Comparison of Processing Time for Different Normal File Size, Proba-
bility of Detection, and Signature Length during the Response Phase.
Figure 6.23: The Impact of Large Scale Files on Processing Time during Response Phase
When Signature Length is 256.
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Figure 6.24: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Response
Phase for Large Scale Files When Signature Length is 256.
6.4.4 Results of Verification Phase
The last phase of the proposed data auditing scheme is verification in which the
auditor checks the integrity of the outsourced blocks on the basis of the challenge and
the response message. Since the verification phase is carried out several times, and the
processing time of such phase is directly incurred on the auditor, verification is one of the
most important phases. The details of verification phase can be found in Section 4.2.1.3
of Chapter 4. In the rest of this section, we show the processing time of verification phase
by using various criteria.
Figure 6.25 illustrates the impact of file size on the processing time of verification
phase on the auditor for 16 bit signature. When the probability of detection is 90%, the
computation time is around 230 ms. By increasing the probability of detection to 95% and
99%, the computation time rises to 233 ms and 245 ms respectively. The graph also shows
that increasing the file size has a tangible effect on the processing time. It is because that
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Figure 6.25: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When the Signature Length is 16.
the verification of the outsourced blocks is only checked on the basis of the response and
challenge messages without requiring the content of the original blocks.
The effect of probability of detection on the processing time of the verification phase
is analyzed in Figure 6.26 for 16 bit signature. When the size of input file is 10 MB, the
processing time of verification phase for 90%, 95%, and 99% probability is about 229.60
ms, 232.60 ms, and 244.60 ms respectively. The graph also shows that by augmenting
the file size to 50 MB, the processing time raised slightly to 230.40 ms, 233.20 ms, and
244.60 ms.
The computation time of verification phase for 32 bit signature is displayed in Figure
6.27 to demonstrate the effect of file size. The result shows that the file size has not been
the considerable impact on the variation phase. For example, the computation time for
90%, 95%, and 99% probability is about 64 ms, 69 ms, and 70 ms orderly.
The effect of probability of detection on verification phase with 32 bit signature is
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Figure 6.26: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 16.
Figure 6.27: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When the Signature Length is 32.
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Figure 6.28: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 32.
shown in Figure 6.28. When the size of file is 10 MB, the imposed processing time on
the auditor for 90%, 95%, and 99% probability is 64 ms, 68.40 ms, and 70.20 ms orderly.
Such cost for 50 MB file is around 63.80 ms, 68.80 ms, and 70.80 on the basis of the rate
of detection.
Figure 6.29 explains the impact of file size on processing time of verification phase
with 64 bit signature. This graph also proves that the rate of such cost is approximately
constraint and is independent from the size of file (31 ms for 90% probability, 32 ms for
95% probability, and 35 ms for 99% probability of detection).
Figure 6.30 shows the effect of probability of detection on processing time of veri-
fication phase with 64 bit signature. Clearly the processing time of verification is around
30.80 ms, 32 ms, and 34.80 ms for 90% 95%, and 99% probability of 10 MB file. When
the size of file raise to 50 MB, the computation time approached 30.80 ms, 32.20, and
35.20 ms for different rate of detection.
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Figure 6.29: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When the Signature Length is 64.
Figure 6.30: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 64.
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Figure 6.31: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When the Signature Length is 128.
The effect of file size and probability of detection on processing time of verification
phase with 128 bit signature are illustrated in Figure 6.31 and Figure 6.32 respectively.
Figure 6.31 demonstrate that such cost has an insignificant fluctuation (from 18.40 ms to
18.80 ms for 90% probability, 19.60 ms to 19.80 ms for 95% probability, and 20 ms to
20.20 ms for 99% probability).
In Figure 6.32, it is clear that the probability of detection has a direct relation with
processing time of verification phase. For example, when the size of file is 10 MB, the
computation time is around 18.40 ms, 19.60 ms, and 20.20 ms on the basis of probability
of detection.
We conducted such experience to analyze the effect of file size and probability of
detection on processing time of verification phase for 256 bit signature in Figure 6.33
and Figure 6.34. From Figure 6.33, it can be understood that the computation time is
independent from the file size, and it is about 11.80 ms, 12.60 ms, and 13.40 ms for 90%,
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Figure 6.32: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 128.
Figure 6.33: The Impact of Normal File Size on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When the Signature Length is 256.
95%, and 99% probability orderly.
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Figure 6.34: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Normal File Size When Signature Length is 256.
Figure 6.34 proves that the processing time of the verification phase only depends on
the probability of detection. For instance, when the size of file is 30 MB, the processing
time is increasing from 11.80 ms to 13.60 ms by increasing the rate of detection from
90% to 99%.
The comparison of the processing time for different probability of detection during
the verification phase is shown in Figure 6.35. It can be seen that there are the direct
relationships between the processing time and the probability of detection. As a result,
by increasing the probability of detection from 90% to 99%, the rate of processing time
is also increasing. This is because the auditor must use more blocks of the file (on the
basis of the number of blocks in the challenge message) to verify the integrity of the
outsourced file. On the other hand, the length of signature and the processing time has the
inverse relationship due to decreasing the number of sectors for computing the signature.
Therefore, the minimum processing time of the verification phase is in 256 bit signature,
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Figure 6.35: The Comparison of the Probability of Detection and Signature Length with
Processing Time during the Verification Phase.
and the maximum cost is in 16 bits. Finally, the graph demonstrates that the processing
time is independent of the size of file.
To ensure that the size of file has not a significant effect on the processing time, an
experiment is conducted to check the integrity of large-scale file size (between 1GB –
10 GB). Figure 6.36 analyzes the impact of large-scale files on the processing time of
verification phase with 256 bit signature. It is easily perceived when the probability of
detection is 90%, 95%, and 99%, the processing time is in the range of 12.20 ms to 12.80
ms, 13 ms to 13.40 ms, and 15.80 ms to 16 ms respectively.
The effect of probability of detection on the processing time is also evaluated in
Figure 6.37 (When the confidence interval is 99%). The graph shows there is a direct
relation between the processing time and such probability in large-scale file size (as same
as the normal file). For instance, the processing time of 5 GB file fluctuates between
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Figure 6.36: The Impact of Large Scale Files on Processing Time during Verification
Phase When Signature Length is 256.
Figure 6.37: The Impact of Probability of Detection on Processing Time during Verifica-
tion Phase for Large Scale Files When Signature Length is 256.
12.40 ms and 15.80 ms on the basis of the rate of detection.
171
6.5 Performance Analysis of Communication Cost
As aforementioned in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter 4, the proposed data auditing scheme
consists of four phases: setup, challenge, response, and verification phase. There are
three types of communication costs in this scheme, such as (1) communication cost of
setup phase, (2) communication cost of challenge phase, and (3) communication cost
of response phase. In the rest of this section, the evaluation results of these costs are
analyzed.
6.5.1 Results of communication cost in setup phase
After dividing the input file into m blocks and computing the tag for each of them, the
data owner needs to outsource the data blocks and tags to the server. The communication
overhead of setup phase consists of the cost of transferring such blocks and tags, which
equal to summation of all blocks, tags, and corresponding auxiliary data into the cloud.
It is important to mention that such cost effects on the data owner only one time because
the data owner sends the data to the cloud only one time.
The communication cost of setup phase is evaluated for two types of files: normal
file size (from 10 MB to 50 MB) and large-scale files between 1GB and 10 GB. The
main goal of conducting this experiment is to show the effect of signature length on the
communication cost of such phase. However, to show the real overhead of the proposed
method, the size of the original file is excluded from communication cost of the setup
phase during this implementation.
Figure 6.38 shows the communication cost of outsourcing 10 MB file into the cloud
when the signature length is from 16 b to 256 b. When the signature length is 16 b, the
real cost of setup phase (by excluding the size of input file) is around 0.009766 MB. The
communication cost rises to 0.019531 MB by increasing the signature length to 32 b. The
maximum communication cost for uploading 10 MB file into the cloud is about 0.078125
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Figure 6.38: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 10 MB.
for 256 b signature.
The experiment is repeated for outsourcing different size of input files. For example,
when the size of input file is 20 MB (Figure 6.39), 30 MB (Figure 6.40), 40 MB (Figure
6.41), and 50 MB (Figure 6.42) for different length of signature.
Therefore, by analyzing these graphs it can be seen that the communication cost of
setup phase directly depends on the length of signature. In other words, by increasing the
size of signature, the more communication overheads are incurred on the client.
The comparison of communication cost for different size of files (from 10 MB to 50
MB) is illustrated in Figure 6.43. The minimum communication cost is approximately
about 0.00976563 MB when the signature length is 16 bits, and the size of file is 10
MB. As it is predictable, by increasing the size of file to 50 MB, the communication
cost is also increasing. On the other hand, the signature length directly impacts on the
communication cost. This is because by augmenting the signature length, the data owner
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Figure 6.39: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 20 MB.
Figure 6.40: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 30 MB.
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Figure 6.41: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 40 MB.
Figure 6.42: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 50 MB.
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Figure 6.43: The Comparison of Communication Cost in Setup Phase for Normal File.
compels to compute and send a bigger tag for each block to the server, which is the main
cause of such enhancement. The maximum communication cost belongs to a file with 50
MB size and 256 b signature length.
The effect of large-scale file on communication overhead is also checked during the
setup phase for the large scale file range from 1 GB to 10 GB file size. It should be noted
that we only consider the additional communication cost on the following figure to show
the effect of the proposed scheme on such cost.
Figure 6.44 shows the communication cost of transferring block tags and considering
auxiliary data into the cloud server during the setup phase. When the signature length
is 32 b, the additional communication cost is around 0.001953 GB. By increasing the
signature length to 256 b, the cost is also ascending to the maximum value (0.015625
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Figure 6.44: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 2 GB.
GB).
When the size of input file reaches 4 GB, a growing trend of communication cost can
be identified explicitly. The minimum cost of setup phase of 4 GB file is about 0.0039062
when the signature length is 16 b in Figure 6.45. This cost rises to 0.031250 for 256 b
signature length. Such procedure is repeated for different file size, such as 6 GB (Figure
6.46), 8 GB (Figure 6.47), and 10 FB (Figure 6.48) while the range of signature is from
16 b to 256 b.
Finally, the effect of large-scale files (1-10 GB) is evaluated on the communication
overhead during the setup phase by using Figure 6.49. It is easily understood that the
enhancement of the file size has a rising trend with the communication overhead in the
setup phase. In addition, the signature length and communication cost has a direct relation
so that minimum communication cost belongs to 16 b signature, and the maximum occurs
when the length of signature is 256 bits.
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Figure 6.45: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 4 GB.
Figure 6.46: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 6 GB.
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Figure 6.47: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 8 GB.
Figure 6.48: The communication Cost of Setup Phase When the File Size is 10 GB.
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Figure 6.49: The Comparison of Communication Cost in Setup Phase for Large Scale
Files.
6.5.2 Results of communication cost in Challenge phase
The communication cost of challenge phase indicates the amount of data that is
transferred to the server during the challenge phase. Since the challenge message only
includes a random set of indices of blocks, the communication cost of challenge phase is
independent from size of input file and length of signature. In other words, the amount of
such data only depends on the number of selected blocks during the challenge phase that
is called probability of detection.
Figure 6.50 displays the communication cost of challenge phase for normal and
large-scale files. It can be understood that the rate of communication cost in challenge
phase for 90% probability is around 0.9 KB. By increasing the probability of detection
to 95%, the communication cost reach 1.17 KB. Finally, the communication cost of chal-
180
Figure 6.50: The Comparison of Communication Cost in Challenge Phase for (a) Normal
File Size, (b) Large Scale Files.
lenge phase for 99%probability is about 1.80 KB.
6.5.3 Results of communication cost in Response phase
The communication cost of response phase indicates the amount of transferred data
from prover to the auditor in the response phase.
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Figure 6.51: The Communication Cost of Response When the Signature is from 16 b to
256 b for any File Size
Since for any number of data blocks as a challenge message the prover compels
to generate the fixed length of message as a response (consists of a linear combination
of the blocks (σ) and the aggregate authenticator tags (µ)), the communication cost of
response phase is independent of the probability of detection and the file size. The effect
of signature length on the communication cost of the response phase is illustrated on
Figure 6.51. It is easily perceived that by increasing the length of signature from 16 b to
256 b, the communication cost is increasing slightly from 4.003906 KB to 4.031250 KB.
Moreover, the communication cost of response phase is independent of the size of file.
Figure 6.52 shows a comparison of the communication cost during the response
phase for normal file size (a) and large-scale files (b). It can be seen that the commu-
nication cost of the large-scale files (1 GB-10 GB) has the same attitude as the rate of
communication cost for normal size (10 MB-50 MB). In other words, the communication
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Figure 6.52: The Comparison of Communication Cost in Response Phase for (a) Normal
File Size, (b) Large Scale Files
cost of the response phase is independent from the size of file.
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6.6 Performance Analysis of D&CT Divisions
The D&CT has an important role in the proposed method to support dynamic data
update effectively. As mentioned in section 4.3, to decrease the processing time of data
updating, the number of divisions of D&CT (k) have to be set on the basis of the number
of data blocks (m). In this section, two scenarios are defined to evaluate the effect of
division feature of D&CT on the processing time of data update on the auditor, as follows.
The first scenario clarifies the importance of division technique that is used in the
D&CT. To achieve this goal; we conduct the experiments for updating several outsourced
files (F) with length from 1 GB to 100 GB, including 125,000 to 1,125,000 data blocks.
The number of division are from 10 to 353 and the number of insert or delete operations is
1000. The position of the blocks that are selected randomly, keep constant for all numbers
of divisions.
Figure 6.53 illustrates that when the size of outsourced files or the number of data
blocks are increased; remarkable processing time is incurred on the auditor. For example,
when the number of divisions is 10, the computation time for updating 1000 blocks of a
file with size 1 GB is about 0.218 s. By increasing the file size to 100 GB, the overhead
rises to 10.811 s. The result also shows that the computation overhead falls down dra-
matically by increasing the number of divisions as such an overhead for updating 1000
blocks of a file with size 100 GB is only about 0.296. When the number of divisions reach
353, the processing time is in the range of 0.140 s to 0.296 s for 1 GB to 100 GB files.
Therefore, the proposed data structure has a significant role in decreasing the computation
overhead when the data owner needs to upload a huge file or update the outsourced file
frequently.
In the last scenario, the effect of the number of divisions on the number of update
blocks is checked in terms of processing time. The size of outsourced file is 1 GB, number
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Figure 6.53: The impact of number of divisions on computation time under different file
size from 1 GB to 100 GB
of update operations (insert or delete) is in the range of 100 to 3000, and the number of
divisions can be 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, and 353.
As aforementioned in section 4.3 of chapter 4, the optimal number of divisions (k)
is equal to
√
n where n indicates the number of blocks. Figure 6.54 illustrates the effect
of division on the incurred processing time on the auditor. It is easily perceived that by
increasing the number of divisions (k) and approaching to the optimum number (353),
the processing time on the auditor is decreasing. Moreover, when the numbers of updated
blocks are increasing, the considerable computation overhead is incurred on the auditor.
One of the best ways to reduce such a computation overhead is to use the optimum number
of divisions based on the file size. For example, when the number of divisions is k = 100,
the computation time of inserting 1000 blocks is around 0.218. Upon increasing the
number of divisions to 353, the computation times fall down to 0.140 s.
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Figure 6.54: The Impact of Number of Divisions on Processing Time under Different
Number of Update Blocks
The main reason of conducting the first part of experiment in section 6.4, Section
6.5, and section 6.6 is to identify the effect of input parameters, such as file size, length
of signature, probability of detection, and number of divisions on the computation and
communication cost of the DRDA method. As it is mentioned in the section 6.4.4 of
chapter 6 and section 3.2 of chapter 3, the processing time of the verification phase is the
most important cost of the remote data auditing schemes. It also shows that when the
length of signature is equal to 256 b, minimum computation overhead is incurred on the
auditor. The result of section 6.6 also shows that the number of divisions in the D&CT
data structure has a direct impact on the processing time of dynamic data update.
6.7 Summary of Findings and Discussions
This section provides a discussion about the implementation results of the proposed
scheme and compares them with state-of-the-art schemes to proof the efficiency of the
method.
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To check whether there are any significant differences between the means of exper-
imented methods, a statistical significance analysis is also conducted in this part. Since
the number of pair-wise comparison is more than two methods, it requires applying the
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) as a way to compare the results. However, the
one-way ANOVA is unable to show which two particular methods are significantly differ-
ent from each other; it only indicates that at least two methods were different. Therefore,
Games-Howell as a post-hoc test was leveraged to perform a multiple comparisons.
6.7.1 Analysis the effect of implementation parameters on performance
Processing time and communication cost are two important measures that are used
to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Table 6.1 shows the effect of im-
plementation parameters such as file size, signature length (Signature), and probability of
misbehavior detection (Detection) on the communication cost and processing time of the
DRDA method, as follows:
(i) Processing Time of setup phase: As illustrated in Figure 6.3, the processing time of
setup phase is related directly with the file size. It is because by increasing the size
of file, the data owner must compute tags for more data blocks. However, growing
the length of signature caused decreasing the processing time during such phase
because of declining the number of divisions to compute the tags (Figure 6.9). The
probability of detection parameter is unable to change the rate of the processing
time of setup phase.
(ii) Processing Time of challenge phase: There is a direct relationship between the pro-
cessing time of challenge phase and the probability of detection (Figure 6.13), due
to the effect of this parameter on the number of blocks in the challenge phase.
Moreover, augmenting the file size causes growth in the range of data blocks.
Therefore, the file size has a direct relation with the processing time of challenge
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phase. Finally, the length of signature is independent from the processing time of
this phase.
(iii) Processing Time of the response phase: There is a direct relation between process-
ing time and probability of detection in the response phase. This is because the
proof message that includes the linear combination of the blocks (σ) and the ag-
gregate authenticator tags (µ) is only computed on the basis of the challenge mes-
sage (that was generated by using the sampling technique in the challenge phase).
As a result, the size of file and signature length has not a significant effect on the
processing time of response phase (Figure 6.25).
(iv) Processing Time of the verification phase: The Length of signature has an inverse
relation with the processing time of the verification phase because increasing the
length of signature results in decreasing the processing time of generating the alge-
braic signature. On the other hand, increasing the number of blocks in the challenge
phase (probability of detection) directly affects the processing time (Figure 6.32).
Finally, the result shows that the size of the outsourced file has a negligible effect
on the processing time of verification phase.
(v) Communication cost of setup phase: The message of setup phase consists of the
data blocks, considering tags, and auxiliary data. Therefore, the amount of such
messages as a communication cost have a direct relation with size of blocks and
signature size that has effect on size of tag. However, the probability of detection
is an independent parameter in this phase (Figure 6.45).
(vi) Communication cost of challenge phase: During the challenge phase, a random of
data blocks and coefficients are generated on the basis of probability of detection.
Therefore, the communication cost of challenge phase depends on such probability
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when the auditor uses a sampling technique.
(vii) Communication cost of response phase: The response message includes an inte-
gration of challenged blocks and considering tags. Therefore, when the size of
data blocks is fixed, the size of file has no relation with the communication cost of
the response messages. The length of signature is the only factor that has a direct
relation with such cost (Figure 6.47).
Table 6.1: Reviewing on the Relationship between Various
Parameters of the Proposed Scheme
Cost Phase File Size Signature Detection
Computation
Setup △ ▽ ⊲⊳
Challenge △ ⊲⊳ △
Response ⊲⊳ ⊲⊳ △
Verification ⊲⊳ ▽ △
Communication
Setup △ △ ⊲⊳
Challenge ⊲⊳ ⊲⊳ △
Response ⊲⊳ △ ⊲⊳
Independent: ⊲⊳ Direct: △ Inverse △
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6.7.2 Comparison of processing time of data integrity with the traditional RDA
methods
This section validates the proposed scheme by comparing the processing time of
DRDA method with the processing time of the traditional RDA methods in the same
situation. To perform the comparison, several parameters need to be defined in Table 6.2,
such as size of file, probability of detection, corruption rate, and signature length.
Table 6.2: The Comparison parameters
Parameters Value
File Size 10 MB - 50 MB
Probability of Detection 90% - 99%
Number of Challenges 230 - 460
Block Size 8 KB
Corruption rate 0.01%
Signature Length 256 b
Figure 6.55 shows the comparison between the traditional RDA methods (PDP, and
Public PDP) and the proposed method (DRDA) on the basis of the processing time of
data integrity when the probability of detection is 90% and 99% respectively. It examined
that the processing time of PDP method is around 250 millisecond and 400 millisecond
for 90% and 99% probability. The processing time of public PDP method increased to
282 millisecond and 805 millisecond approximately for different rate of probability. The
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graphs demonstrate that the processing time of DRDA method is much better than PDP
and public PDP methods, which is about 12 millisecond and 14 millisecond when the
probability of detection is 90% and 99%. It is because of applying the algebraic signature
and the D&CT structure.
6.7.3 Comparison of processing time during dynamic data update
This section analyzes the comparison of processing time of dynamic data update
for different number of update operations. The usefulness of the proposed method is
evaluated in terms of dynamic data update when the size of file is large-scale (1 GB –
10 GB). The probability of detection is 99%, size of data block is 8 KB, the number of
divisions is 350, and the length of signature is 256.
Figure 6.56 shows the comparison of the processing time of dynamic data update
in the DRDA and public PDP method for large-scale files when the number of update
operations is 2. It is examined that processing time of dynamic data update reduces
significantly in the DRDA method due to applying D&CT data structure. Experimental
result indicates that the processing time of dynamic data update in public PDP is around
1.65 second, while the processing time of the proposed method reduces to 0.03 second.
Figure 6.57 shows the comparison of processing time of dynamic data update in
the DRDA and public PDP method when the number of update operations is 4. The
experimental result demonstrates that processing time of dynamic update is around 3.31
second when the large-scale outsourced file is updated 4 times. The processing time of
the DRDA method significantly reduces to 0.06 second due to the structure of the D&CT.
The comparison of processing time of dynamic update in DRDA and public PDP
method when the number of update is 6 is illustrated in Figure 6.58. It is examined
that processing time of dynamic update in the proposed method decreases significantly.
For instance, the processing time of public PDP is approximately 4.96 second while the
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Figure 6.55: The Comparison of the Processing Time between the Traditional RDA
method and the Proposed Method for (a) 90% Probability of Detection, and (b) 99%
Probability of Detection
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Figure 6.56: Comparison of processing time of Data Update when the number of updates
is 2
Figure 6.57: Comparison of processing time of Data Update when the number of updates
is 4
193
Figure 6.58: Comparison of processing time of Data Update when the number of updates
is 6
processing time of the DRDA method is around 0.1 second.
The processing time of dynamic update operations in the DRDA method is compared
by processing time of public PDP in Figure 6.59 when the number of update is 8. It can
be seen that the proposed method significantly decreases the processing time of dynamic
update for large-scale file.
Figure 6.60 shows the comparison of processing time of dynamic update in the
DRDA and public PDP method when the number of update is 10. The experimental
result indicates that the processing time of dynamic update in public PDP is around 8.26
second while the processing time of the DRDA method is about 0.18 second.
Figure 6.61 compares the processing time of dynamic data update operations in the
DRDA and public PDP methods when the number of update is in the range of 2 to 10. The
experimental result indicates that the processing time of the DRDA method is better than
the processing time of public PDP method. It can be seen that by increasing the number
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Figure 6.59: Comparison of processing time of Data Update when the number of updates
is 8
Figure 6.60: Comparison of processing time of Data Update when the number of updates
is 10
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Figure 6.61: Comparison of processing time of Data Update for different number of
updates
of update operation the processing time of public PDP method increases significantly. For
example, the processing time of public PDP increases from 1.61 second to 8.26 second.
The rate of processing time of update operations in the DRDA method is from 0.03 to
0.18 for different number of update operations.
6.7.4 Comparison of processing time of frequent data update
In this section, the effectiveness of the proposed data structure (D&CT) to support
frequent dynamic data update operations is evaluated on the basis of the amount of the
processing time of node re-balancing. To achieve this goal, different scenarios were de-
signed and the result of each scenario was compared with the state-of-the-art methods to
validate the proposed method.
In the first scenario, the experiments was conducted for 100 – 1000 times updating
an outsourced file with length 1 GB, including 125,000 data blocks. The main reason to
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perform such an experience is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method
for frequent data update. The update operation consists of inserting or deleting a data
block randomly (Ateniese et al., 2011; L. Chen, Zhou, Huang, & Xu, 2013; Erway et al.,
2009; Q. A. Wang et al., 2011).
The first method that contributes in this scenario is Public PDP (Q. A. Wang et al.,
2011; C. Wang, Wang, et al., 2012)(Wang et al., 2011) that used the MHT for supporting
dynamic data update. As explained in section 2.4.1.2, the Wang scheme is one of the best
and well-known data auditing methods in terms of dynamic data update operation. To
insert or delete a block in such scheme, the auditor needs to find the position of the block
(i) in the MHT tree. Moreover, inserting or deleting a block requires re-calculating the
hash of the new leaf and existing nodes in the path to the root of the tree each time that
incurs the huge computation overhead on the auditor. The next method in this scenario is
EPP-PDP method (Yang & Jia, 2013), which supports dynamic data update using an index
table to support dynamic data update operations. Similarly, after finding the position of
the block (i) in the EPP-PDP method, the auditor prerequisites to shift the remaining
(n− i) blocks for every insert or delete operation. Subsequently, repeating this process
multiple times results in a significant computation overhead on the auditor.
As aforementioned in section 4.3 of chapter 4, the optimal number of division in the
proposed method is equal to
√
n, where n is the number of blocks. As a result, the number
of division must be 353 approximately. Therefore, the experiment of the proposed scheme
is performed when 353 D&CTs with size 355 are used for dynamic updates. By using
the D&CT data structure, the number of shifts reduced in DRDA method resulting in the
minimum computation overhead on the client side.
Figure 6.62 shows the performance in terms of processing time under the different
number of update (insert or delete) operations. it can be understood that the D&CT is
able to reduce the processing time of data update.
197
Figure 6.62: The Comparison of Processing Time of Node Re-balancing during Different
Number of Update Operations
The ANOVA test was also used to ensure the validity of the data and comparisons.
Firstly, the normality of data is checked on the basis of Shapiro-Wilk test (P < 0.05). The
results confirm that all data were normal (Significant of public PDP method: 0.936, sig-
nificant of EPP PDP method: 0.879, and significant of the proposed method: 0.578394).
The ANOVA analysis also approved a significant difference between the proposed scheme
and the other methods. Table 6.3 shows the validity of the comparison of the processing
time for different number of update operations using Post Hoc tests.
The second scenario demonstrated the effect of the data update on the different
large-scale files (with sizes from 1 GB to 10 GB) in which the data owner updates the
outsourced file 10 times and 100 times (Figure 6.63).
Figure 6.63-a shows when the number of updates are 10, the computation overhead
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Table 6.3: Validity of the Comparison of Processing Time for Different Number of Update
Operations using Post Hoc tests
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Processing Time
Games-Howell
(I) Methods (J) Methods Mean Difference (I-J) Sig.
Public PDP EPP PDP 0.12036 0.757DRDA .6452625* 0.001
EPP PDP Public PDP -0.1204 0.757DRDA .5249000* 0.003
DRDA Public PDP -.6452625* 0.001EPP PDP -.5249000* 0.003
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
of the public PDP method (Wang et al., 2011) is increasing from 0.0920 second to ap-
proximately 0.4177 second by increasing the size of file. By increasing the number of
updates to 100, the processing time of node re-balancing in the public PDP method raised
more (from 0.9143 to 4.1273). This is because the auditor encounters a huge number of
data block in the MHT. Similarly, in the EPP-PDP method, when the size of input file is
enhancing from 1 GB to 10 GB with the same size of data block (8 kB), the number of
data blocks are also increasing. Consequently, the auditor requires shifting huge numbers
of blocks to insert or delete a data block. For example, the processing time for updating
10 blocks is from 0.0310 second to 0.2757 second.
As it is shown in Figure 6.63-b, the DRDA method incurs the minimum overhead on
the auditor (maximum 0. 0015 second when the number of updates are 10, and 0.1250
second for performing update operations 100 times). The main reason for decreasing
the processing time of node re-balancing in the DRDA method is using the structure of
D&CTs in the proposed data auditing method (number of divisions = 353). Therefore,
the DRDA method can be applicable for auditing large scale files dynamically.
To ensure the normality of data for each method as a preliminary assumption for
ANOVA, the Shapiro-Wilk test (P < 0.05) carried out and the result confirms the nor-
mality of data. The conducted ANOVA analysis shows that the proposed scheme has a
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Figure 6.63: The Effect of Large-Scale Files on Processing Time of Node Re-balancing
during Dynamic Update Operation When (a) Number of Updates = 10, (b) Number of
Updates = 100
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significant difference (p = 0.05,Sig = 0.01) with EPP PDP and public PDP schemes.
Table 6.4 shows the validity of the comparison using Post Hoc tests.
Table 6.4: Validity of the Comparison of Processing Time for Large Scale files using Post
Hoc tests
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable: Processing Time
Games-Howell
(I) Methods (J) Methods Mean Difference (I-J) Sig.
Public PDP EPP PDP 0.0948 0.819DRDA .65125* 0.001
EPP PDP Public PDP -0.0948 0.819DRDA .55645* 0.001
DRDA Public PDP -.65125* 0.001EPP PDP -.55645* 0.001
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
6.7.5 Comparison of Complexity of Communication Cost and Processing Time
Table 6.5 shows a comparison of our scheme and state-of-the-art remote data au-
diting protocols based on the communication and the computation overhead through dy-
namic data update, where m is the number of blocks, n is the number of sectors of a
block; c indicates the number of challenge blocks in each auditing query, and k indicates
the number of the D&CTs (Sookhak, Akhunzada, Gani, Khurram Khan, & Anuar, 2014).
In this table, the processing time consists of: computation audit, computation modify,
computation insert, computation delete, and computation append. As mentioned earlier
in section 5.2.3 of chapter 5, the processing time of the response phase is incurred on
the server, and the processing time of the verification phase is incurred on the auditor.
Moreover, the incurred processing time on the auditor during modify, insert, delete, and
append operation are called computation modify, computation insert, computation delete,
and computation append respectively.
From the table, it can be found that the public PDP method (Q. A. Wang et al., 2011;
C. Wang, Wang, et al., 2012)) has the maximum computation overhead during dynamic
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data update. It is because this method uses the MHT data structure to check the integrity
or perform update operations on the outsource data blocks.
Although modifying and appending a block in the EPP PDP scheme (Yang & Jia,
2013) is efficient (O(c)), to insert a block after i or delete a specific block ( f [i]), the veri-
fier must shifts (m− i) entities in the data structure. As a result, the computation overhead
of such method during insert and delete operations is O(m) (Sookhak, Akhunzada, et al.,
2014).
This study carried out to address this issue and improve the auditing scheme by
designing a new data structure (D&CT) for reducing the computation overhead. As men-
tioned earlier in section 4.2, the verifier only needs to shift (mk − i) blocks that incurs
O(mk ) computation overhead on the verifier. It is important to mention that to find a block
( f [i]) in D&CT structure, the verifier only needs to divide the location of block to k and
find the appropriate D&CT that incurs negligible overhead on the verifier.
The first step to perform insert, delete, append, and modify operations is to identify
that the ith block of data block is stored in which D&CTs. The auditor is able to find the
ith data block by computing the quotient of a division of the requested block index (i) by
the number of data block in each D&CT structure (k). Such quotient shows the D&CT
number and the remaining of the division shows the position of block in the found D&CT.
To insert a new data block after jthdata block or delete the jth data block, the auditor has
to find the considered D&CT and the position of the block in it (i), and then moves
forward or backward the remain blocks of the D&CT (mk − i).Since each D&CT contains
(mk ) blocks, performing insert and delete operations incur O(
m
k ) computation overhead
on the auditor. The modification operation incurs O(C) as a computation overhead on
the auditor. It is because the auditor only requires finding the position of ith data block
in the D&CTs and modifying the content. Finally, to perform append operation, the
auditor must inset a new data block after the last data block of the last D&CT which
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Table 6.5: The comparison of different remote data auditing schemes
Methods Comm.Cost
Processing Time
Verify Modify Insert Delete AppendServer Client
Public
PDP
O(c logm) O(c logm) O(c logm) O(c logm) O(c logm) O(c logm) O(c logm)
EPP
PDP
O(c) O(cn) O(c) O(c) O(m) O(m) O(c)
DRDA O(c) O(cn) O(c) O(c) O(mk ) O(
m
k ) O(c)
impose O(C) as a processing time. Furthermore, for auditing the outsourced blocks, the
auditor needs to send a challenge message including indices of some blocks or receiving a
response message including integration of requested blocks and tags, which incur constant
communication cost on the auditor.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents the experimental result of the proposed remote data auditing
method to prove the efficiency of the DRDA method on the basis of the processing time
and communication cost.
The experiment was conducted based on the significant criteria, such as: size of
file, size of signature, and probability of detection. The processing time tested during
four different phases of the proposed scheme: setup, challenge, response, and verification
phases. However, since the data owner only requires to perform the setup phase one time,
the computation overhead for setup phase was negligible. The communication cost of
the method is also examined during three phases: setup, challenge, and response phases.
The main goals of the implementation are: (1) to identify the effect of size of file, size of
signature, and probability of detection on the computation and communication overhead
of the proposed scheme, (2) to find the effective criteria for the proposed scheme that
incur minimum overhead on the auditor.
Finally, to validate the implementation of the results, we compared the DRDA scheme
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with the state-of-the-art methods on the basis of the processing time and the commu-
nication cost. We also validated the results by using the one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) analysis to study whether there are any significant differences between the
means of experimented methods or not. The next chapter of this study concludes the
research, makes an overview of the objectives and how to fulfill them, and presents the
scope, limitation, and some open issues for further investigations.
204
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
This chapter concludes the research on proposing a dynamic remote data auditing
scheme for securing big data storage in cloud computing. For this reason, the research
objectives are re-evaluated and the accomplishments of this study are put forward. More-
over, the contributions of the research are summarized and the limitations and scope of
this work are discussed. Finally, some future research directions of this research are pre-
sented.
The complete organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 provides an
overview of the results and finding of this study to show how the research objectives are
fulfilled. The contributions of this research are highlighted in section 7.3. In section 7.4,
the scope and limitations are discussed. Section 7.5 presents some outstanding issues as
a future work.
7.2 Research Summary and Objectives Achievement
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the problem of additional pro-
cessing time in the existing data auditing methods and develop a remote data auditing
method that can be used to check the integrity of the outsourced data in cloud computing.
This scheme has the capability to securely support dynamic data update operations on the
block level, such as insert, delete, modify, and append operations. As mentioned earlier
in section 1.4, this research has four objectives that are achieved as follows:
To identify the gaps and outstanding issues in the area of data storage integrity of
cloud computing, the literature review was performed as a first objective of this research.
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We selected more than 300 papers from the most important web-based databases and on-
line digital libraries such as IEEE, ACM, Elsevier, Springer, Wiley, and ISI Web of Sci-
ence. These papers were within the domain of cloud computing, mobile cloud computing,
security and privacy in cloud and mobile cloud computing, modern cryptographic proto-
cols (including Homomorphic mechanism, algebraic signature) with in 7 years (2007 –
2014). We proposed a thematic taxonomy on the basis of the state-of-the-art data audit-
ing methods to meet the requirements of the literature review objective. The remote data
auditing schemes are classified into three main groups in the thematic taxonomy (section
2.3.2). We also used qualitative analysis to compare the existing methods and highlight
the advantages and disadvantages of them (section 2.5). Finally, the open issues and chal-
lenges of data auditing schemes in cloud and mobile cloud computing environment that
have not been addressed yet were identified and highlighted (section 2.6).
The quantitative analysis based on computation overhead and communication over-
head as two important measures for auditing methods was utilized to establish and justify
the research problem. The existing data auditing approaches were implemented in the
real cloud computing environment, and the benchmark test was used to evaluate such
methods based on the computation and communication cost on the client and server side
(section 3.2). Moreover, the impact of dynamic data update operations was analyzed on
the existing data approaches in the real environment (section 3.3). We also studied the
effect of dynamic data update operations on the large-scale file size (section 3.4). Finally,
the impact of frequent data updates was evaluated for different size of the files (section
3.5).
A new remote data auditing method was proposed on the basis of algebraic signa-
ture technique to fulfill the objective of efficient solution for checking the integrity of
the outsourced data in cloud computing. The proposed scheme addresses the problem of
additional computation and communication cost for cloud data storage system. We also
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designed a new data structure to support dynamic data update with minimum computation
and communication cost on the auditor. In other words, by using the D&CT data struc-
ture, the data owner has the capability to modify, delete, insert, or append in block level
without requiring to download the whole file. The D&CT data structure also empowers
our method to be applicable for large-scale data with least processing time on the client.
The proposed data auditing scheme is implemented in the real environment by using
java and C++ language to address the objective of evaluating DRDA method. The perfor-
mance of the DRDA scheme was validated by using the benchmark test in the emulation
environment.
We analyzed the DRDA scheme by using distinctive parameters such as length of
signature, file size, and probability of detection. The different scenarios also defined to
evaluate the proposed method. Furthermore, we analyzed the strength of the security on
the basis of mathematic to validate and proof the security of the DRDA method (section
6.2 and section 6.3). The comparison of the results with the sate-of-the-art remote data
auditing method validated the efficiency of the proposed method in terms of computation
and communication cost (section 6.6). The results showed that the D&CT data structure
reduces the processing time of dynamic data update operations by decreasing the number
of shifting. The results also demonstrated that the D&CT data structure dramatically
decrease the processing time of dynamic data update for large-scale outsourced file in
cloud computing.
7.3 Contribution of the Research
After focusing on the existing data auditing methods, the problems were identified:
(1) additional computation overhead through checking the integrity of outsourced data,
(2) additional communication and computation overhead through dynamic data update
operations for normal file size and large-scale file size, and (3) additional computation
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overhead through frequent data update (chapter 3). Accordingly, the contributions of this
research are summarized as follows:
Thematic Taxonomy: The first contribution of this study is to design a thematic tax-
onomy for data auditing schemes in cloud computing environment. We analyzed
and classified the current RDA approaches into three different categories on the
basis of the data redundancy feature, namely: integrity-based, recovery-based, and
deduplication-based approaches. We aimed to investigate the similarities and differ-
ences of such schemes based on the thematic taxonomy to diagnose the significant
and outstanding issues for further investigation.
Effective Static Remote Data Auditing (SRDA) Method: The next contribution of this
research is to propose an effective remote data auditing method for preserving the
integrity of static data in the cloud computing. The main idea behind of this scheme
is to utilize the algebraic properties of the outsourced data blocks to remotely check
the integrity of files. The experimental results showed that the proposed scheme in-
curs minimum computation and communication cost on the auditor. Since the size
of outsourced file has negligible computation overhead on the auditor, the SDRA
method has the capability to be applied for different size of file.
Divide and Conquer Table (D&CT): Although the SRDA method is able to check the
integrity of the outsourced data in the cloud storage system, modifying a single
block can incur significant processing time on the auditor. For example, to insert a
new block after b[i], the data owner must download n− i block, modify the tag of
them, insert the new block and upload the n+1− i block to the cloud storage. It is
clear that performing such process imposes high computation and communication
overhead on the client and server. In addition, such modification allows the attacker
to perform the replay attack by passing the verification phase using an old version
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of the file. We design a new data structure, namely D&CT to address this problem
and support dynamic data update operation efficiently.
Efficient Dynamic Remote Data Auditing (DRDA) Method: To support dynamic data up-
date, the SRDA scheme was modified on the basis of the D&CT in which the data
owner has the capability to update the outsourced data in the block level. In other
words, performing an update operation on a single block is independent of the
other blocks to reduce the computation and communication overhead on the client
and server side. As a result, the data owner only needs to download the request data
block and upload it after accomplishing the update operation.
Updating large-Scale-file size: One of the main advantages of the DRDA method is to
support dynamic data update for large-scale file size with minimum processing time
on the data owner. For example, inserting a data block in the large-scale file (100
GB file with 26214400 blocks) requires shifting a large number of data blocks,
which incur high processing time on the auditor. The D&CT is designed in such a
way that a small part of data blocks, including the requested block must be shifted
to reduce the computation overhead.
Frequently data update: The DRDA scheme allows the data owner to modify a small
part of file frequently with minimum processing time. Therefore, this method is
applicable for social network systems in which the users are able to frequently
modify a part of file.
In the rest of this section, some research papers are outlined:
Accepted Articles:
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Samee U. Khan, Rajkumar Buyya, Albert Y.
Zomaya, “Remote Data Auditing in Cloud Computing Environment,” ACM Com-
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puting Surveys, Accepted (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 4.1, ERA Ranking A*)
• Mehdi Sookhak, Hamid Talebian, Ejaz Ahmed, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khur-
ram Khan, “A review on remote data auditing in single cloud server: Taxonomy and
open issues”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Volume 43, August
2014, Pages 121-141, ISSN 1084-8045, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2014.04.011
(ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A). In the list of top most
downloaded paper in journal of Network and Computer Applications.
• Mehdi Sookhak, Adnan Akhunzada, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan,
Nor Badrul Anuar “ Towards Dynamic Remote Data Auditing in Computational
Clouds,” Scientific World Journal, Accepted 8 May 2014,(ISI Indexed Q1, Impact
Factor 1.730).
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, “ Geographic Worm-
hole Detection in Wireless Sensor Network,” Plos One, Accepted (ISI Indexed Q1,
Impact Factor 3.7, ERA Ranking A)
• Muhammad Shiraz, Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Syed Adeel Ali Shah, “A
Study on the Critical Analysis of Computational Offloading Frameworks for Mo-
bile Cloud Computing”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Volume
47, January 2015, Pages 47-60, ISSN 1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor
1.772, ERA Ranking A).
• Adnan Akhunzada, Mehdi Sookhak, Nor Badrul Anuar, Abdullah Gani, Steven
Furnell, Amir Hayat, Muhammad Khurram Khan, “Man-At-The-End attacks: Anal-
ysis, taxonomy, human aspects, motivation and future directions”, Journal of Net-
work and Computer Applications, Volume 48, February 2015, Pages 44-57, ISSN
1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A).
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• Md Whaiduzzaman, Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Rajkumar Buyya, “A survey
on vehicular cloud computing”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
Volume 40, April 2014, Pages 325-344, ISSN 1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact
Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A). Second place in the list of top most downloaded
paper in journal of Network and Computer Applications with 54 citations.
• Ejaz Ahmed, Abdullah Gani, Mehdi Sookhak, Siti Hafizah, Feng Zia “Applica-
tion Optimization in Mobile Cloud Computing: Motivation, Taxonomies, and open
challenges”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, In press (ISI Indexed
Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A).
Under Review Articles:
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, Rajkumar Buyya,
“Performance Analysis of Dynamic Remote Data Auditing for Cloud Computing,”
Information Sciences Journal, Under Review (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 3.89,
ERA Ranking A)
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Yang Xiang, Cong Wang, Muhammad Khurram
Khan, Rajkumar Buyya, “ Dynamic Remote Data Auditing for Securing Data Stor-
age in Cloud Computing,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, Under Re-
view (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.985, ERA Ranking A*)
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, Rajkumar Buyya, “
Attribute-Based Data Access Control in Cloud Computing Taxonomy and Open
Issues,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing Journal, Under Review (ISI Indexed Q2,
Impact Factor 1.66, ERA Ranking A)
• Mohammad Reza Jabbarpour, Mehdi Sookhak, Rafidah Md Noor , Abdullah Gani,
Chi Harold Liu, Kin K. Leung, “A Survey on Cloud-enabled Vehicular Networks:
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Architectures, Applications and Open Issues”, IEEE Communication Survey and
Tutorials, Under Review, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 6.49, ERA Ranking A*).
7.4 Research Scope and Limitations
The scope of this study is restricted to two main parts: (1) analyzing the problem
of existing data storage integrity methods for the cloud storage, and (2) proposing a new
remote data auditing method with minimum computation overhead. The limitation of this
study also listed as follows:
• This research only focuses on single provable data possession (PDP) methods wherein
a singular copy of the file is outsourced in the cloud storage. Therefore, the dis-
tributed auditing methods are not considered in this research.
• The proposed scheme can be used for checking the integrity of two types of file size
such as normal size (10 MB – 50 MB) and large-scale size (1 GB – 10 GB), which
are extracted from the existing literature. For example, the maximum file size for
storing documents in Google Drive is 10 MB to 50 MB (Google Docs, Sheets, and
Slides size limits, 2015), Box is 2 GB to 5 GB (What’s the maximum file size I can
upload?, 2014), and OneDrive is 2 GB to 10 GB (Perez, 2014).
7.5 Future Works
The RDA methods are applicable for the single and distributed servers (B. Chen et
al., 2010). In the single server that only a copy of the file is outsourced, such algorithms
are only responsible to prevent unauthorized parties from altering the outsourced data. In
other words, the auditor must check the data integrity through a RDA algorithm to detect
data corruption (Ateniese et al., 2011; B. Chen & Curtmola, 2012; Cash et al., 2012;
Erway et al., 2009). However, when data corruption is detected, the majority of the single
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server RDA techniques do not have the necessary capabilities to recover data (Sookhak et
al., 2015).
Currently, individuals and organizations prefer to store data on distributed servers,
because the single server setting does not support data recovery when data corruption is
detected. For instance, in deep archival applications that use peer-to-peer storage systems
(Maniatis, Roussopoulos, Giuli, Rosenthal, & Baker, 2005), the third party is responsible
for managing the data. Therefore, data owners need RDA to verify the integrity and
correctness of the large archival data sets, which makes the single server auditing methods
prohibitive. This is because most of the aforementioned RDA approaches are inapplicable
to such systems, or incur huge computation and communication overhead on the client
and server (Sookhak et al., 2015). Consequently, the RDA technique is complemented
with data storage redundancy on multiple servers because the data owner is able to restore
the corrupted data by using the remaining healthy servers (Sookhak et al., 2015; B. Chen
et al., 2010).
This study is focused on proposing a single remote data auditing method with mini-
mum processing time and communication overhead. However, the proposed scheme lacks
in considering distributed systems issues. Hence, the future work includes improving the
DRDA method to be applicable for auditing the integrity of large archival files in the
distributed storage system.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
Accepted Articles:
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Samee U. Khan, Rajkumar Buyya, Albert Y.
Zomaya, “Remote Data Auditing in Cloud Computing Environment,” ACM Com-
puting Surveys, Accepted (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 4.043, 5-years Impact
Factor 7.443, ERA Ranking A*). ACM Computing Surveys is the best ISI journal
in Computer Science, Theory & Method category.
• Mehdi Sookhak, Hamid Talebian, Ejaz Ahmed, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khur-
ram Khan, “A review on remote data auditing in single cloud server: Taxonomy
and open issues”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Volume 43, Au-
gust 2014, Pages 121-141, ISSN 1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.772,
ERA Ranking A). In the list of top most downloaded paper in journal of Network
and Computer Applications.
• Mehdi Sookhak, Adnan Akhunzada, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan,
Nor Badrul Anuar “ Towards Dynamic Remote Data Auditing in Computational
Clouds,” Scientific World Journal, Accepted 8 May 2014,(ISI Indexed Q1, Impact
Factor 1.730).
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, “ Geographic Worm-
hole Detection in Wireless Sensor Network,” Plos One, Accepted (ISI Indexed Q1,
Impact Factor 3.7, ERA Ranking A)
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Under Review Articles:
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Yang Xiang, Cong Wang, Muhammad Khurram
Khan, Rajkumar Buyya, “ Dynamic Remote Data Auditing for Securing Data Stor-
age in Cloud Computing,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, Under Re-
view (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.985, ERA Ranking A*)
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, Rajkumar Buyya,
“Performance Analysis of Dynamic Remote Data Auditing for Cloud Computing,”
Information Sciences Journal, Under Review (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 3.89,
ERA Ranking A)
• Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan, Rajkumar Buyya,
“ Attribute-Based Data Access Control in Cloud Computing Taxonomy and Open
Issues,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing Journal, Under Review (ISI Indexed Q2,
Impact Factor 1.66, ERA Ranking A)
Collaborative Articles:
• Muhammad Shiraz, Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Syed Adeel Ali Shah, “A
Study on the Critical Analysis of Computational Offloading Frameworks for Mo-
bile Cloud Computing”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, Volume
47, January 2015, Pages 47-60, ISSN 1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor
1.772, ERA Ranking A).
• Adnan Akhunzada, Mehdi Sookhak, Nor Badrul Anuar, Abdullah Gani, Steven
Furnell, Amir Hayat, Muhammad Khurram Khan, “Man-At-The-End attacks: Anal-
ysis, taxonomy, human aspects, motivation and future directions”, Journal of Net-
work and Computer Applications, Volume 48, February 2015, Pages 44-57, ISSN
1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A).
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• Md Whaiduzzaman, Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Rajkumar Buyya, “A survey
on vehicular cloud computing”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
Volume 40, April 2014, Pages 325-344, ISSN 1084-8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact
Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A). Second place in the list of top most downloaded
paper in journal of Network and Computer Applications with 50 citations.
• Ejaz Ahmed, Abdullah Gani, Mehdi Sookhak, Siti Hafizah, Feng Zia “Applica-
tion Optimization in Mobile Cloud Computing: Motivation, Taxonomies, and open
challenges”, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, In press (ISI Indexed
Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A).
• Mohammad Reza Jabbarpour, Mehdi Sookhak, Rafidah Md Noor , Abdullah Gani,
Chi Harold Liu, Kin K. Leung, “A Survey on Cloud-enabled Vehicular Networks:
Architectures, Applications and Open Issues”, IEEE Communication Survey and
Tutorials, Under Review, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 6.49, ERA Ranking A*).
• Abdullah Gani, Golam Mokatder Nayeem, Muhammad Shiraz, Mehdi Sookhak,
Md Whaiduzzaman, Suleman Khan, A review on interworking and mobility tech-
niques for seamless connectivity in mobile cloud computing, Journal of Network
and Computer Applications, Volume 43, August 2014, Pages 84-102, ISSN 1084-
8045, (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact Factor 1.772, ERA Ranking A).
• Abdullah Yousafzai, Mehdi Sookhak, Abdullah Gani, Muhammad Khurram Khan,
“ Cloud Resource Allocation Techniques: Review, Taxonomy, and Open Issues,”
Knowledge and Information Systems Journal, Revision (ISI Indexed Q1, Impact
Factor 2.67, ERA Ranking A)
• Mohammadreza Eslaminejad, Abd Razak Shukor, Mehdi Sookhak,“ Classification
of energy-efficient routing protocols for wireless sensor networks,” Ad hoc Sensor
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Wireless Network, Volume 17, August 2013, Pages 103-129, ISSN 1551-9899, (ISI
Indexed Q4, Impact Factor 0.478)
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